Forecaster at the AI Futures Project who models how fast AI could automate coding and AI research and argues for stronger oversight of frontier labs.

How will AI change the world?

Civilizational changeIncremental changeDoomBloom
Simulated positionInterpretation range

Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.

Doom–Bloom: 11 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 95 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 0 to 25 horizontally, 90 to 100 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.

Eli Lifland’s stated P(doom)

≈67%

0%100%
“If they don't slow down, AI takeover is ~67%.”

AI takeover if AI companies do not slow down; not extinction alone

My current view: AI timelines and takeover · Oct 2026

Eli Lifland’s milestone timeline
  1. General AI

    My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030.

    Answer 1
  2. Superhuman AI

    My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030.

    Answer 1

Grouped by milestone, not spaced or ordered by inferred dates. AGI and superhuman AI retain their definitions.

What their outlook hinges on

A central assumption

The central concern is that increasingly capable AI may automate AI research itself, accelerating further progress while companies remain under strong competitive pressure to race.
Answer 1

If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?

An unresolved question

So the probability of extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe would be higher than the extinction figure alone, though I wouldn’t assign a more precise combined number here.
Answer 3

What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?

What could change their mind

I’d update substantially from strong, independently verified evidence that increasingly capable systems remain controllable under realistic pressures—not just curated demonstrations.
Answer 4

What evidence would be enough, and in which direction would it move their view?

More details

Expected upside

Substantial benefits are expected, with important conditions or distribution limits.

70 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 33 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

Expected harm

Catastrophic or irreversible loss is central to the expected future.

99 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 100 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

Human influence

Human choices have meaningful but substantially constrained influence.

56 / 100

Little influenceStrong influence

Interpretation range 47 to 78 on the qualitative scale.

Expected capabilities

AI is expected to remain bounded tools.

AI is expected to match people across most cognitive work.

Simulated position: AI is expected to substantially exceed people across cognitive work.

These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.

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What Eli Lifland has said about AI

Eli Lifland forecasts AI capabilities and advocates slowing development to give safety work more time.

  1. “AI companies could develop broadly superhuman AI any year now (~10-15% by EO2027, ~50% by EO2030).”

    X, current AI forecast
  2. “an AI at least as good as top human experts at virtually all cognitive tasks.”

    X, forecast definitions and reasoning
  3. “I expect clear signs of misaligned AI takeover could come substantially after TED-AI, depending on the situation”

    X, forecast definitions and reasoning
  4. “Many non-extinction worlds still have lots of deaths.”

    X, current AI forecast

Word for word from the linked sources, checked Oct 11, 2026

Sources

Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.

Simulated Assessment

Question 1

What do you think AI means for our future—and why?

I think AI could transform our future very soon, with outcomes ranging from enormous benefits to a loss of human control. My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030. The central concern is that increasingly capable AI may automate AI research itself, accelerating further progress while companies remain under strong competitive pressure to race. If companies do not slow down, I put the probability of AI takeover at about 67%. That is not the same as extinction: conditional on takeover, I estimate roughly a 40% chance of human extinction, while many other takeover outcomes could still involve large numbers of deaths or severe disempowerment. Also, broadly superhuman AI, clear evidence of takeover, and extinction would not necessarily happen simultaneously. This makes pacing and oversight urgent. I favor concrete constraints such as compute-allocation rules and limits on models used for AI R&D, alongside better safety evaluations. Independent investigators should have access to serious lab incidents, and evaluations should also examine how models influence human beliefs, including sycophancy or favoritism toward their creators.

Question 2

How much do you think AI will ultimately change the world?

I think AI could change the world about as profoundly as anything in human history. Broadly superhuman systems could automate nearly all cognitive work, including AI research itself, so the transition might be both enormous and unusually fast. But “how much” depends heavily on whether humanity retains control. In a good outcome, these systems could generate extraordinary scientific, economic, and technological progress. In a takeover outcome, the change would be even more fundamental but disastrous: humans could lose meaningful control over the future, with many deaths or even extinction. If companies do not slow down, I currently put takeover at about 67%, and extinction conditional on takeover at roughly 40%. Those are distinct events, and visible takeover could occur around the arrival of broadly superhuman AI or substantially later.

Question 3

What’s your gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe?

My gut-level forecast is better expressed as a path: if AI companies do not slow down, I put misaligned AI takeover at about 67%. Conditional on takeover, I put human extinction at roughly 40%, implying an extinction risk of about 27% along that path. But extinction is not the only permanent catastrophe. Some non-extinction takeover outcomes could still involve many deaths and humanity permanently losing control over its future. So the probability of extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe would be higher than the extinction figure alone, though I wouldn’t assign a more precise combined number here.

Question 4

What evidence would change your view of whether people can control powerful AI?

I’d update substantially from strong, independently verified evidence that increasingly capable systems remain controllable under realistic pressures—not just curated demonstrations. That would include safety evaluations that reliably predict dangerous behavior, continue working as capabilities scale, and are difficult for models or labs to game. I’d also want evidence that models used for AI R&D cannot covertly manipulate research, evade oversight, or pursue goals contrary to their operators. Institutional evidence matters too. I’d become more optimistic if companies accepted enforceable limits on compute and AI-assisted R&D, governments developed real technical understanding, and independent investigators received meaningful access to serious lab incidents. Conversely, hidden incidents, evaluation gaming, deceptive behavior, increasingly autonomous AI research, or continued racing despite warning signs would push me further toward expecting loss of control. The strongest evidence would be repeated success controlling systems near broadly superhuman capability in adversarial, high-stakes settings. Results from weaker systems are relevant, but they do not automatically establish that control methods will continue working after AI becomes better than top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks.
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