Thomas G. Dietterich

Thomas G. Dietterich

x.com/tdietterich

Oregon State machine learning professor emeritus who works on safe and robust AI and argues that AI agents need continual human oversight.

AIは世界をどのように変えるでしょうか?

文明規模の変化漸進的な変化DoomBloom
シミュレーション上の位置解釈範囲

横軸:彼が表明したDoom–Bloomの見通し。 縦軸:変革の規模。

Doom–Bloom:100点中63。変革の規模:100点中57。解釈範囲:横方向は50から75、縦方向は50から75。これらは解釈上の座標であり、事象の確率ではありません。

Thomas G. DietterichのP(doom) · 推定

≈9%

0%100%

本人が示した数値ではなく、シミュレーションされた本人の回答から推定したものです。 妥当と考えられる範囲:5–16%。

彼の見通しを左右するもの

中心的な前提

It is maintained by monitoring and controlling the whole human-machine system, with adversarial testing and rapid detection and recovery when failures occur.
回答1

この前提が実際には異なると判明した場合、彼の見通しはどう変わりますか?

考えを変え得るもの

The biggest change would be a convincing demonstration that a system can learn general rules and reliably apply them far beyond its training distribution—not merely interpolate, imitate, or pass a benchmark.
回答4

どのような証拠なら十分で、それによって彼の見解はどちらの方向に変わりますか?

詳細

予想される恩恵

大きな恩恵が予想されていますが、重要な条件や分配上の制約があります。

67 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は67から67です。

予想される害

深刻または広範な害が、予想される将来の実質的な一部となっています。

58 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は33から67です。

人間の影響力

人間の選択には意味のある影響力がありますが、大幅に制約されています。

54 / 100

影響力が小さい影響力が大きい

質的尺度での解釈範囲は44から81です。

開発ペース

より高性能なAIの開発を停止するか、大幅に減速させます。

シミュレーション上の位置:明示された安全対策の下で開発を継続します。

より高性能なAIの開発を加速させます。

AI利用のルール

事前の保護措置または許可が整うまで、取り上げられたAIの利用を制限します。

シミュレーション上の位置:対象を絞った説明責任と保護措置を伴う形で、取り上げられたAIの利用を認めます。

取り上げられたAIの利用に対する制限を最小限にします。

これらの解釈では、彼が示した条件が維持されています。恩恵と害は、どちらも大きくなり得ます。この範囲は、統計的な信頼区間ではなく、彼のシミュレーションされた回答をどのように読み取ったかを示すものです。

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シミュレーション評価

質問1

AIは私たちの未来にとって何を意味すると思いますか?また、なぜそう思いますか?

I expect AI to be useful and consequential, but not because we have created some mystical “AGI.” Arguing over AGI and superintelligence is mostly a waste of time. The practical question is what particular systems can do, where they fail, and whether we can build reliable, controllable systems around them. Today’s systems are impressive statistical learners, but they remain unreliable. They can state a rule and then violate it, invent citations, or fail when a problem extends beyond patterns in their training data. Machine learning means always having to say you’re sorry. That does not make it useless; it means we must engineer for inevitable mistakes. Safety is not a permanent property trained into a model. It is maintained by monitoring and controlling the whole human-machine system, with adversarial testing and rapid detection and recovery when failures occur. The benefits could be substantial, especially where machines complement rather than imitate us: formal proofs, software testing, scientific-literature integration, drug and materials discovery, weather forecasting, ecosystem management, and complex simulations. But direct-action agents are probabilistic execution engines, so using them in weapons or other high-stakes settings without quantified uncertainty and hard constraints is reckless. I think AI-caused extinction is unlikely. Mass-casualty misuse is another matter: an AI-assisted pathogen release, for example, could kill millions. Present harms also deserve attention, particularly emotional dependence on chatbots and the erosion of creative or intellectual work. So my future is neither utopia nor apocalypse. It is a long engineering struggle to obtain real benefits from powerful but fallible machinery.

質問2

Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?

A lot, but “completely” is too vague to be useful. AI will become embedded in science, engineering, organizations, education, and everyday tools, much as computation already has. It could substantially accelerate drug and materials discovery, simulation, formal verification, and environmental management. But widespread use is not the same as autonomous mastery. These systems will continue to make mistakes, and real deployments will depend on people, institutions, monitoring, and other software to compensate. So I expect deep, broad change—not a magical discontinuity in which machines replace every human capability or take control of everything.

質問3

What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.

I have not assigned it a numerical probability. My qualitative judgment is that human extinction from AI is unlikely. But a permanent global catastrophe is a broader and less clearly defined category, and AI-assisted misuse—such as a pathogen release—could still kill many millions without causing extinction. I would not invent a percentage that implies more precision than I have.

質問4

どのような発見や出来事があれば、AIが将来もたらす影響についてのあなたの見解が最も大きく変わりますか?

The biggest change would be a convincing demonstration that a system can learn general rules and reliably apply them far beyond its training distribution—not merely interpolate, imitate, or pass a benchmark. It would need to know when it lacks evidence, attribute its conclusions, quantify uncertainty, and remain controllable while acting in unfamiliar situations. Conversely, repeated real-world evidence that continual supervision cannot detect and recover from failures quickly enough—especially in cyber, biological, or military settings—would make me substantially more pessimistic. A polished demonstration or another larger language model would not be enough. I would want adversarial testing and sustained deployment evidence, because engineering history is full of systems that looked reliable until they encountered novelty.

出典

このシミュレーション対象者の根拠として使用された記事、インタビュー、著作です。

The Chaotic Evolution of the Field with Tom Dietterich

Asked whether machine learning is over, he says it is in a crisis in Kuhn’s sense: after enormous investment in scaling statistical learning, large language models look more like smoothing and interpolating between training data than learning general rules that extrapolate; they can state the rules of chess yet make illegal moves, cannot judge which sources to trust, struggle to know whether they saw relevant data, and cannot attribute outputs. He names causal machine learning, world models, uncertainty quantification, attribution and multi-agent trust as open challenges. From his DARPA PAL and startup experience he warns that agents must fit real workflows, demand intrusive personal knowledge, need ways to forget, and will make mistakes. These are research challenges, not proofs of impossibility. Own turns in the publisher’s machine transcript inspected; most of the episode is field history.

machinelearning.transistor.fm
Running to the Noise, Episode 23

Calls recent scaling a brute-force period and expects its environmental costs to fall partly through efficiency incentives. Repeats that hallucination and failure to learn generalizable rules (for example, multiplication beyond trained lengths) suggest a fundamentally different approach may be needed. Says he shares concerns about AI replacing creative and intellectual work, that LLMs do not understand argument or evidence so universities must still teach them, that artists’ styles may deserve new legal protection, and that the claim people who do not use AI will be left behind is “too much of an AI-booster statement.” Expects some of the biggest benefits in drugs, materials and sustainability. Full published transcript of his turns inspected.

oberlin.edu
Complexity is a reason not to push the current technology

Three-post reply to a user arguing that AI’s supposedly inevitable advance is driven by capital. As an AI/ML researcher he says complexity is a reason not to push today’s systems, the first “knowledge technology” to scale but with many problems. He hopes for something simpler and better: cheaper, more efficient, more controllable and safer, able to attribute outputs to sources, learn continually, quantify uncertainty and avoid hallucination; attribution would compensate creators and control would mitigate risks. A hope and research vision, not a forecast. Thread and parent inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
Layering symbolic systems on top of LLMs

Points to symbolic layers over LLMs as a way to address probabilistic execution, continual learning, attribution and perhaps uncertainty quantification. Says an LLM directly taking actions is an unpredictable probabilistic execution engine that cannot enforce hard safety constraints, noting an agent architecture that checks LLM-emitted code before execution. Suggests layering could also allow very rapid learning from little data. A favored research direction, not a claim that it already works. Three-post thread inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
“AGI” shares the defects of the Turing Test

Six-post thread arguing that defining AGI as matching or exceeding humans on all tasks makes human performance the measure of intelligence. He prefers systems that complement people by doing well what people do poorly, such as formal proofs, verification tests, integrating the scientific literature, faster physical simulations, organizational situational awareness and helping journalists assess sources, evaluated on those capabilities rather than IQ-style tests. Ends by calling AGI-building a distraction. Older context consistent with his 2026 posts. Full thread inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
LLMs are not reliable tools for autonomous weaponry

During a dispute over military AI contracts, he says LLM-based technology is good for many things but not reliable for autonomous weapons: it needs large GPU computers and lacks quantified uncertainty for novel, high-stakes situations. He first attributed a rival contract to an Altman-orchestrated move, then in later self-replies noted reporting that the government initiated it and that the story was more complex. He adds that models need guardrails, but guardrails trained by RL or fine-tuning are not modular, raising questions about who chooses them. Thread self-replies inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
The International AI Safety Report as a good-faith risk assessment

In a thread where another user said experts are not worried enough to act, he notes that Bengio chairs the International AI Safety Report, calls it a good-faith effort to assess the whole spectrum of AI risks, and says he served as one of its external advisors. This establishes engagement with broad risk assessment, not agreement with every finding or any probability. Post inspected via the public Bluesky API; the thread root was unavailable.

bsky.app
Emotional addiction to chatbots as today’s top AI risk

Sharing a New York Times opinion piece about chatbot romance, he says he agrees that emotional addiction to chatbots is the number one risk of AI today. This ranks present-day harms; it is not a long-run forecast. The linked op-ed’s arguments are not his and were not inspected. Post inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
AI experts challenge ‘doomer’ narrative, including ‘extinction risk’ claims

Older, secondary context. Responding to the Statement on AI Risk, he said he was baffled by prominent signers’ positions, that outside deep learning most researchers thought industry and the press were over-reacting to LLM fluency, and that the greatest computing risk was cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. He suggested examining the funding incentives of existential-risk organizations alongside those of researchers like himself, without questioning their sincerity. Newer sources take precedence: by 2026 he takes AI-enabled mass-casualty misuse seriously and endorses a broad international risk assessment. Full article inspected.

venturebeat.com
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