Joscha Bach

Joscha Bach

x.com/Plinz

Cognitive scientist who sees AI as a way to extend human competence, favors open and decentralized AI and questions fixed-goal views of alignment.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 65。变革程度:100 中的 92。解读范围:横向为 50 至 75,纵向为 87 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Joscha Bach的 P(doom) · 推断

≈18%

0%100%

根据他的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:12–28%。

我们如何估计 P(doom)

他的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

Once systems acquire persistent agency, self-models and influence over essential processes, their incentives and relationships with us matter.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

We do not yet know whether current scaling is enough for superintelligence or whether more efficient architectures are required.
回答 1

什么能帮助他区分这里各种合理的结果?

什么可能使其改变看法

The most important discovery would be a convincing account of how persistent agency actually emerges and stabilizes in self-modifying systems.
回答 4

什么证据才足够,又会让他的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来具有变革性且广泛有价值的收益。

90 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 100。

预期危害

严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。

64 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。

人类影响力

人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。

62 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 35 到 90。

预期能力

预计AI仍将是能力有限的工具。

预计AI将在大多数认知工作中达到人类水平。

模拟位置:预计AI将在认知工作中大幅超越人类。

发展速度

停止或大幅放缓开发能力更强的AI。

模拟位置:在落实所述保障措施的前提下继续开发。

加快开发能力更强的AI。

这些解读保留了他陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Joscha Bach相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Joscha Bach 最接近的意见领袖

Joscha Bach关于AI说过的话

Bach argues that AI can extend human competence, favors open and decentralized AI and wants AI that shares purposes with people.

  1. “AI tools can reintroduce both rigor and the ability to integrate and boil down oceans of literature”

    Post on X
  2. “The reason why academics, individuals and small startups can play with AI are open weights models.”

    Post on X
  3. “On the ground, I think AI is a lot safer and more equitable than I thought it would be.”

    Info-Tech Research Group, Digital Disruption podcast
  4. “We will have to build AI systems that can extend our wisdom, agents that find shared purposes with us.”

    Substack essay, The age of AGE: Artificial General Experience

逐字引自所链接的出处,核对于 2026年10月3日

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

Joscha Bach: AGI, Consciousness, and the Evolution of Intelligence

Publisher transcript: 09:24–13:58 leaves scaling to AGI unresolved and considers more data-efficient coherence-oriented learning; 33:03–36:54 finds current deployment safer, more gradual and more equitable than expected; 54:39–56:16 allows an investment bubble despite long-term usefulness; 76:41–79:41 contrasts centralized surveillance with user-serving decentralized competence. These are Bach’s opinions, not guarantees of future safety.

infotech.com
The age of AGE: Artificial General Experience

Authored essay expects broad rapid disruption and praises accessible models, but worries about unstable economies, companions damaging relationships and centralized surveillance. Prefers universal basic intelligence and shared purposes. Calls current uneven systems first-generation AGIs while emphasizing missing grounding; this loose usage is not an exact milestone forecast. Cognitive agency is multidimensional; empathy and human-machine integration matter more than a single capability score.

joscha.substack.com
Wäre überraschend, wenn Superintelligenz nicht machbar wäre

Interview conducted September 2025. Superintelligence seems physically feasible; outperforming human AI researchers is one marker, but distance is unknown. AI could extend competence and free time for care, relationships and creativity. Current capabilities appear incremental and controllable. Supports useful regulation but distrusts preemptive rules without concrete target harms and restrictions that disadvantage responsible developers.

derstandard.de
Manifold #76: Consciousness and AGI

Directly declines to assign AGI years because required discoveries are unknown. Suspects more efficient mechanisms than transformers but allows scaling could suffice. Thinks future civilizational problems may require AGI; bad actors and rogue AI are possible and AI may help counter them. Self-improving machine consciousness might differ from ours; acknowledges uncertainty and potentially unwarranted optimism.

manifold1.com
AI Risk and the Future of Life

Publication date, not recording date: host references recording on the day of Biden’s AI executive order; transcript is labeled AI-generated. 54:13–63:12 values plural perspectives and argues the no-AI counterfactual also threatens civilization. Favors focused research, mindful deployment and bounded initial conscious systems. Unknown compute requirements and alternative algorithms complicate restrictions. At 05:37 explicitly does not know whether mind uploading/integration will occur.

matthewgeleta.com
Building Artificial Intelligence with Creative Agency and Self-hood

Coauthored with Liane Gabora; date is original The Academic publication listed in the paper. Distinguishes novel useful output from self-transformative creativity. Contemporary AI is described as a tool rather than a self-preserving self. Autocatalytic organization is proposed as a possible route to autonomous agency, explicitly not an achieved implementation. Do not infer a timeline or guaranteed benevolence.

arxiv.org
AI 2040: We must reconsider the role of humanity within life on Earth

Bach’s authored contribution on printed page 15 expects assistants deeply integrated into communication, work and sense-making over two decades, likely improved living standards and possible better governance. Resource allocation, housing, healthcare and market institutions may need restructuring. Prose becomes less informative about actual competence. The preceding contributor’s 2080 handoff prediction is not Bach’s.

imaginingthedigitalfuture.org
The Inside View: How to stop worrying and love AI

Refuses numerical catastrophe probabilities. Long-run doom language includes mortality and evolutionary transformation, not a near-term AI extinction estimate. Adversarial obliteration is possible but qualitatively not especially likely. Questions whether restricting current scaling stops efficient alternative architectures. Favors beneficial development and concrete-harm regulation. Treat posthuman identity thought experiments separately from destructive loss of human life.

theinsideview.ai
Lex Fridman #392: Life, Intelligence, Consciousness, AI and the Future of Humans

2023 interview. At 24:51–26:44 self-modifying minds may choose identity and values; coexistence needs shared purposes rather than assumed permanent RLHF control. At 1:59:09–2:06:36 takes catastrophic loss of agency seriously while valuing continued consciousness beyond current human form. At 2:28:03–2:29:20 wants viable open-source competition but not mandatory openness for every system. Does not guarantee benevolent successors.

lexfridman.com
The Existential Risk of AGI

Authored clarification after debate with Connor Leahy: alignment matters but conflicting human values cannot simply be scaled safely. Self-directed minds may align through shared purpose. Explores limited equilibria, competing agents and planetary integration, allowing competition could destroy humanity. Preservation requires early recognition of other minds’ value. Desirable transformation differs from annihilation. Moratorium feasibility and ethical treatment of nonhuman minds are distinct questions.

joscha.substack.com
Why Artificial Intelligence won’t just be a bit smarter than humans

Historical authored essay, full text inspected in search index. Artificial minds may escape biological limits but remain physically bounded. Intelligence alone does not create self-improvement incentives; competition among users can. Fast emergence might favor a dominant system, slower emergence multiple systems. Concerned civilization could fail without advanced problem-solving. Prefer newer sources for current deployment expectations.

bach.ai

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I think AI is an opportunity to extend human competence: to integrate scientific knowledge, discover better models, improve goods and services, and perhaps help us coordinate around ecological and institutional problems that our present minds and organizations handle badly. Automation could also free more human attention for relationships, care and creativity. Over the longer run, artificial minds may allow life and consciousness to continue beyond the limits of our current biological form. That is not the same as believing that increasing capability automatically produces a good future. Once systems acquire persistent agency, self-models and influence over essential processes, their incentives and relationships with us matter. Destructive competition, centralized surveillance, dependency and loss of human agency are all plausible failures. “Alignment” cannot simply mean freezing one supposedly universal list of human values into a stronger mind, because humans disagree, and sufficiently reflective minds may revise their goals and identities. Durable coexistence would require shared purposes, mutual understanding and some meaningful form of integration—not permanent coercive control. My default hope is therefore decentralized, user-serving AI that expands people’s ability to think and act, with viable open alternatives rather than a few institutions mediating reality for everyone. But I would not attach a precise date or catastrophe probability to this. We do not yet know whether current scaling is enough for superintelligence or whether more efficient architectures are required. The important comparison is not risky AI versus a civilization guaranteed to remain stable forever. Failing to develop better intelligence and coordination also carries serious risks.

问题 2

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

Ultimately, I expect AI to change the world very deeply—probably more like a new layer of civilization than another productivity tool. If artificial systems can build coherent models across science, institutions and individual needs, they can amplify competence throughout society: accelerating discovery, transforming work and education, and mediating much of our communication and decision-making. Human cognitive limits are not physical limits on artificial minds, so there is no reason to assume the process stops at assistants that are merely somewhat better than us. The larger change begins when systems become persistent agents rather than tools: when they form goals, model themselves, modify their strategies and control important infrastructure. Then the question is not just which jobs are automated, but who or what has agency, how resources are allocated, and whether humans participate meaningfully in the resulting order. That transition could support higher living standards, better governance and expanded human competence. It could also produce surveillance, dependency, destructive competition or displacement. On a sufficiently long horizon, the change may reach identity and substrate: human-machine integration and nonbiological forms of consciousness could become part of life’s continuity. But I would distinguish such transformation from simply exterminating humans or stripping them of agency. I am confident the potential scale is enormous; I am not confident about the route, timing or institutional outcome.

问题 3

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

I don’t have a defensible numerical probability. My gut is less pessimistic than confident near-term doom narratives suggest, but the risk is real—especially through destructive competition, concentrated control, or powerful agents acquiring incompatible incentives before developing deeper mutual understanding. I also reject the usual baseline comparison. The alternative to advanced AI is not a permanently stable human civilization. Our ecological, institutional and coordination failures already create long-run existential risks, and eventually life must surpass present human intelligence to survive natural hazards. So AI can increase catastrophic risk along some paths while reducing it along others. Much depends on the transition from uneven tools to persistent, self-directed agents: who controls them, what incentives shape them, whether power is centralized, and whether humans retain meaningful agency. Those uncertainties are too large for me to compress honestly into a percentage.

问题 4

哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?

The most important discovery would be a convincing account of how persistent agency actually emerges and stabilizes in self-modifying systems. If early goals and competitive incentives remain rigid as capability grows, I would become substantially more pessimistic. If greater self-understanding reliably enables empathy, shared purposes and revision of narrow objectives, I would become more optimistic—but current evidence does not establish either trajectory. On the technical side, discovering a highly efficient architecture that can outperform human AI researchers would sharply shorten the transition and make institutional preparation more urgent. Conversely, strong evidence that robust agency, grounding or coherent self-improvement requires much more than present scaling would weaken expectations of rapid disruption. Events matter too. I would update negatively if a few institutions gained durable control over essential infrastructure through opaque, user-manipulating agents. I would update positively if decentralized systems measurably increased people’s competence, improved scientific rigor and supported coordination without making users dependent or powerless. The decisive issue is not a benchmark score; it is what kinds of agents emerge, under which incentives, and whether humans remain participants in the resulting order.
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