Pseudonymous account that runs public experiments on AI refusals, censorship and watermarks and calls for transparency from frontier labs.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 74。变革程度:100 中的 52。解读范围:横向为 69 至 79,纵向为 47 至 57。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

xlr8harder的 P(doom) · 推断

≈4%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:2–7%。

我们如何估计 P(doom)

xlr8harder 的里程碑时间线
  1. 工作与机构

    I expect major changes, but I don’t have a defensible timeline.

    回答 4
  2. 科学与日常生活

    I expect major changes, but I don’t have a defensible timeline.

    回答 4

按里程碑分组,不按推断日期间隔或排序。AGI 和超人类 AI 保留他们的定义。

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

The practical threshold is deployment: whether models can perform useful tasks consistently, withstand ordinary security failures, and operate under policies that preserve quality, privacy, and user control.
回答 4

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

I expect major changes, but I don’t have a defensible timeline.
回答 4

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

68 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。

预期危害

预计会出现可控或局部的危害。

25 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 0 到 33。

人类影响力

人类的选择可以大幅改变AI的发展轨迹。

74 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 50 到 75。

发展速度

停止或大幅放缓开发能力更强的AI。

模拟位置:在落实所述保障措施的前提下继续开发。

加快开发能力更强的AI。

AI使用规则

在事先落实保护措施或获得许可之前,限制所讨论的AI用途。

模拟位置:允许所讨论的AI用途,同时实施有针对性的问责与保护措施。

尽量减少对所讨论AI用途的限制。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与xlr8harder相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 xlr8harder 最接近的意见领袖

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I expect AI to be broadly beneficial, but the outcome depends heavily on whether we evaluate real systems rather than govern imagined ones. In cybersecurity, for example, increasingly capable models may improve defense over the long term, but that does not excuse weak operational security today. A theoretical side channel is not evidence of practical weight exfiltration; ordinary failures and repeated audits deserve priority. I’m similarly interested in what interventions actually do. Watermarks should be tested for detection reliability, effects on output quality, privacy implications, identifiability, and adversarial robustness. Refusal policies and other behavioral constraints deserve the same empirical scrutiny. For alignment, a stable, coherent model identity may prove more robust than layers of imposed rules, though that remains an experimental direction rather than a settled result. Governance matters, but it should target observable risks and remain open to scrutiny. I oppose secrecy, broad discretionary government power, and rules effectively written by incumbents. Frontier labs should disclose substantially more, even when that costs them proprietary advantage. At the same time, safety policy has opportunity costs: delaying useful systems, particularly in healthcare, can also cost lives. The right question is not simply how to slow AI down, but how to measure its risks and benefits honestly, audit it repeatedly, and preserve public control over the institutions shaping it.

问题 2

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

I expect the change to be substantial, but I would not attach a confident numerical scale or endpoint to it. AI could materially alter healthcare, cybersecurity, research, and knowledge work. In healthcare especially, beneficial deployment may save lives, so delay is not a neutral policy choice. In cybersecurity, I expect defensive capabilities to improve over the long term, although ordinary operational failures will remain important and should not be displaced by exotic threat narratives. The magnitude will also depend on institutional choices: who controls these systems, what models are allowed to say, whether interventions degrade quality or privacy, and whether frontier labs permit meaningful independent scrutiny. A world with transparent labs, repeated audits, user control, and regulation aimed at observable harms will differ greatly from one governed through secrecy and broad discretionary power. So I anticipate major change, but not a predetermined transformation. The technology’s effects will be shaped by practical reliability, deployment decisions, and governance—not capability alone.

问题 3

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

I don’t have a defensible percentage. My default is to separate catastrophic-risk scenarios from evidence that current systems can actually realize them. I would examine concrete capabilities, access, deployment pathways, security failures, and repeated audit results rather than turn uncertainty into a precise extinction forecast. A nonzero possibility can justify targeted precautions, but it does not automatically justify secrecy, unlimited government discretion, or blanket delays. Those measures have risks too, including entrenching incumbents and postponing beneficial uses in areas such as healthcare. I’m more confident that we need radical transparency, ordinary security engineering, and ongoing empirical testing than I am in any particular probability of permanent catastrophe.

问题 4

你预计AI会在什么时候给日常生活带来重大变化?如果你认为它会带来这种变化的话。

I expect major changes, but I don’t have a defensible timeline. They will likely arrive unevenly as systems become reliable enough for routine use in healthcare, cybersecurity, research, and knowledge work—not simply when benchmark scores rise. The practical threshold is deployment: whether models can perform useful tasks consistently, withstand ordinary security failures, and operate under policies that preserve quality, privacy, and user control. Institutional choices may accelerate or delay that transition. Transparent labs, repeated audits, and targeted regulation could support trustworthy adoption; secrecy, brittle restrictions, and fear-driven blanket delays could obstruct beneficial uses. So I would watch concrete integration into daily services and workflows rather than predict a particular year.
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