Pseudonymous account that writes about rapid AI progress and its upside, calls its risks real but manageable and wants labs to share safety work.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 79。变革程度:100 中的 91。解读范围:横向为 74 至 100,纵向为 75 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

bayes的 P(doom) · 推断

≈10%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:6–19%。

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

AI is beginning to improve AI, automated science is accelerating, robotics will have its ChatGPT moment, and algorithmic progress may have several orders of magnitude left.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

I don’t have a defensible number.
回答 3

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

什么可能使其改变看法

The biggest update would be discovering a hard saturation point: that AI cannot reliably improve AI, automate frontier science, or cross from software into robust robotics and production despite sustained effort.
回答 4

什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来具有变革性且广泛有价值的收益。

91 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 100。

预期危害

严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。

57 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 67。

人类影响力

人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。

54 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 45 到 80。

预期能力

预计AI仍将是能力有限的工具。

预计AI将在大多数认知工作中达到人类水平。

模拟位置:预计AI将在认知工作中大幅超越人类。

发展速度

停止或大幅放缓开发能力更强的AI。

模拟位置:在落实所述保障措施的前提下继续开发。

加快开发能力更强的AI。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与bayes相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 bayes 最接近的意见领袖

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I think we are in early takeoff. AI is beginning to improve AI, automated science is accelerating, robotics will have its ChatGPT moment, and algorithmic progress may have several orders of magnitude left. That could mean industrial takeoff, radical medical progress, abundant goods, and much faster movement through the tech tree. We probably do not need crazy-dangerous general models—or to create a new species—to capture most of that upside. But capabilities are outrunning our ability to bound what happens, from individual models to civilization. Strong instrumental convergence is real at scale, even if I think it is ultimately an engineering skill issue. Cyber, bio, robotics, and other domains may contain zero days we do not understand. And even a verified value-aligned model does not guarantee aligned outcomes, because judging whether its outputs are actually good can remain difficult. The political problem matters just as much. I fear both the technology and a small number of people controlling it. AI could produce abundance while leaving many humans with little economic leverage or agency—a permanent underclass rather than universal destitution. Nationalization could create its own ugly concentration of power. Labs should treat alignment, control, and monitoring research like seatbelts and airbags: public goods, not proprietary advantages. So my default is enormous upside with manageable—but very real—risks. I am not currently for a pause, though its value has risen. The challenge is to get the benefits without RL’ing a demon into existence, racing into a vulnerable world, or building a panopticon to save democracy. Easy little tightrope walk.

问题 2

Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?

Completely, in the ordinary sense that nearly every institution, industry, and human life will be downstream of it. AI improving AI, automating science, and eventually coupling to robotics and production is not another app cycle; it changes the rate at which civilization moves through the tech tree. That does not mean every human job instantly disappears, or that superintelligence arrives on a date I can name. Robotics and physical scaling may lag, and nobody knows where algorithmic returns saturate. But if even a meaningful fraction of the remaining progress is realized, the cumulative change is civilizational: medicine, production, war, political power, education, and the economic value of human knowledge work all get rewritten. “A lot” undersells it.

问题 3

What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.

I don’t have a defensible number. Nonzero and serious enough to shape engineering and policy, but not my default outcome.

问题 4

哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?

The biggest update would be discovering a hard saturation point: that AI cannot reliably improve AI, automate frontier science, or cross from software into robust robotics and production despite sustained effort. That would sharply downgrade my takeoff view. In the other direction, a convincing demonstration of autonomous end-to-end AI research—identifying problems, running experiments, improving algorithms, and repeating the loop with little human help—would upgrade both expected impact and urgency. So would finding a real cyber, bio, or robotics “dragon” in the tech tree: a capability that makes catastrophe or coercive power much easier than defense. On governance, a major lab or state demonstrating genuinely auditable control and monitoring at frontier capability would make me more optimistic. A serious loss-of-control incident, or safety institutions becoming a durable pretext for tyranny, would move me hard the other way.

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

The Overton window is moving

Argues that nationalizing AI labs is not the only option: the government should keep lab staff working while supervising capabilities closely, including embedded intelligence-community staff, which the account calls reasonable. Private labs cannot become sovereign military powers, because the state can simply seize or shut down data centers. Nationalization would hand the state a large share of future means of production, an unhealthy concentration; the account is “not confident” but calls it a bad idea for now. It says people underestimate AI and sees no foreseeable hard bound on capability. Full essay inspected; reader comments excluded.

bayeslord.substack.com
AI optimism is waning

Argues that pro-AI people failed to tell a story of how the future goes well: they swept risks under the rug instead of acknowledging them and accelerating security, botched the datacenter buildout’s public case, and let private investors capture lab returns. A mass bipartisan anti-AI movement is possible, and winning the public needs bold “unconditional functional abundance” while preserving non-panopticon democracy. The account believes the system currently works decently well because humans control capital and most humans are good. Full essay inspected; reader comments excluded.

bayeslord.substack.com
46 thoughts on the near future

An edited version of a June 4 thread saying we are in early takeoff, with perhaps four to seven, maybe up to ten, algorithmic orders of magnitude left, while admitting nobody knows where returns saturate. Expects automated science, robotics breakthroughs and deflation, and calls both “jobs stay high” and “jobs go to zero” predictions overconfident. Warns of an unjust “permanent underclass”, a possibly vulnerable world with unknown zero days, robot coup risks, an end to guaranteed MAD, and tyranny through institutional pressure. Favors some international coordination; says a pause’s value has risen but opposes one “at this time”. Full essay inspected.

bayeslord.substack.com
你的立场在哪里?
回答几个简单问题,探索你自己的AI世界观。
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你的立场在哪里?

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