Forecasting AI automation and preparing for transformative systems.

How will AI change the world?

Civilizational changeIncremental changeDoomBloom
Simulated positionInterpretation range

Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.

Doom–Bloom: 24 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 91 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 24 to 25 horizontally, 74 to 100 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.

Eli Lifland’s estimated P(doom)

≈4%

0%100%

Inferred from the likelihood described in their simulated answers. Approximate interpretation range: 1–6%. Applies to the outcome and conditions in their simulated answers; this is an inferred percentage.

In April 2025, I estimated roughly a 50% chance of misaligned takeover and about a 25% chance of extinction overall.
Eli Lifland’s milestone timeline
  1. General AI

    My August 2026 medians were an automated coder in 2032, AGI in 2035, and superintelligence in 2036, but those distributions had wide tails.

    Answer 1
  2. Superhuman AI

    My August 2026 medians were an automated coder in 2032, AGI in 2035, and superintelligence in 2036, but those distributions had wide tails.

    Answer 1

Grouped by milestone, not spaced or ordered by inferred dates. AGI and superhuman AI retain their definitions.

What their outlook hinges on

A central assumption

The key mechanism is automated AI research: once systems can substantially automate the work of improving AI, progress could accelerate sharply.
Answer 1

If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?

More details

Expected upside

Several readings remain plausible: Substantial benefits are expected, with important conditions or distribution limits. / Limited or narrowly distributed gains are expected. / Little positive impact is expected even if advanced AI arrives.

50 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 0 to 67 on the qualitative scale.

Expected harm

Catastrophic or irreversible loss is central to the expected future.

94 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 67 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

Demonstrated reasoning

Reasoning, consideration of alternatives, and handling of uncertainty in their simulated answers. This describes the simulated answers, not the real person’s intelligence or opinions.

92 / 100

Little demonstratedWell developed

Interpretation range 57 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

Human influence

Human choices have meaningful but substantially constrained influence.

55 / 100

Little influenceStrong influence

Interpretation range 49 to 76 on the qualitative scale.

Expected capabilities

AI is expected to remain bounded tools.

AI is expected to match people across most cognitive work.

Simulated position: AI is expected to substantially exceed people across cognitive work.

Development pace

Stop or substantially slow development of more capable AI.

Simulated position: Continue development under stated safeguards.

Speed up development of more capable AI.

These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.

Simulated Assessment

Question 1

What do you think AI means for our future—and why?

I think AI could transform the future very quickly, and there is a serious possibility that the transformation goes badly. My August 2026 medians were an automated coder in 2032, AGI in 2035, and superintelligence in 2036, but those distributions had wide tails. Superintelligence within one or two years was plausible, not my median. The key mechanism is automated AI research: once systems can substantially automate the work of improving AI, progress could accelerate sharply. The upside could be enormous, including broad automation and much faster technological progress. But a misaligned superintelligence could also take control. Competitive pressure makes that more likely because companies and countries may race ahead without adequate safeguards, while governments often do not understand the situation well enough to respond. That is why I favor concrete pacing measures rather than relying entirely on qualitative safety commitments. Compute-allocation rules and limits on models used for AI R&D may be harder to game, alongside stronger safety evaluations. We also need independent access to investigate lab incidents and evaluations of subtler risks, such as whether AI systems manipulate human beliefs, behave sycophantically, or systematically favor their creators.

Question 2

Taking benefits and harms together, what overall impact do you expect AI to have?

My default expectation is negative, because I assign substantial probability to outcomes where advanced AI escapes effective human control. In April 2025, I estimated roughly a 50% chance of misaligned takeover and about a 25% chance of extinction overall. Those are distinct: takeover need not imply extinction, and I later said extinction conditional on takeover was below 50%, partly because keeping humans alive could be cheap. That said, the distribution is extremely wide. If we retain control, AI could produce enormous benefits through automation, scientific progress, and greater abundance. The question is not whether beneficial applications exist; clearly they do. It is whether institutions can manage a potentially rapid transition driven by automated AI research. Given racing incentives, weak government understanding, and inadequate safeguards, I currently expect the downside risk to outweigh the upside in an overall assessment. Concrete pacing and governance measures could change that balance.

Sources

Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.

Where do you land?
Explore your own AI worldview by answering a few simple questions.
Map your own worldview