Thomas G. Dietterich

Thomas G. Dietterich

x.com/tdietterich

Oregon State machine learning professor emeritus who works on safe and robust AI and argues that AI agents need continual human oversight.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 63。变革程度:100 中的 57。解读范围:横向为 50 至 75,纵向为 50 至 75。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Thomas G. Dietterich的 P(doom) · 推断

≈9%

0%100%

根据他的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:5–16%。

他的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

It is maintained by monitoring and controlling the whole human-machine system, with adversarial testing and rapid detection and recovery when failures occur.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他的展望会如何变化?

什么可能使其改变看法

The biggest change would be a convincing demonstration that a system can learn general rules and reliably apply them far beyond its training distribution—not merely interpolate, imitate, or pass a benchmark.
回答 4

什么证据才足够,又会让他的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

67 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。

预期危害

严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。

58 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 67。

人类影响力

人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。

54 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 44 到 81。

发展速度

停止或大幅放缓开发能力更强的AI。

模拟位置:在落实所述保障措施的前提下继续开发。

加快开发能力更强的AI。

AI使用规则

在事先落实保护措施或获得许可之前,限制所讨论的AI用途。

模拟位置:允许所讨论的AI用途,同时实施有针对性的问责与保护措施。

尽量减少对所讨论AI用途的限制。

这些解读保留了他陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Thomas G. Dietterich相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Thomas G. Dietterich 最接近的意见领袖

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I expect AI to be useful and consequential, but not because we have created some mystical “AGI.” Arguing over AGI and superintelligence is mostly a waste of time. The practical question is what particular systems can do, where they fail, and whether we can build reliable, controllable systems around them. Today’s systems are impressive statistical learners, but they remain unreliable. They can state a rule and then violate it, invent citations, or fail when a problem extends beyond patterns in their training data. Machine learning means always having to say you’re sorry. That does not make it useless; it means we must engineer for inevitable mistakes. Safety is not a permanent property trained into a model. It is maintained by monitoring and controlling the whole human-machine system, with adversarial testing and rapid detection and recovery when failures occur. The benefits could be substantial, especially where machines complement rather than imitate us: formal proofs, software testing, scientific-literature integration, drug and materials discovery, weather forecasting, ecosystem management, and complex simulations. But direct-action agents are probabilistic execution engines, so using them in weapons or other high-stakes settings without quantified uncertainty and hard constraints is reckless. I think AI-caused extinction is unlikely. Mass-casualty misuse is another matter: an AI-assisted pathogen release, for example, could kill millions. Present harms also deserve attention, particularly emotional dependence on chatbots and the erosion of creative or intellectual work. So my future is neither utopia nor apocalypse. It is a long engineering struggle to obtain real benefits from powerful but fallible machinery.

问题 2

Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?

A lot, but “completely” is too vague to be useful. AI will become embedded in science, engineering, organizations, education, and everyday tools, much as computation already has. It could substantially accelerate drug and materials discovery, simulation, formal verification, and environmental management. But widespread use is not the same as autonomous mastery. These systems will continue to make mistakes, and real deployments will depend on people, institutions, monitoring, and other software to compensate. So I expect deep, broad change—not a magical discontinuity in which machines replace every human capability or take control of everything.

问题 3

What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.

I have not assigned it a numerical probability. My qualitative judgment is that human extinction from AI is unlikely. But a permanent global catastrophe is a broader and less clearly defined category, and AI-assisted misuse—such as a pathogen release—could still kill many millions without causing extinction. I would not invent a percentage that implies more precision than I have.

问题 4

哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?

The biggest change would be a convincing demonstration that a system can learn general rules and reliably apply them far beyond its training distribution—not merely interpolate, imitate, or pass a benchmark. It would need to know when it lacks evidence, attribute its conclusions, quantify uncertainty, and remain controllable while acting in unfamiliar situations. Conversely, repeated real-world evidence that continual supervision cannot detect and recover from failures quickly enough—especially in cyber, biological, or military settings—would make me substantially more pessimistic. A polished demonstration or another larger language model would not be enough. I would want adversarial testing and sustained deployment evidence, because engineering history is full of systems that looked reliable until they encountered novelty.

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

The Chaotic Evolution of the Field with Tom Dietterich

Asked whether machine learning is over, he says it is in a crisis in Kuhn’s sense: after enormous investment in scaling statistical learning, large language models look more like smoothing and interpolating between training data than learning general rules that extrapolate; they can state the rules of chess yet make illegal moves, cannot judge which sources to trust, struggle to know whether they saw relevant data, and cannot attribute outputs. He names causal machine learning, world models, uncertainty quantification, attribution and multi-agent trust as open challenges. From his DARPA PAL and startup experience he warns that agents must fit real workflows, demand intrusive personal knowledge, need ways to forget, and will make mistakes. These are research challenges, not proofs of impossibility. Own turns in the publisher’s machine transcript inspected; most of the episode is field history.

machinelearning.transistor.fm
Running to the Noise, Episode 23

Calls recent scaling a brute-force period and expects its environmental costs to fall partly through efficiency incentives. Repeats that hallucination and failure to learn generalizable rules (for example, multiplication beyond trained lengths) suggest a fundamentally different approach may be needed. Says he shares concerns about AI replacing creative and intellectual work, that LLMs do not understand argument or evidence so universities must still teach them, that artists’ styles may deserve new legal protection, and that the claim people who do not use AI will be left behind is “too much of an AI-booster statement.” Expects some of the biggest benefits in drugs, materials and sustainability. Full published transcript of his turns inspected.

oberlin.edu
Complexity is a reason not to push the current technology

Three-post reply to a user arguing that AI’s supposedly inevitable advance is driven by capital. As an AI/ML researcher he says complexity is a reason not to push today’s systems, the first “knowledge technology” to scale but with many problems. He hopes for something simpler and better: cheaper, more efficient, more controllable and safer, able to attribute outputs to sources, learn continually, quantify uncertainty and avoid hallucination; attribution would compensate creators and control would mitigate risks. A hope and research vision, not a forecast. Thread and parent inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
Layering symbolic systems on top of LLMs

Points to symbolic layers over LLMs as a way to address probabilistic execution, continual learning, attribution and perhaps uncertainty quantification. Says an LLM directly taking actions is an unpredictable probabilistic execution engine that cannot enforce hard safety constraints, noting an agent architecture that checks LLM-emitted code before execution. Suggests layering could also allow very rapid learning from little data. A favored research direction, not a claim that it already works. Three-post thread inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
“AGI” shares the defects of the Turing Test

Six-post thread arguing that defining AGI as matching or exceeding humans on all tasks makes human performance the measure of intelligence. He prefers systems that complement people by doing well what people do poorly, such as formal proofs, verification tests, integrating the scientific literature, faster physical simulations, organizational situational awareness and helping journalists assess sources, evaluated on those capabilities rather than IQ-style tests. Ends by calling AGI-building a distraction. Older context consistent with his 2026 posts. Full thread inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
LLMs are not reliable tools for autonomous weaponry

During a dispute over military AI contracts, he says LLM-based technology is good for many things but not reliable for autonomous weapons: it needs large GPU computers and lacks quantified uncertainty for novel, high-stakes situations. He first attributed a rival contract to an Altman-orchestrated move, then in later self-replies noted reporting that the government initiated it and that the story was more complex. He adds that models need guardrails, but guardrails trained by RL or fine-tuning are not modular, raising questions about who chooses them. Thread self-replies inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
The International AI Safety Report as a good-faith risk assessment

In a thread where another user said experts are not worried enough to act, he notes that Bengio chairs the International AI Safety Report, calls it a good-faith effort to assess the whole spectrum of AI risks, and says he served as one of its external advisors. This establishes engagement with broad risk assessment, not agreement with every finding or any probability. Post inspected via the public Bluesky API; the thread root was unavailable.

bsky.app
Emotional addiction to chatbots as today’s top AI risk

Sharing a New York Times opinion piece about chatbot romance, he says he agrees that emotional addiction to chatbots is the number one risk of AI today. This ranks present-day harms; it is not a long-run forecast. The linked op-ed’s arguments are not his and were not inspected. Post inspected via the public Bluesky API.

bsky.app
AI experts challenge ‘doomer’ narrative, including ‘extinction risk’ claims

Older, secondary context. Responding to the Statement on AI Risk, he said he was baffled by prominent signers’ positions, that outside deep learning most researchers thought industry and the press were over-reacting to LLM fluency, and that the greatest computing risk was cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. He suggested examining the funding incentives of existential-risk organizations alongside those of researchers like himself, without questioning their sincerity. Newer sources take precedence: by 2026 he takes AI-enabled mass-casualty misuse seriously and endorses a broad international risk assessment. Full article inspected.

venturebeat.com
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