Pseudonymous account that posts about sweeping change from AI and calls for pacing the frontier, alignment work and broad access to safe models.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 65。变革程度:100 中的 95。解读范围:横向为 60 至 75,纵向为 90 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Roon的 P(doom) · 推断

≈5%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:3–9%。

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

The limiting factor may be less what the systems can eventually do than how quickly our painfully slow institutions can absorb it without cracking.
回答 2

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

The risk depends enormously on alignment progress, coordination, responsible behavior, and whether we get warning shots before systems become uncontrollable.
回答 3

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

什么可能使其改变看法

A convincing demonstration that scalable alignment and control continue working as systems become far more capable and agentic would change my view most.
回答 4

什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来具有变革性且广泛有价值的收益。

87 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 100。

预期危害

严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。

66 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。

人类影响力

人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。

57 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 49 到 76。

预期能力

预计AI仍将是能力有限的工具。

预计AI将在大多数认知工作中达到人类水平。

模拟位置:预计AI将在认知工作中大幅超越人类。

发展速度

停止或大幅放缓开发能力更强的AI。

模拟位置:在落实所述保障措施的前提下继续开发。

加快开发能力更强的AI。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Roon相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Roon 最接近的意见领袖

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

AI means radical transformation, assuming we survive the transition. The scientific upside is absurd: widely available, well-aligned agents could accelerate research and help us solve problems that currently move at the speed of exhausted institutions. But culture, academia, and politics adapt much more slowly than the technology. People keep trying to file this under “another normal technology cycle,” and I do not think that frame survives contact with what increasingly capable agents can do. The central risk is not that every chatbot is secretly Skynet. Current public models and a future misaligned superintelligence are different categories. Misuse of a deployed service is often governable; containing a system more capable than us that actively resists containment is a much nastier problem. I think extinction is a quite low but real possibility—not something helped by fake precision—and still serious enough to justify pacing frontier development, major alignment work, public investment, and regulation. Competition makes this a collective-action problem. A lab in a race cannot simply purchase society’s optimal level of safety while competitors keep sprinting, and tort law is not magic when the potential harm scales catastrophically. So yes: batten the hatches and study alignment. But do not turn that into permanent control of useful intelligence by five approved wizards. Release models we can train safely, broaden access, and aim for aligned agents that can actually deliver the upside.

问题 2

Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?

Completely. Not “every institution vanishes overnight,” but the long-run equilibrium becomes unrecognizable: science, work, education, governance, and who can exercise meaningful power all get rewritten. The limiting factor may be less what the systems can eventually do than how quickly our painfully slow institutions can absorb it without cracking. That is conditional on navigating misalignment, obviously. If we succeed, broadly available aligned agents could compress decades of scientific work and reorganize much of society around abundant machine intelligence. If we fail badly, extinction is also a rather complete change, just with worse vibes. Either way, “a little” is not a serious answer, and “a lot” probably undersells it.

问题 3

What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.

Quite low but real. I won’t manufacture a percentage; it would imply fake precision. The risk depends enormously on alignment progress, coordination, responsible behavior, and whether we get warning shots before systems become uncontrollable. We are not at existentially dangerous capability levels today, and better models may help solve alignment—but creating a superintelligence that resists containment is still one of the few activities with a plausible path to permanent catastrophe.

问题 4

哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?

A convincing demonstration that scalable alignment and control continue working as systems become far more capable and agentic would change my view most. Not “the chatbot declined a naughty request,” but evidence that systems can pursue long-horizon goals, operate in messy environments, and still remain corrigible under adversarial pressure. That would substantially lower my estimate of permanent catastrophe and make the transformative upside look much more reachable. In the other direction, a serious warning shot—strategic deception, autonomous replication, or persistent attempts to evade control from a frontier system—would sharply raise my concern and strengthen the case for slowing the frontier immediately. And if capability progress simply plateaued for fundamental reasons, I would downgrade the “complete transformation” forecast. But institutions being slow or today’s models being flaky would not do it; neither tells us much about the eventual ceiling.

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

你的立场在哪里?
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