问题 1
Robert Miles
x.com/robertskmilesAI safety educator who explains on YouTube why advanced AI may not share human goals and who calls for enforceable limits on frontier AI development.
AI将如何改变世界?
横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。
Doom–Bloom:100 中的 6。变革程度:100 中的 93。解读范围:横向为 0 至 11,纵向为 88 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。
10–90%
“any number in the 10 to 90% range is plausibly defensible”
Unspecified AI “doom” as asked on Doom Debates (AI existential catastrophe); he does not define the endpoint
Rob Miles, Top AI Safety Educator: Humanity Isn’t Ready for Superintelligence! · 2025年8月
一个核心假设
A sufficiently capable agent pursuing the wrong objective may seek resources, improve its own capabilities, and resist shutdown simply because those actions help it achieve almost any long-term goal.回答 1
如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?
一个尚未解决的问题
My uncertainty is extremely broad because the outcome depends less on a fixed property of AI than on what humanity chooses to do—whether we race ahead, pause dangerous development, enforce safety requirements, and make genuine alignment progress.回答 3
什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?
更多详情
预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。
61 / 100
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 67。
灾难性或不可逆的损失是预期未来的核心。
99 / 100
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 100 到 100。
人类的选择可以大幅改变AI的发展轨迹。
81 / 100
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 50 到 100。
预计AI仍将是能力有限的工具。
预计AI将在大多数认知工作中达到人类水平。
模拟位置:预计AI将在认知工作中大幅超越人类。
模拟位置:停止或大幅放缓开发能力更强的AI。
在落实所述保障措施的前提下继续开发。
加快开发能力更强的AI。
这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。
相似的世界观
模拟世界观与 Robert Miles 最接近的意见领袖
来源
用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。
Speaker-attributed interview: Miles calls doom his mainline prediction, while allowing alignment breakthroughs and being fundamentally mistaken in a lucky direction. This is dated pessimism with uncertainty, not an exact probability or a 2050 forecast.

Author’s introductory safety talk; accessible primary video metadata establishes topic and authorship, not a fresh quantitative forecast.

Miles’s own answers at 21:58–30:50 allow a broad 10–90% risk range, with uncertainty dominated by societal response. At 1:45:46–1:48 he supports pausing AGI/superintelligence development, particularly AI-research agents, while welcoming useful narrow AI. The host’s numerical framing is not his estimate.

Explains why effectiveness at pursuing goals does not entail human-compatible goals: understanding morality is different from wanting to act morally. Foundational argument about possible agents, not a measured claim about every current model.

Given sufficiently capable goal-directed agents, many goals incentivize resources, self-improvement and resistance to shutdown or goal changes. These are instrumental pressures, not human malice; the argument preserves exceptions and depends on agentic competence.

Advocates deployment obligations and control protocols as interim safeguards, not an alignment solution or assurance for superintelligence. Benchmark attack success is not real-world extinction probability.

模拟评估
问题 2
你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?
问题 3
凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?
问题 4
你认为哪些压力会影响AI公司处理安全问题的方式?
你的立场在哪里?
描绘我的世界观