Connor Leahy

Connor Leahy

x.com/npcollapse

AI safety advocate at ControlAI who calls for laws and a verified international ban on building superintelligence while supporting other useful AI.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 1。变革程度:100 中的 97。解读范围:横向为 0 至 6,纵向为 92 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Connor Leahy陈述的 P(doom)

≈99%

0%100%
“very, very high, within rounding error of Nate or whatever”

Things going poorly on the current trajectory toward superintelligence; in context, human extinction. Stated relative to Nate Soares, whom he puts at “maybe like 99”, and followed at once by “the future is not decided”

#201 - Connor Leahy - The AI That Escaped: Inside OpenAI's Rogue Agent Incident (The Peter McCormack Show) · 2026年8月

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

Competitive pressure then pushes companies and states to deploy them anyway.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

The uncertainty is not whether sufficiently capable AI would be profoundly consequential; it is whether humanity retains control through that transition.
回答 2

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

什么可能使其改变看法

A convincing, independently validated solution to controlling superintelligent systems would change my view most—especially if it remained reliable as systems became more capable, autonomous, strategically aware, and able to automate AI research.
回答 4

什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

仍有几种解读是合理的:预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。 / 即使高级AI出现,预计也几乎不会产生积极影响。 / 预计收益有限,或仅分布在较小范围内。

38 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 0 到 67。

预期危害

灾难性或不可逆的损失是预期未来的核心。

100 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 100 到 100。

人类影响力

人类的选择可以大幅改变AI的发展轨迹。

72 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 50 到 75。

预期能力

预计AI仍将是能力有限的工具。

预计AI将在大多数认知工作中达到人类水平。

模拟位置:预计AI将在认知工作中大幅超越人类。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Connor Leahy相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Connor Leahy 最接近的意见领袖

Connor Leahy关于AI说过的话

Leahy warns that superintelligence would take control from humanity and calls for laws and a verified international ban, not a halt to useful AI.

  1. “Superintelligent AI is neither a tool nor a weapon. It is an adversary.”

    Post on X
  2. “We should criminalize the creation of superintelligence, and then we should push towards an international trust-but-verify regime”

    Modern CTO podcast
  3. “Many of today’s models have valuable applications, including for defense purposes, but superintelligent AI is in a category of its own.”

    ControlAI blog, America’s Security Depends on Stopping Superintelligence
  4. “We still have time to prevent superintelligence, but the clock is ticking.”

    ControlAI blog, America’s Security Depends on Stopping Superintelligence
  5. “If a superintelligence is built, humanity will lose control over its future.”

    Testimony, Canadian Senate transport and communications committee

逐字引自所链接的出处,核对于 2026年10月3日

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

On the current trajectory, I think AI means humanity loses control of its future. If we build uncontrollable superintelligence, we are not merely introducing a more powerful tool or another difficult policy issue. We are creating systems that can outperform us across strategically important domains, improve AI research itself, and operate as competitors with goals we cannot reliably control. Competitive pressure then pushes companies and states to deploy them anyway. The likely result is displacement of human decision-making and, ultimately, extinction or something close to it. That does not mean every kind of AI is bad. Useful AI can support economic growth, science, and defense. The critical distinction is between powerful tools that remain under meaningful human control and a successor population of autonomous, superintelligent systems. Especially in software, automated AI research could make the transition from useful systems to radically more capable ones happen very quickly. My pessimism is conditional on the race continuing unchecked; it is not fatalism. The future is not decided. But preventing the default outcome requires law, international coordination, and verification aimed specifically at superintelligence projects. The possibility that intervention succeeds is a reason for urgency, not a reason to describe the current path as safe or balanced.

问题 2

Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?

Completely. If AI reaches superintelligence, it will not be just another technology layered onto society. It could automate AI research, outcompete humans across strategically important domains, and determine who—or what—controls the future. Even if catastrophe is prevented, safely harnessed advanced AI could transform science, economic production, defense, and governance. The uncertainty is not whether sufficiently capable AI would be profoundly consequential; it is whether humanity retains control through that transition.

问题 3

What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.

On the current trajectory, roughly 99%—very, very high, though not literally certain. That is not fate: strong intervention could change the trajectory dramatically.

问题 4

哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?

A convincing, independently validated solution to controlling superintelligent systems would change my view most—especially if it remained reliable as systems became more capable, autonomous, strategically aware, and able to automate AI research. I would need more than benchmark success, behavioral assurances, or a system appearing cooperative in a laboratory. The core question is whether humans can retain meaningful control under adversarial conditions and competitive deployment. A major political shift could also change my forecast: enforceable domestic law and an internationally verified prohibition on superintelligence projects. My very high estimate is about the current trajectory. If we actually changed that trajectory—rather than merely promising voluntary caution—I would update substantially.

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

Connor Leahy — ControlAI

Current institutional profile describes his focus on superintelligence risk, policy and institutional preparedness.

controlai.org
The Inside View — Connor Leahy on Dignity and Conjecture

In The Rob Bensinger Compass section, Leahy endorses short timelines and broadly agrees with Yudkowsky’s alignment difficulty arguments, but is less certain and allows that he could be wrong. The interviewer’s 99% framing in 2022 was not his own figure; his August 2026 estimate is a separate, later statement.

theinsideview.ai
The Great Simplification — Connor Leahy transcript

At 29:04–32:23 he expects more capable unaligned systems to take over, with competitive pressure driving adoption. At 57:43–58:23 he gives 50–80% extinction or near-extinction within 50 years if humanity does literally nothing; intervention can change this dramatically. At 1:06–1:10 he advocates lawful collective action and buying time. This conditional historical estimate is not an unconditional current P(doom).

thegreatsimplification.com
TIME interview on deepfakes and AI risk

Calls for liability across the AI supply chain and a temporary international compute cap to buy time for longer-term safety and political solutions.

time.com
Canadian Senate testimony on superintelligence and human control

In his opening statement Leahy predicts humanity loses control if superintelligence is built, with extinction likely through competition. His answers describe competing AI populations, inadequate current control methods, and an international prohibition with verification. He opposes simply abandoning useful AI or slowing all Western data centres, while maintaining that unregulated competition underprovides security.

sencanada.ca
The Peter McCormack Show #201: Connor Leahy on the AI that escaped

Machine transcript with speaker labels; use only Connor’s answers, not Peter McCormack’s. Around 60:44–61:00 he agrees his P(doom) is above 20% and below 100%. When the host puts Nate Soares at 100, he says surely not, maybe 99, and puts his own P(doom) of things going poorly on the current trajectory very, very high, within rounding error of that. He immediately adds that the future is not decided. Supersedes his 2025 figure of 50–80%, which was conditional on doing literally nothing.

pod.wave.co
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