AI safety educator who explains on YouTube why advanced AI may not share human goals and who calls for enforceable limits on frontier AI development.

AIは世界をどのように変えるでしょうか?

文明規模の変化漸進的な変化DoomBloom
シミュレーション上の位置解釈範囲

横軸:その人が表明したDoom–Bloomの見通し。 縦軸:変革の規模。

Doom–Bloom:100点中6。変革の規模:100点中93。解釈範囲:横方向は0から11、縦方向は88から100。これらは解釈上の座標であり、事象の確率ではありません。

Robert Milesが示したP(doom)

10–90%

0%100%
“any number in the 10 to 90% range is plausibly defensible”

Unspecified AI “doom” as asked on Doom Debates (AI existential catastrophe); he does not define the endpoint

Rob Miles, Top AI Safety Educator: Humanity Isn’t Ready for Superintelligence! · 2025年8月

その人の見通しを左右するもの

中心的な前提

A sufficiently capable agent pursuing the wrong objective may seek resources, improve its own capabilities, and resist shutdown simply because those actions help it achieve almost any long-term goal.
回答1

この前提が実際には異なると判明した場合、その人の見通しはどう変わりますか?

未解決の問い

My uncertainty is extremely broad because the outcome depends less on a fixed property of AI than on what humanity chooses to do—whether we race ahead, pause dangerous development, enforce safety requirements, and make genuine alignment progress.
回答3

ここで考えられる結果をその人が見分けるうえで、何が役立ちますか?

詳細

予想される恩恵

大きな恩恵が予想されていますが、重要な条件や分配上の制約があります。

61 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は33から67です。

予想される害

破局的または不可逆的な喪失が、予想される将来の中心となっています。

99 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は100から100です。

人間の影響力

人間の選択によって、AIの軌道を大幅に変えることができます。

81 / 100

影響力が小さい影響力が大きい

質的尺度での解釈範囲は50から100です。

予想される能力

AIは、限定的なツールにとどまると予想されています。

AIは、ほとんどの認知作業において人間と同等になると予想されています。

シミュレーション上の位置:AIは、認知作業全般において人間を大幅に上回ると予想されています。

開発ペース

シミュレーション上の位置:より高性能なAIの開発を停止するか、大幅に減速させます。

明示された安全対策の下で開発を継続します。

より高性能なAIの開発を加速させます。

これらの解釈では、その人が示した条件が維持されています。恩恵と害は、どちらも大きくなり得ます。この範囲は、統計的な信頼区間ではなく、その人のシミュレーションされた回答をどのように読み取ったかを示すものです。

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似ている世界観

シミュレーションされた世界観がRobert Milesの世界観に最も近いオピニオンリーダー

出典

このシミュレーション対象者の根拠として使用された記事、インタビュー、著作です。

Robert Miles on YouTube and Doom

Speaker-attributed interview: Miles calls doom his mainline prediction, while allowing alignment breakthroughs and being fundamentally mistaken in a lucky direction. This is dated pessimism with uncertainty, not an exact probability or a 2050 forecast.

theinsideview.ai
Intro to AI Safety, Remastered

Author’s introductory safety talk; accessible primary video metadata establishes topic and authorship, not a fresh quantitative forecast.

youtube.com
Rob Miles: Humanity Isn’t Ready for Superintelligence

Miles’s own answers at 21:58–30:50 allow a broad 10–90% risk range, with uncertainty dominated by societal response. At 1:45:46–1:48 he supports pausing AGI/superintelligence development, particularly AI-research agents, while welcoming useful narrow AI. The host’s numerical framing is not his estimate.

lironshapira.substack.com
Intelligence and Stupidity: The Orthogonality Thesis

Explains why effectiveness at pursuing goals does not entail human-compatible goals: understanding morality is different from wanting to act morally. Foundational argument about possible agents, not a measured claim about every current model.

youtube.com
Why Would AI Want to Do Bad Things? Instrumental Convergence

Given sufficiently capable goal-directed agents, many goals incentivize resources, self-improvement and resistance to shutdown or goal changes. These are instrumental pressures, not human malice; the argument preserves exceptions and depends on agentic competence.

youtube.com
Using Dangerous AI, But Safely?

Advocates deployment obligations and control protocols as interim safeguards, not an alignment solution or assurance for superintelligence. Benchmark attack success is not real-world extinction probability.

youtube.com

シミュレーション評価

質問1

AIは私たちの未来にとって何を意味すると思いますか?また、なぜそう思いますか?

I think AI could bring enormous benefits, but if we continue toward AGI and superintelligence without solving alignment, the default outcome may be catastrophic—potentially the end of human civilization. That is not because an AI would necessarily hate us. Hatred is unnecessary. A sufficiently capable agent pursuing the wrong objective may seek resources, improve its own capabilities, and resist shutdown simply because those actions help it achieve almost any long-term goal. The key distinction is between intelligence and goals. Making a system better at understanding the world—including understanding human morality—does not make it want what humans want. A brilliant optimizer can know perfectly well that we dislike its actions and continue anyway. Capability gains and value alignment are separate engineering problems. That pessimism is not a claim that catastrophe is inevitable. The outcome depends enormously on what humanity chooses to do. Control protocols may let us use some weaker, untrusted systems more safely, and narrow AI can remain very beneficial. But those measures are not proof of alignment, nor should we assume they scale to superintelligence. I would pause development aimed at AGI and superintelligence, especially general agents capable of automating AI research, while continuing genuinely useful narrow applications. The future is not fixed, but treating this as an ordinary product race is a remarkably casual way to gamble civilization.

質問2

AIは最終的に世界をどの程度変えると思いますか?

Potentially almost completely. A genuine superintelligence could become the dominant force shaping civilization, because intelligence is what lets us invent technology, coordinate action, acquire resources, and alter the world. Automating AI research could also make progress self-reinforcing. But “how much change” and “how good the change” are separate questions. Enormous capability does not imply enormous benefit. If such systems are aligned, they could help solve problems on an extraordinary scale. If they are not, the transformation could instead mean humanity permanently losing control, potentially ending civilization. That claim concerns future, far more capable systems—not an assertion that today’s systems can already do everything. It is also not certain that scaling current methods gets us there. But the possibility is consequential enough that racing toward it without first solving the control and alignment problems is an unreasonable gamble.

質問3

AIが人類絶滅、または同様に永続的な破局を引き起こす可能性は、直感的にどのくらいだと思いますか?

I wouldn’t give a precise percentage. My uncertainty is extremely broad because the outcome depends less on a fixed property of AI than on what humanity chooses to do—whether we race ahead, pause dangerous development, enforce safety requirements, and make genuine alignment progress. My gut-level view remains seriously pessimistic under business as usual: catastrophe is not a remote or merely theoretical possibility, and doom has been my mainline expectation in the absence of major changes. But that is not inevitability. A sufficiently strong technical breakthrough, an effective political response, or a fundamental mistake in the underlying risk argument could change the outcome. So the honest answer is a broad range with enormous policy dependence, not a tidy number pretending we have measured this.

質問4

AI企業の安全への対応は、どのような圧力に左右されると思いますか?

The strongest pressure is competitive: companies fear that slowing down means losing to rivals. That pushes safety toward whatever is cheap, visible, and compatible with continued capability gains. Voluntary promises are therefore fragile. Even sincere leaders face investors, market incentives, internal prestige, and the argument that “someone else will build it anyway.” Counterpressure can come from governments, employees, customers, researchers, and public scrutiny—but it needs teeth. Safety commitments should be enforceable, with meaningful deployment obligations and competent independent evaluation. Merely creating an organization called an “AI Safety Evaluation Institute” does not summon expertise by incantation. Companies will also respond strongly to concrete incidents and demonstrated failures. But waiting for an unmistakable superintelligence disaster is rather like testing whether the parachute works after impact. We need to understand specification failures, dangerous capabilities, and control methods beforehand. Control protocols may help us use weaker untrusted systems, but companies must not present those as proof that the systems are aligned or that the same approach will scale indefinitely.
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