问题 1
Eli Lifland
x.com/eli_liflandForecaster at the AI Futures Project who models how fast AI could automate coding and AI research and argues for stronger oversight of frontier labs.
AI将如何改变世界?
横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。
Doom–Bloom:100 中的 11。变革程度:100 中的 95。解读范围:横向为 0 至 25,纵向为 90 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。
≈67%
“If they don't slow down, AI takeover is ~67%.”
AI takeover if AI companies do not slow down; not extinction alone
My current view: AI timelines and takeover · 2026年10月
通用 AI
My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030.
回答 1超人类 AI
My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030.
回答 1
按里程碑分组,不按推断日期间隔或排序。AGI 和超人类 AI 保留他们的定义。
一个核心假设
The central concern is that increasingly capable AI may automate AI research itself, accelerating further progress while companies remain under strong competitive pressure to race.回答 1
如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?
一个尚未解决的问题
So the probability of extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe would be higher than the extinction figure alone, though I wouldn’t assign a more precise combined number here.回答 3
什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?
什么可能使其改变看法
I’d update substantially from strong, independently verified evidence that increasingly capable systems remain controllable under realistic pressures—not just curated demonstrations.回答 4
什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?
更多详情
预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。
70 / 100
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 100。
灾难性或不可逆的损失是预期未来的核心。
99 / 100
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 100 到 100。
人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。
56 / 100
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 47 到 78。
预计AI仍将是能力有限的工具。
预计AI将在大多数认知工作中达到人类水平。
模拟位置:预计AI将在认知工作中大幅超越人类。
这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。
相似的世界观
模拟世界观与 Eli Lifland 最接近的意见领袖
Eli Lifland关于AI说过的话
Eli Lifland forecasts AI capabilities and advocates slowing development to give safety work more time.
“AI companies could develop broadly superhuman AI any year now (~10-15% by EO2027, ~50% by EO2030).”
X, current AI forecast “an AI at least as good as top human experts at virtually all cognitive tasks.”
X, forecast definitions and reasoning “I expect clear signs of misaligned AI takeover could come substantially after TED-AI, depending on the situation”
X, forecast definitions and reasoning “Many non-extinction worlds still have lots of deaths.”
X, current AI forecast
逐字引自所链接的出处,核对于 2026年10月11日
来源
用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。
Coauthored scenario explores automated research, competitive pressure and alternative outcomes; scenario dates are not personal certainty.

Lists Lifland on the core team and presents forecast distributions for software-engineering automation; links updated modeling and governance scenarios.

In the transcript, Lifland explains scenario uncertainty, coding-automation feedback loops and his historically longer median than the title year. At 02:19–02:25 he gives his then-official medians: automated coder 2032, AGI 2035 (possibly soon 2034), superintelligence 2036, with wide tails. At02:03:17–02:04:29 he says extinction conditional on misaligned AI takeover is below50%, explaining humans might survive because keeping them alive is cheap; this is not an unconditional extinction probability.

In this dated interview estimates roughly25% extinction and50% misaligned takeover. Separates those from75% takeover conditional on the specific fast, closely raced AI2027 scenario. These are April2025 views; later timeline revisions should remain intact.

模拟评估
问题 2
你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?
问题 3
凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?
问题 4
哪些证据会改变你对人们能否控制强大AI的看法?
你的立场在哪里?
描绘我的世界观

