Cody Blakeney

Cody Blakeney

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Machine learning researcher who works on training data and fine-tuning and argues for self-hosted models and careful security as AI agents spread.

How will AI change the world?

Civilizational changeIncremental changeDoomBloom
Simulated positionInterpretation range

Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.

Doom–Bloom: 70 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 41 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 65 to 75 horizontally, 21 to 54 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.

Cody Blakeney’s P(doom) · inferred

≈4%

0%100%

Inferred from their simulated answers, not a number they gave. Plausible range: 1–10%.

How we estimate P(doom)

What their outlook hinges on

A central assumption

So I see AI as a powerful automation layer whose effects depend heavily on data quality, evaluation, operator experience, access control, and whether the surrounding systems remain understandable and reversible.
Answer 1

If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?

An unresolved question

That practical trajectory does not, by itself, establish a particular timeline for AGI or settle every frontier-risk question.
Answer 1

What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?

More details

Expected upside

Substantial benefits are expected, with important conditions or distribution limits.

67 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 67 to 67 on the qualitative scale.

Expected harm

Manageable or localized harms are expected.

37 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 33 to 67 on the qualitative scale.

Human influence

Human choices can substantially redirect the AI trajectory.

63 / 100

Little influenceStrong influence

Interpretation range 30 to 95 on the qualitative scale.

Rules for using AI

Restrict the AI uses discussed until prior protections or permission are in place.

Simulated position: Allow the AI uses discussed with targeted accountability and protections.

Minimize restrictions on the AI uses discussed.

These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.

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Similar worldviews

Thought leaders whose simulated worldviews are closest to Cody Blakeney’s

Sources

Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.

Simulated Assessment

Question 1

What do you think AI means for our future—and why?

I expect AI to automate a growing share of routine, valuable work, especially in software and other digital workflows. But the benefit will not come merely from generating more output. Experienced practitioners still have to identify which problems matter, define the task, evaluate the result, and recognize when an apparently plausible answer is wrong. Better data selection, efficient adaptation, and careful evaluation are therefore at least as important as raw model scale. As agents gain access to systems such as email, chat, repositories, and cloud infrastructure, security will increasingly depend on human permission choices. An agent can become another path for social engineering or hijacked access. Provider concentration creates a related systems risk: relying on one hosted model can expose users to common outages, interception, or infrastructure failure, while self-hosted models and provider diversity can improve resilience. In software engineering, faster code production raises the value of fundamentals rather than eliminating them. Maintainable designs, clear interfaces, reviewable changes, and easy rollback become more important when code can be produced rapidly. So I see AI as a powerful automation layer whose effects depend heavily on data quality, evaluation, operator experience, access control, and whether the surrounding systems remain understandable and reversible. That practical trajectory does not, by itself, establish a particular timeline for AGI or settle every frontier-risk question.

Question 2

Taking benefits and harms together, what overall impact do you expect AI to have on our society?

I expect a broadly positive impact where AI is deployed as supervised automation: reducing routine work, speeding development, and helping experienced people apply their judgment more efficiently. The largest gains will come not from producing the most output, but from choosing valuable tasks, using high-quality data, and evaluating results carefully. The harms will often arise from the systems around the model. Agents connected to email, chat, repositories, or infrastructure amplify bad permission decisions and create opportunities for social engineering. Concentrating access in a small number of hosted providers also creates shared points of failure. In software, rapid generation can accumulate brittle code unless changes remain coherent, reviewable, maintainable, and reversible. So I do not think “AI” has one automatic social effect. Its impact will depend substantially on deployment practices, human expertise, security boundaries, and infrastructure diversity. I would not infer a precise overall forecast—or an AGI timeline—from current success at automating particular tasks.

Question 3

How much do you think AI will ultimately change the world?

I expect substantial change in how digital work gets done, but I would not attach a reliable numerical magnitude or claim that current automation establishes an AGI endpoint. Agents can remove large amounts of routine work and dramatically increase the rate of software production. That shifts human effort toward selecting worthwhile problems, specifying them clearly, checking results, and managing access. The downstream effects depend on engineering choices. Faster output is not automatically better output: poor data, weak evaluation, excessive permissions, and unmaintainable generated code can scale mistakes just as efficiently. Agents connected to communications, repositories, and infrastructure also widen the consequences of social engineering and compromised access. Meanwhile, dependence on a few hosted providers can turn outages or interception into system-wide failures. So I expect AI to change workflows and infrastructure deeply. How beneficial and resilient that change becomes will depend less on raw generation volume than on experienced judgment, careful evaluation, secure permissions, maintainable systems, and diversity in how models are deployed.

Question 4

What’s your gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe?

I would not give a defensible percentage. My work and observations support concrete concerns about permissions, social engineering, provider concentration, and failures amplified by rapid automation, but they do not establish a probability of human extinction or an equivalently permanent catastrophe. Those practical risks should not be mistaken for a blanket denial of frontier risks. They simply operate at a different evidentiary level: I can evaluate whether an agent has excessive repository access, whether a deployment creates a single point of failure, or whether generated changes are reversible. Turning those findings into an extinction forecast requires assumptions about future capabilities, deployment, control, and institutional responses that current task automation does not resolve.
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