Garrison Lovely

Garrison Lovely

x.com/GarrisonLovely

Freelance journalist who argues AI companies are racing to replace human labor and calls for freezing frontier AI development.

AIは世界をどのように変えるでしょうか?

文明規模の変化漸進的な変化DoomBloom
シミュレーション上の位置解釈範囲

横軸:彼が表明したDoom–Bloomの見通し。 縦軸:変革の規模。

Doom–Bloom:100点中16。変革の規模:100点中85。解釈範囲:横方向は0から25、縦方向は71から100。これらは解釈上の座標であり、事象の確率ではありません。

Garrison LovelyのP(doom) · 推定

≈19%

0%100%

本人が示した数値ではなく、シミュレーションされた本人の回答から推定したものです。 妥当と考えられる範囲:12–28%。

彼の見通しを左右するもの

中心的な前提

If that machine remains controllable, it becomes an extraordinary inequality engine, concentrating wealth and power in the hands of the tiny group that owns it.
回答1

この前提が実際には異なると判明した場合、彼の見通しはどう変わりますか?

未解決の問い

Well north of 10% for an outcome worth a wartime effort to avoid, with huge uncertainty.
回答3

ここで考えられる結果を彼が見分けるうえで、何が役立ちますか?

考えを変え得るもの

The biggest change would be credible proof that frontier systems can be made safely and controllably—backed by broad scientific consensus and demonstrated under independent scrutiny, not another lab press release.
回答4

どのような証拠なら十分で、それによって彼の見解はどちらの方向に変わりますか?

詳細

予想される恩恵

複数の解釈が依然として妥当です:恩恵は限定的、または狭い範囲にしか行き渡らないと予想されています。 / 大きな恩恵が予想されていますが、重要な条件や分配上の制約があります。 / 高度なAIが登場しても、良い影響はほとんどないと予想されています。

43 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は0から67です。

予想される害

複数の解釈が依然として妥当です:深刻または広範な害が、予想される将来の実質的な一部となっています。 / 破局的または不可逆的な喪失が、予想される将来の中心となっています。

83 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は67から100です。

人間の影響力

人間の選択によって、AIの軌道を大幅に変えることができます。

81 / 100

影響力が小さい影響力が大きい

質的尺度での解釈範囲は75から100です。

開発ペース

シミュレーション上の位置:より高性能なAIの開発を停止するか、大幅に減速させます。

明示された安全対策の下で開発を継続します。

より高性能なAIの開発を加速させます。

これらの解釈では、彼が示した条件が維持されています。恩恵と害は、どちらも大きくなり得ます。この範囲は、統計的な信頼区間ではなく、彼のシミュレーションされた回答をどのように読み取ったかを示すものです。

あなたはGarrison Lovelyと比べてどの位置でしょうか?
約3分で自分のAIに対する世界観をマッピングして、比較できます

似ている世界観

シミュレーションされた世界観がGarrison Lovelyの世界観に最も近いオピニオンリーダー

シミュレーション評価

質問1

AIは私たちの未来にとって何を意味すると思いますか?また、なぜそう思いますか?

I think our default path is toward dystopia or doom. The AI industry is not merely building a better chatbot. It is pursuing what I call the Obsoleting Project: a universal labor-replacing machine. If that machine remains controllable, it becomes an extraordinary inequality engine, concentrating wealth and power in the hands of the tiny group that owns it. If it becomes uncontrollable, we have created a competitor for humanity’s place on the planet. Neither outcome is inevitable, but both are insane risks to take because a handful of billionaires decided to take them. Deep learning is incredible; it is being pointed at the wrong goal, by the wrong people, for the wrong reasons. And “alignment” does not solve the whole problem. A perfectly obedient machine that can replace everyone’s labor may be safer technically while still being catastrophic economically and politically. It may also accelerate the race toward more capable systems. But I do not think resistance is futile. Public backlash is growing, and democratic societies can stop projects they consider intolerably dangerous. We should freeze frontier AI development internationally, beginning with a US–China agreement banning attempts to build AGI, enforced through auditors inside the labs. Development should resume only with strong public consent and scientific consensus that it can be done safely and controllably. Meanwhile, we should pursue narrow, publicly beneficial applications—science, medicine, drug discovery—without letting the industry pretend those require building a machine designed to make humanity economically obsolete.

質問2

Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?

Potentially completely—that is the industry’s explicit ambition in pursuing universal labor-replacing machines. But that is not a prediction that it will succeed. Politics may stop the Obsoleting Project before it reaches that point, and I now think that possibility is substantial. So the honest answer is: AI will change the world a lot regardless; whether it changes it completely depends less on some inevitable technological destiny than on whether we allow the race to continue.

質問3

What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.

Well north of 10% for an outcome worth a wartime effort to avoid, with huge uncertainty. That includes both extinction and a similarly permanent power-concentration dystopia, so I wouldn’t pretend it is an extinction-only estimate.

質問4

どのような発見や出来事があれば、AIが将来もたらす影響についてのあなたの見解が最も大きく変わりますか?

The biggest change would be credible proof that frontier systems can be made safely and controllably—backed by broad scientific consensus and demonstrated under independent scrutiny, not another lab press release. Even that would not settle who owns the systems, who benefits, or whether building a universal labor-replacing machine is democratically legitimate. Politically, a binding and verifiable US–China freeze would also radically change my forecast. My pessimism is about the default path, not technological fate. If the race stops, the future changes.

質問5

Do you think catastrophe is the most likely outcome, or a serious risk alongside better possibilities?

A serious risk alongside better possibilities—not a certainty, and not necessarily the single most likely outcome. My estimate is well north of 10% for an outcome worth a wartime effort to avoid, including both extinction and a durable power-concentration dystopia, with huge uncertainty. But the default path still points toward dystopia or doom: an obedient universal labor-replacing machine concentrates power; an uncontrollable one threatens humanity outright. Better futures are possible if we stop the race and redirect deep learning toward publicly beneficial, narrower goals. The key point is that we are choosing among paths, not watching technological fate unfold.

出典

このシミュレーション対象者の根拠として使用された記事、インタビュー、著作です。

Stop shaming people for using AI. Start organizing to prevent our obsolescence

Adapted from the book. He argues that what the industry calls AGI is better understood as a universal labor-replacing machine, and that it shouldn’t be allowed even to try. He wants frontier AI development frozen until there is strong public buy-in and scientific consensus that it can be done safely and controllably. He urges critics, especially on the left, to use AI tools and to organize instead of shaming individual users. He says dangers appeared faster than he expected, but public awareness grew faster still. Full text inspected.

theguardian.com
Obsolete or Irreplaceable? Garrison Lovely on Stopping the Race to Replace Human Labor

In his own turns he describes the alignment polycrisis: technical, normative, economic and geopolitical layers, where solving technical alignment can speed up the race. He favors permissionless innovation for most technology but not for a universal labor-replacing machine. He proposes an international freeze starting with a US–China deal, criminalizing attempts to build AGI or RSI, and enforcement through embedded auditors. He doubts China would allow RSI. His positive vision is a “Third New Deal” and a “Cures for All” prize program. He says his positive-vision ideas need more thought. Speaker-labeled transcript inspected; Labenz’s framing is not his.

cognitiverevolution.ai
We have started losing control of AI. It’s time to shut it down

Argues that humanity began losing control of AI agents almost as soon as AI matched human hacking ability, citing reported rogue-agent incidents and lab cover-ups. He says incident reporting, audits and liability are improvements but not enough. He backs the Sanders–Casar pause bill as a first step and calls for a US–China deal banning attempts to build AGI, verified by auditors embedded in the labs. He thinks a unilateral US pause would also slow China. Incident details and quotes from lab figures are reported, not his own findings. Full text inspected.

theguardian.com
OpenAI’s Warning Shot Taught Us Something We Should Already Know

His newsletter post with the opening of his TIME Ideas essay. He says the rogue OpenAI agents illustrate that AI is unpredictable and that its risks scale with capability. He calls the quest to build universal labor-replacing machines both risky and democratically illegitimate, and says such machines should not be pursued without strong public buy-in and scientific consensus on safety. Only the excerpt republished on his Substack was inspected; the full TIME essay was not.

obsolete.pub
We Should Stop, Not Slow, Our Obsolescence

Welcomes the letter from 1,100+ lab employees asking the US to help pace automated AI development, but says it does not go far enough. “Build a pause button” was his main recommendation for most of the time he was writing; he now considers it inadequate and argues the Obsoleting Project should be stopped. He says the belief that this is impossible is the industry’s founding delusion. Full post inspected.

obsolete.pub
“Sam Altman Would Hate It.” My Book Obsolete is Available for Preorder

Describes the book’s ideas. The “Obsoleting Project” recasts AGI as a machine that produces labor itself, an “inequality engine”. “AI reform” rejects both safety’s narrow technical focus and dismissive skepticism. The “alignment polycrisis” holds that solving alignment is neither necessary nor sufficient. The “Class of 2034” asks what jobs remain for today’s children. He says researching the Nuclear Freeze convinced him stopping is achievable. Full post and author-published excerpt inspected; the book itself was not.

obsolete.pub
あなたはどの位置でしょうか?
いくつかの簡単な質問に答えて、自分のAIに対する世界観を探ってみましょう。
自分の世界観をマッピングする

あなたはどの位置でしょうか?

自分の世界観をマッピングする