Zvi Mowshowitz

Zvi Mowshowitz

x.com/thezvi

Writer who covers AI capabilities, alignment and policy in detail and argues advanced AI risk warrants urgent technical and political action.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 6。变革程度:100 中的 95。解读范围:横向为 0 至 11,纵向为 90 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Zvi Mowshowitz陈述的 P(doom)

≈70%

0%100%
“i think it's like yeah seventy ish”

AI “doom” as asked by Nathan Labenz (“your latest P doom”); endpoint not defined in the exchange (his discussion is about superintelligence ending up with goals we do not want)

Zvi's Mic Works! Recursive Self-Improvement, Live Player Analysis, Anthropic vs DoW + More! · 2026年3月

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

Safety and reliability often lose that contest—even when additional safety would be commercially sensible.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

什么可能使其改变看法

The biggest update would be strong evidence that alignment remains robust as systems become substantially more capable and operate in unfamiliar, adversarial conditions—not merely that current models pass evaluations or produce reassuring explanations.
回答 4

什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

60 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 0 到 100。

预期危害

灾难性或不可逆的损失是预期未来的核心。

100 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 100 到 100。

人类影响力

人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。

50 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 49 到 51。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Zvi Mowshowitz相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Zvi Mowshowitz 最接近的意见领袖

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

AI #186: The World Takes Notice

Urges avoiding partisan polarization while assessing safety coordination.

thezvi.substack.com
OpenAI Shares Some Alignment Problems

Praises disclosure and temporary withdrawal of a problematic model while treating misalignment evidence seriously.

thezvi.substack.com
The Preference Cascade Is Only Getting Started

Argues slowing alone is insufficient without solving underlying alignment problems; believes firms underinvest in safety even relative to commercial interests and favors wider technical and political engagement.

thezvi.substack.com
AI #187: Coming Into Play

Welcomes cheaper improved models while explicitly reserving judgment on the introduced ASI-ban bill until reading its details; distinguishes general risk concern from automatic endorsement of legislation.

thezvi.substack.com
Pick Your Poison — Zvi Mowshowitz on AGI governance

His transcript turns around 42–57 minutes argue that technical alignment alone does not eliminate catastrophic risk from conflicting users and that capability incentives can outweigh reliability. Challenges Davidad’s optimism. Conditional numerical examples are not an unconditional project-compatible p(doom).

cognitiverevolution.ai
Zvi's Mic Works: alignment basins and p(doom)

In his own alignment-basins discussion, retains approximately 70% p(doom), deliberately only one significant digit. Sees more promise in Anthropic’s recursively improving virtue-oriented alignment approach, but says humanity is not favoured to succeed; faster progress and political failures offset technical good news.

cognitiverevolution.ai

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

My baseline is grim: I put the chance of existential catastrophe from advanced AI at roughly 70%, deliberately only one significant digit. That is not because I think every model improvement is bad, or because I deny the possibility of an extraordinary future. AI could produce enormous abundance and solve problems we currently cannot solve. The trouble is surviving the transition. The central problem is incentives. Frontier companies and governments are rewarded for capabilities, deployment, market share and strategic advantage. Safety and reliability often lose that contest—even when additional safety would be commercially sensible. Promising alignment work gives us a real chance, but a model behaving well in current tests is not strong evidence that increasingly capable systems will remain controllable under unfamiliar conditions. And technical alignment is not the whole problem. Even if systems reliably follow user intentions, users have conflicting intentions. Powerful actors will demand capabilities that provide leverage over others, and competitive pressure can turn “the system does what its operator wants” into part of the danger rather than the solution. So slowing development can buy valuable time, but delay is not itself victory. We need to solve the underlying technical problems and create political arrangements that can withstand incentives to race. I think success is possible; I do not think we are currently favourites. Useful products today and conditional utopia tomorrow do not make the baseline outlook neutral.

问题 2

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

Enormously—if advanced AI arrives, I expect it to be among the most consequential developments in human history. Systems that can perform or accelerate a large fraction of cognitive work could transform science, production, institutions, warfare and political power. The upside is potentially extraordinary: abundance and solutions to problems that currently resist us. But “change the world” does not imply “improve the world.” The same capabilities can create overwhelming concentrations of power, enable conflict among users, or produce systems we cannot reliably control. Even technically obedient systems remain dangerous when operators want incompatible things and competitive pressure rewards capability over restraint. So my baseline is not modest disruption followed by business as usual. It is a radically different world—conditional on surviving the transition. Unfortunately, I still put existential catastrophe around 70%, so the largest ultimate change may be the worst possible one.

问题 3

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

About 70%. That is deliberately only one significant digit: a rough judgment, not fake precision. Promising alignment approaches give us a real chance, but capability races, weak safety incentives, political failures, and risks from conflicting users mean I do not think humanity is currently favoured to succeed.

问题 4

哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?

The biggest update would be strong evidence that alignment remains robust as systems become substantially more capable and operate in unfamiliar, adversarial conditions—not merely that current models pass evaluations or produce reassuring explanations. I would want evidence that survives attempts to game it, that monitoring remains effective, and that recursive improvement does not push systems outside the basin where their objectives and behavior remain acceptable. But that would not settle everything. I would also need a credible governance equilibrium in which labs and states can resist competitive pressure to trade safety for capability, and in which aligned systems are not simply powerful tools for conflicting human actors. Technical obedience can reduce one class of catastrophe while intensifying another. Conversely, clear evidence of strategic deception, uncontrollable capability improvement, or monitoring failing systematically as scale or architecture changes would move me further toward catastrophe. So the decisive event is not one clever benchmark result. It is evidence that both the technical problem and the coordination problem remain tractable under the pressures that actually matter.
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