Question 1
Eli Lifland
x.com/eli_liflandForecaster at the AI Futures Project who models how fast AI could automate coding and AI research and argues for stronger oversight of frontier labs.
How will AI change the world?
Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.
Doom–Bloom: 11 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 95 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 0 to 25 horizontally, 90 to 100 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.
≈67%
“If they don't slow down, AI takeover is ~67%.”
AI takeover if AI companies do not slow down; not extinction alone
My current view: AI timelines and takeover · Oct 2026
General AI
My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030.
Answer 1Superhuman AI
My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030.
Answer 1
Grouped by milestone, not spaced or ordered by inferred dates. AGI and superhuman AI retain their definitions.
A central assumption
The central concern is that increasingly capable AI may automate AI research itself, accelerating further progress while companies remain under strong competitive pressure to race.Answer 1
If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?
An unresolved question
So the probability of extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe would be higher than the extinction figure alone, though I wouldn’t assign a more precise combined number here.Answer 3
What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?
What could change their mind
I’d update substantially from strong, independently verified evidence that increasingly capable systems remain controllable under realistic pressures—not just curated demonstrations.Answer 4
What evidence would be enough, and in which direction would it move their view?
More details
Substantial benefits are expected, with important conditions or distribution limits.
70 / 100
Interpretation range 33 to 100 on the qualitative scale.
Catastrophic or irreversible loss is central to the expected future.
99 / 100
Interpretation range 100 to 100 on the qualitative scale.
Human choices have meaningful but substantially constrained influence.
56 / 100
Interpretation range 47 to 78 on the qualitative scale.
AI is expected to remain bounded tools.
AI is expected to match people across most cognitive work.
Simulated position: AI is expected to substantially exceed people across cognitive work.
These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.
Similar worldviews
Thought leaders whose simulated worldviews are closest to Eli Lifland’s
What Eli Lifland has said about AI
Eli Lifland forecasts AI capabilities and advocates slowing development to give safety work more time.
“AI companies could develop broadly superhuman AI any year now (~10-15% by EO2027, ~50% by EO2030).”
X, current AI forecast “an AI at least as good as top human experts at virtually all cognitive tasks.”
X, forecast definitions and reasoning “I expect clear signs of misaligned AI takeover could come substantially after TED-AI, depending on the situation”
X, forecast definitions and reasoning “Many non-extinction worlds still have lots of deaths.”
X, current AI forecast
Word for word from the linked sources, checked Oct 11, 2026
Sources
Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.
Coauthored scenario explores automated research, competitive pressure and alternative outcomes; scenario dates are not personal certainty.

Lists Lifland on the core team and presents forecast distributions for software-engineering automation; links updated modeling and governance scenarios.

In the transcript, Lifland explains scenario uncertainty, coding-automation feedback loops and his historically longer median than the title year. At 02:19–02:25 he gives his then-official medians: automated coder 2032, AGI 2035 (possibly soon 2034), superintelligence 2036, with wide tails. At02:03:17–02:04:29 he says extinction conditional on misaligned AI takeover is below50%, explaining humans might survive because keeping them alive is cheap; this is not an unconditional extinction probability.

In this dated interview estimates roughly25% extinction and50% misaligned takeover. Separates those from75% takeover conditional on the specific fast, closely raced AI2027 scenario. These are April2025 views; later timeline revisions should remain intact.

Simulated Assessment
Question 2
How much do you think AI will ultimately change the world?
Question 3
What’s your gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe?
Question 4
What evidence would change your view of whether people can control powerful AI?
Where do you land?
Map my worldview

