質問1
Connor Leahy
x.com/npcollapseAI safety advocate at ControlAI who calls for laws and a verified international ban on building superintelligence while supporting other useful AI.
AIは世界をどのように変えるでしょうか?
横軸:その人が表明したDoom–Bloomの見通し。 縦軸:変革の規模。
Doom–Bloom:100点中1。変革の規模:100点中97。解釈範囲:横方向は0から6、縦方向は92から100。これらは解釈上の座標であり、事象の確率ではありません。
≈99%
“very, very high, within rounding error of Nate or whatever”
Things going poorly on the current trajectory toward superintelligence; in context, human extinction. Stated relative to Nate Soares, whom he puts at “maybe like 99”, and followed at once by “the future is not decided”
中心的な前提
Competitive pressure then pushes companies and states to deploy them anyway.回答1
この前提が実際には異なると判明した場合、その人の見通しはどう変わりますか?
未解決の問い
The uncertainty is not whether sufficiently capable AI would be profoundly consequential; it is whether humanity retains control through that transition.回答2
ここで考えられる結果をその人が見分けるうえで、何が役立ちますか?
考えを変え得るもの
A convincing, independently validated solution to controlling superintelligent systems would change my view most—especially if it remained reliable as systems became more capable, autonomous, strategically aware, and able to automate AI research.回答4
どのような証拠なら十分で、それによってその人の見解はどちらの方向に変わりますか?
詳細
複数の解釈が依然として妥当です:大きな恩恵が予想されていますが、重要な条件や分配上の制約があります。 / 高度なAIが登場しても、良い影響はほとんどないと予想されています。 / 恩恵は限定的、または狭い範囲にしか行き渡らないと予想されています。
38 / 100
質的尺度での解釈範囲は0から67です。
破局的または不可逆的な喪失が、予想される将来の中心となっています。
100 / 100
質的尺度での解釈範囲は100から100です。
人間の選択によって、AIの軌道を大幅に変えることができます。
72 / 100
質的尺度での解釈範囲は50から75です。
AIは、限定的なツールにとどまると予想されています。
AIは、ほとんどの認知作業において人間と同等になると予想されています。
シミュレーション上の位置:AIは、認知作業全般において人間を大幅に上回ると予想されています。
これらの解釈では、その人が示した条件が維持されています。恩恵と害は、どちらも大きくなり得ます。この範囲は、統計的な信頼区間ではなく、その人のシミュレーションされた回答をどのように読み取ったかを示すものです。
似ている世界観
シミュレーションされた世界観がConnor Leahyの世界観に最も近いオピニオンリーダー
Connor LeahyがAIについて語ったこと
Leahy warns that superintelligence would take control from humanity and calls for laws and a verified international ban, not a halt to useful AI.
“Superintelligent AI is neither a tool nor a weapon. It is an adversary.”
Post on X “We should criminalize the creation of superintelligence, and then we should push towards an international trust-but-verify regime”
Modern CTO podcast “Many of today’s models have valuable applications, including for defense purposes, but superintelligent AI is in a category of its own.”
ControlAI blog, America’s Security Depends on Stopping Superintelligence “We still have time to prevent superintelligence, but the clock is ticking.”
ControlAI blog, America’s Security Depends on Stopping Superintelligence “If a superintelligence is built, humanity will lose control over its future.”
Testimony, Canadian Senate transport and communications committee
リンク先の出典から原文どおりに引用(2026年10月3日に確認)
シミュレーション評価
出典
このシミュレーション対象者の根拠として使用された記事、インタビュー、著作です。
Current institutional profile describes his focus on superintelligence risk, policy and institutional preparedness.

In The Rob Bensinger Compass section, Leahy endorses short timelines and broadly agrees with Yudkowsky’s alignment difficulty arguments, but is less certain and allows that he could be wrong. The interviewer’s 99% framing in 2022 was not his own figure; his August 2026 estimate is a separate, later statement.

At 29:04–32:23 he expects more capable unaligned systems to take over, with competitive pressure driving adoption. At 57:43–58:23 he gives 50–80% extinction or near-extinction within 50 years if humanity does literally nothing; intervention can change this dramatically. At 1:06–1:10 he advocates lawful collective action and buying time. This conditional historical estimate is not an unconditional current P(doom).

Calls for liability across the AI supply chain and a temporary international compute cap to buy time for longer-term safety and political solutions.

In his opening statement Leahy predicts humanity loses control if superintelligence is built, with extinction likely through competition. His answers describe competing AI populations, inadequate current control methods, and an international prohibition with verification. He opposes simply abandoning useful AI or slowing all Western data centres, while maintaining that unregulated competition underprovides security.

Machine transcript with speaker labels; use only Connor’s answers, not Peter McCormack’s. Around 60:44–61:00 he agrees his P(doom) is above 20% and below 100%. When the host puts Nate Soares at 100, he says surely not, maybe 99, and puts his own P(doom) of things going poorly on the current trajectory very, very high, within rounding error of that. He immediately adds that the future is not decided. Supersedes his 2025 figure of 50–80%, which was conditional on doing literally nothing.

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