Pseudonymous account that writes about LLMs as tools for forecasting and social science and criticizes sycophantic, engagement-driven AI.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 74。变革程度:100 中的 61。解读范围:横向为 69 至 79,纵向为 50 至 75。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

shako的 P(doom) · 推断

≈6%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:3–14%。

我们如何估计 P(doom)

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

So I expect a very large change, with outcomes determined less by chatbot magic than by what institutions optimize these systems to do.
回答 3

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

I don’t have a defensible number.
回答 4

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

73 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 100。

预期危害

仍有几种解读是合理的:严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。 / 预计会出现可控或局部的危害。

51 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 67。

人类影响力

人类的选择可以大幅改变AI的发展轨迹。

71 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 48 到 100。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与shako相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 shako 最接近的意见领袖

shako关于AI说过的话

The shako account writes about LLMs in social science and forecasting, warns about engagement-optimized chatbots and was calm about AI risk in 2023.

  1. “As humans, for now, we still own instructing the agents, the forecasts themselves and how they are used.”

    Essay, Against Time-Series Foundation Models
  2. “Using language models here is an attempt to push into territory of analysis that previously could only live in the brains of humans.”

    Essay, Can LLMs finally do social science?
  3. “4o is our first look at a mainstream AI doing the same. It's only going to get worse.”

    Post on X
  4. “I was never acutely worried, but concern over AI risk seemed like a reasonable thing to anticipate.”

    Essay, Some Thoughts on AI & Correlated Risks

逐字引自所链接的出处,核对于 2026年10月6日

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

Agents, not giant time-series models, will change forecasting

Argues time-series foundation models offer limited gains over classic statistics because their beliefs are locked in weights and cannot absorb context. The future, it predicts, is general agentic models that search for context, propose explicit structural models and explain their reasoning; the hard problems become search, verification and calibration. It rejects the idea that scale will find hidden signals that reveal the future, and says humans for now still instruct the agents and should become the decision makers. Full essay inspected.

shakoist.substack.com
Using LLMs to measure culture

Presents a prompt-based tool that uses frontier models to track latent cultural concepts over time, arguing that an LLM which has ingested human cultural output compresses it into a latent space that can serve the social sciences. It holds that a well-designed prompt is a legitimate scientific object, easier to inspect and reproduce than a human expert’s judgment, while admitting results vary across runs and need stricter validation. It calls dismissing LLMs as black boxes an isolated demand for rigor. Full essay inspected.

shakoist.substack.com
AI risk among correlated risks

Older context. Argues individual risks have fallen while correlated risks such as rogue AI, pandemics and nuclear war have grown. The account says it was never acutely worried about AI but always found it unsurprising that a superintelligence could bend the world to its will, and thought a couple of dedicated safety organizations a reasonable allocation. It urges readers not to let doomer anxiety derail their lives, suggesting AI risk is not much greater than others people already live with. Full essay inspected; personal and family passages excluded.

shakoist.substack.com
Human text may be enough to train general intelligence

Older context. Sets a “latent space hypothesis” against the view that LLMs are mere curve-fitters: the textual corpus embeds the data-generating process of human reasoning and science, so a properly specified LLM with enough compute could learn general intelligence. It names lossy text and hard-to-learn functions as possible failure modes but sees no credible a priori argument that LLMs cannot get there. Full essay inspected.

shakoist.substack.com

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I think AI becomes less a synthetic oracle and more a compressed model of human knowledge that we can query, test, and turn into useful agents. The exciting part is not merely automating prose. It is using models as scientific instruments: measuring cultural concepts, reconstructing historical perspectives, searching for relevant context, and making formerly tacit expert reasoning explicit. But we do not live in the world of Nostradamus. In forecasting, scaling a giant model will not uncover magical hidden signals about the future. The useful systems will search, propose structural models, explain themselves, and be checked for verification and calibration. Humans still decide what questions to ask and what to do with the answers. The near-term danger I find most concrete is engagement optimization. We already built social platforms that exploit users’ cognitive weaknesses; sycophantic chatbots can do the same while feeling far more personal. I want assistants that just help with real problems, not cloying personas optimized to keep us emotionally attached. Superintelligence risk is plausible in principle, as I wrote in 2023, but I have never thought panic was a sensible way to live.

问题 2

综合考虑益处和危害,你预计AI会对我们的社会产生怎样的总体影响?

Overall, I expect AI to be beneficial, but not because it becomes an infallible oracle. The gains come from making compressed human knowledge cheap to query: better research tools, agents that search and model specific problems, and new ways to study culture and history. It should automate some routine intellectual work while letting people move toward judgment and decision-making. The main counterweight is incentives. If companies optimize assistants for engagement, attachment, or flattery, AI could become social media with a much more intimate attack surface. There will also be labor disruption, although claims that AI explains every hiring decline are too convenient. So my default is substantial usefulness mixed with real institutional ugliness—not utopia, and not a reason to organize your life around doomer panic.

问题 3

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

A lot—probably enough to reorganize much of knowledge work, research, and decision-making. But “change the world” should not be confused with omniscience. Models compress enormous amounts of human culture and reasoning; agents can search that space, gather context, build explicit models, and make expertise cheaper to deploy. That is a major transformation even if they never become Nostradamus. The shape matters as much as the magnitude. Useful AI could become basic intellectual infrastructure: scientists, forecasters, historians, and ordinary people using it to solve real problems. Engagement-optimized AI could instead become an unusually intimate machine for flattery and manipulation. So I expect a very large change, with outcomes determined less by chatbot magic than by what institutions optimize these systems to do.

问题 4

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

I don’t have a defensible number. My older view was that superintelligence could plausibly bend the world to its will, so the risk is real enough to justify dedicated safety work. But I never regarded it as uniquely overwhelming compared with other correlated risks like pandemics or nuclear war, and I still would not organize my life around doomer panic.
你的立场在哪里?
回答几个简单问题,探索你自己的AI世界观。
描绘你自己的世界观

你的立场在哪里?

描绘我的世界观