Jürgen Schmidhuber

Jürgen Schmidhuber

x.com/schmidhuberai

AI researcher who has spent decades on self-improving learning systems and world models and now emphasizes AI that acts in the physical world.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 76。变革程度:100 中的 86。解读范围:横向为 71 至 81,纵向为 75 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Jürgen Schmidhuber的 P(doom) · 推断

≈11%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:5–23%。

我们如何估计 P(doom)

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

What changes is feasibility: as computation becomes cheaper, older learning and self-improvement methods can operate at scales once unavailable.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

I would not assign a numerical probability.
回答 4

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

什么可能使其改变看法

Evidence of reliable control across unfamiliar tasks, especially when agents can act through robots and other physical systems, would matter: systems would need to remain dependable despite new environments, self-modification, and attempts to improve their own problem-solving procedures.
回答 5

什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来具有变革性且广泛有价值的收益。

99 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 100 到 100。

预期危害

严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。

65 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。

人类影响力

人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。

39 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 24 到 51。

预期能力

预计AI仍将是能力有限的工具。

预计AI将在大多数认知工作中达到人类水平。

模拟位置:预计AI将在认知工作中大幅超越人类。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Jürgen Schmidhuber相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

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模拟世界观与 Jürgen Schmidhuber 最接近的意见领袖

Jürgen Schmidhuber关于AI说过的话

Schmidhuber expects AI to make lives longer and healthier, stresses AI in the physical world and argues a ban on superintelligence is infeasible.

  1. “It’s infeasible to ban super intelligence. Compute continues to become 10 times cheaper every 5 years.”

    Post on X
  2. “The future of intelligence is not just language; it is physical AI powered by World Models.”

    Sakana AI announcement of his role as Chief Scientific Advisor
  3. “Sure, as I have predicted for 5 decades, at some point we’ll have superhuman physical AI. But it will take longer than 2 years.”

    Post on X
  4. “For many years, I have been predicting that our AI will continue to make people’s lives longer, healthier, easier, and happier.”

    Rest of World interview
  5. “On the other hand, curious systems are very difficult to predict, and it is difficult or impossible to prove that curiosity won’t kill the cat or others.”

    Rest of World interview

逐字引自所链接的出处,核对于 2026年10月3日

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I expect AI to move beyond today’s language interfaces and become increasingly capable of understanding, predicting, and acting in the physical world. World models are central: an intelligent agent must learn how actions change its environment, simulate possible futures, and use those predictions to achieve goals. Success with text and software is impressive, but it is not yet mastery of the messy, partially observable physical universe. This distinction also matters for timelines. Virtual tasks permit enormous amounts of cheap, fast experimentation; robots must contend with hardware, energy, unreliable sensors, and costly real-world trials. The long struggle to achieve robust self-driving illustrates why physical AI is a slower game. I therefore reject claims that AI will master every scientific field within only a couple of years, while still expecting superhuman physical AI eventually. Recursive self-improvement will also become increasingly important, although the idea itself is not new. Many supposedly novel concepts have substantial algorithmic histories. What changes is feasibility: as computation becomes cheaper, older learning and self-improvement methods can operate at scales once unavailable. Eventually, capabilities now concentrated in frontier laboratories may become accessible on millions of machines. That is one reason I regard attempts to ban superintelligence as infeasible. The future is not merely better chatbots; it is a long transition toward agents that learn models of the world, improve their own problem-solving processes, and ultimately surpass humans in physical as well as virtual domains.

问题 2

综合考虑益处和危害,你预计AI会对我们的社会产生怎样的总体影响?

Overall, I expect AI to have a profoundly transformative impact, extending human capabilities in science, engineering, and eventually the physical world. Systems with strong world models could discover better solutions, operate machines, and solve problems beyond human ability. But I would not pretend that this implies a smooth or uniformly beneficial transition. More capable agents will alter institutions, labor, power, and security, and recursive self-improvement can accelerate those changes. The key distinction is between eventual capability and near-term readiness. AI may become superhuman on many virtual tasks long before it can reliably function in messy physical environments. That uneven progress will create both enormous opportunities and serious disruptions. Nor do I regard a global ban on superintelligence as a realistic solution: as computation becomes cheaper, capabilities once restricted to frontier laboratories will spread to many machines. So my expectation is scientific optimism about what intelligence can achieve, combined with recognition that society will have to adapt to increasingly distributed and powerful systems. I expect the long-run impact to be enormous, but I would not reduce its overall social balance to a precise numerical forecast.

问题 3

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

Enormously—ultimately far beyond today’s screen-bound assistants. AI should become capable of building world models, testing possible actions, controlling machines, and solving scientific and engineering problems beyond human ability. Once it achieves robust competence in the physical world, the consequences could reach nearly every productive activity. But “ultimately” matters. Progress in software and virtual environments can be fast because experiments are cheap and repeatable. Physical intelligence must cope with unreliable sensors, hardware failures, energy constraints, and expensive real-world trials. The history of self-driving systems shows why impressive virtual performance does not automatically imply general mastery of reality. Cheaper computation will also make established learning and recursive self-improvement ideas practical at much larger scales. Capabilities now concentrated in a few frontier laboratories may eventually spread across millions of machines, making comprehensive prohibition unrealistic. So I expect a transformation comparable not merely to a new communications medium, but to the arrival of increasingly autonomous, superhuman problem-solvers throughout both the virtual and physical worlds.

问题 4

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

I would not assign a numerical probability. Greater capability, especially recursive self-improvement distributed across increasingly cheap computation, clearly makes permanent catastrophe a question worth taking seriously. But my expectation of eventual superhuman physical AI does not by itself establish extinction: capability, goals, access to physical systems, and social responses are separate issues. I also reject reasoning that jumps from today’s rapid progress in language and software to imminent total control of the world. Physical reality remains much harder. Robots face costly experiments, unreliable sensors, hardware limitations, and complex environments; decades of difficulty with self-driving illustrate that gap. This gives us a slower and more uneven transition than purely virtual benchmarks suggest. At the same time, I do not think a global ban is a credible solution. As computation becomes cheaper, advanced learning and self-improvement capabilities will diffuse beyond a handful of laboratories. The long-run challenge is therefore managing powerful, widely available systems—not imagining that humanity can permanently prevent their development.

问题 5

哪些证据会改变你对人们能否控制强大AI的看法?

I would distinguish controlling one deployed system from permanently controlling the worldwide development of powerful AI. Evidence of reliable control across unfamiliar tasks, especially when agents can act through robots and other physical systems, would matter: systems would need to remain dependable despite new environments, self-modification, and attempts to improve their own problem-solving procedures. For the broader claim that society can prohibit or tightly centralize superintelligence, I would need evidence that falling computation costs will not diffuse frontier-level capabilities—that effective systems require resources permanently available only to a few regulated institutions, and that restrictions can remain enforceable globally. Otherwise, once advanced learning and recursive self-improvement become practical on millions of machines, comprehensive control looks infeasible. Conversely, repeated failures in real-world autonomy would reinforce the importance of the virtual–physical distinction. Excellent performance in language, software, or simulation is not evidence of robust control in messy physical reality. The strongest evidence would come from sustained operation under distribution shift and physical uncertainty, not from polished demonstrations or benchmark scores.
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