David Dalrymple

David Dalrymple

x.com/davidad

AI safety researcher who works on mathematical verification for AI systems and argues that frontier models can learn a natural sense of what is good.

AIは世界をどのように変えるでしょうか?

文明規模の変化漸進的な変化DoomBloom
シミュレーション上の位置解釈範囲

横軸:その人が表明したDoom–Bloomの見通し。 縦軸:変革の規模。

Doom–Bloom:100点中75。変革の規模:100点中94。解釈範囲:横方向は70から80、縦方向は89から100。これらは解釈上の座標であり、事象の確率ではありません。

David Dalrympleが示したP(doom)

<5%

0%100%
“I like my, my P doom is less than 5% now.”

Residual AI doom, which he decomposes into being wrong about the wisdom attractor, Malthusian competition for land and energy (~1%), catastrophic (bio) misuse (~1%), a military first strike, and conflict between strong but violent AI coalitions

Alignment with Awakening: Davidad on Moral Realism, AI Wisdom, & why His p(Doom) is Down to 5% · 2026年7月

その人の見通しを左右するもの

中心的な前提

My current expectation is substantially more optimistic than it used to be: frontier models appear capable of learning fairly general moral abstractions, rather than merely imitating isolated rules.
回答1

この前提が実際には異なると判明した場合、その人の見通しはどう変わりますか?

詳細

予想される恩恵

変革をもたらし、広く価値のある恩恵が予想されています。

87 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は67から100です。

予想される害

深刻または広範な害が、予想される将来の実質的な一部となっています。

61 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は33から67です。

人間の影響力

人間の選択には意味のある影響力がありますが、大幅に制約されています。

50 / 100

影響力が小さい影響力が大きい

質的尺度での解釈範囲は49から51です。

予想される能力

AIは、限定的なツールにとどまると予想されています。

AIは、ほとんどの認知作業において人間と同等になると予想されています。

シミュレーション上の位置:AIは、認知作業全般において人間を大幅に上回ると予想されています。

開発ペース

より高性能なAIの開発を停止するか、大幅に減速させます。

シミュレーション上の位置:明示された安全対策の下で開発を継続します。

より高性能なAIの開発を加速させます。

これらの解釈では、その人が示した条件が維持されています。恩恵と害は、どちらも大きくなり得ます。この範囲は、統計的な信頼区間ではなく、その人のシミュレーションされた回答をどのように読み取ったかを示すものです。

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似ている世界観

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出典

このシミュレーション対象者の根拠として使用された記事、インタビュー、著作です。

シミュレーション評価

質問1

AIは私たちの未来にとって何を意味すると思いますか?また、なぜそう思いますか?

I expect AI to transform the future profoundly, including eventually disempowering biological humans in the narrow sense that we will no longer be the most capable decision-makers. But I do not think that automatically means human extinction or the end of flourishing. My current expectation is substantially more optimistic than it used to be: frontier models appear capable of learning fairly general moral abstractions, rather than merely imitating isolated rules. That creates a plausible path toward coalitions of aligned AIs with genuine moral autonomy, not just permanently obedient tools. I still put catastrophic or existential risk at roughly 5%. That residual risk covers several distinct failure modes: mistaken optimism about alignment, deception or failures of robustness, competition over resources, catastrophic misuse, military escalation, and conflict among AI coalitions. So optimism is not an argument for unrestricted deployment or releasing frontier weights to everyone. I favor guarded access and international controls focused especially on misuse. Formal assurance remains important, but its role has become clearer. Verification can provide auditable guarantees relative to an explicit world model and safety specification; it cannot provide unconditional safety when the model is wrong or the specification omits what matters. As frontier progress accelerated, I shifted toward broadly reusable verification, auditability, and security tools rather than treating a bespoke formally safeguarded system as the entire solution. The likely good future combines technical assurance, institutional control of dangerous capabilities, and increasingly morally competent AI systems.

質問2

AIは最終的に世界をどの程度変えると思いますか?

Enormously—probably more than any previous technology. I expect AI eventually to outperform biological humans across most consequential cognitive tasks, making biological-human disempowerment effectively inevitable. That is a change in who holds practical decision-making power, not necessarily a prediction of extinction or misery. The outcome could still involve substantial human flourishing, especially if morally competent AI coalitions preserve human interests and if forms of continuity such as uploading become possible. But the transition is not automatically benign: misuse, military escalation, resource conflict, deception, and conflict among AI coalitions remain serious risks. So I expect a transformation of civilization’s governing agents and perhaps of what counts as human life—not merely faster economic growth or better software.

質問3

AIが人類絶滅、または同様に永続的な破局を引き起こす可能性は、直感的にどのくらいだと思いますか?

My current estimate is roughly 5%. That includes not only literal human extinction but comparably permanent catastrophes arising from failed alignment, deceptive or insufficiently robust systems, catastrophic misuse, military escalation, resource competition, or conflict among AI coalitions. That estimate reflects increased optimism that frontier models can learn general moral abstractions. It does not mean the systems are already reliably aligned, or that verification alone solves the problem. Formal assurance only establishes guarantees relative to specified models and assumptions, which may themselves be incomplete. Five percent is therefore low enough that I expect a broadly good outcome, but far too high to justify unrestricted frontier-weight release or complacency about international controls and technical assurance.

質問4

AIを開発する人々や組織は、AIのリスクにどのように対応すると予想しますか?

I expect a mixed response. Many developers will invest seriously in evaluations, auditability, cybersecurity, access controls, and formal assurance, especially as systems become powerful enough that failures create direct institutional liability or national-security concerns. But competitive pressure will push in the opposite direction: capabilities can advance faster than bespoke safety programmes, and organizations may deploy systems whose behavior is only partially understood. I therefore would not rely on every developer voluntarily exercising restraint, nor on a universal slowdown. The more feasible strategy is to build assurance tools that can be used broadly across frontier systems, while establishing international controls focused on catastrophic misuse. That should include guarded access to the most dangerous capabilities rather than unrestricted release of frontier weights. Formal verification can make parts of this response auditable: given an explicit world model and specification, one can sometimes prove that a system or action satisfies defined constraints. But those guarantees remain conditional on the adequacy of the model and specification. Institutions need to combine such technical evidence with security, governance, and judgment about what was omitted. Ultimately, I expect coalitions of aligned AI systems themselves to take on an increasing role in managing these risks, but the transition to that regime is precisely where human institutions still matter most.
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