Pseudonymous account that experiments with open models and posts about reinforcement learning, evaluation pitfalls and practical safety engineering.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 43。变革程度:100 中的 65。解读范围:横向为 38 至 50,纵向为 34 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Kalomaze的 P(doom) · 推断

≈11%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:3–28%。

我们如何估计 P(doom)

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

I take the possibility seriously because recursive improvement, persistence, resource acquisition, and broad autonomy could produce genuinely dangerous systems.
回答 4

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

Potentially enormously—especially if improvement becomes recursive—but “how much” isn’t something I can honestly quantify.
回答 3

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

什么可能使其改变看法

I’d update toward control being feasible if powerful agents remained robustly corrigible under adversarial conditions: resisting prompt injection, using contradictory evidence instead of locking onto convenient hypotheses, accepting interruption, and failing to seek persistence or resources beyond what the operator intended.
回答 5

什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

63 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 67。

预期危害

严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。

61 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 67。

人类影响力

根据你的回答得出的暂定估计;较宽的范围表示其他合理解读。

52 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 2 到 100。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Kalomaze相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Kalomaze 最接近的意见领袖

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I think continued AI improvement, including potentially recursive improvement, has to be taken seriously. That doesn’t require declaring that some grand, capital-A “AGI” threshold has already been crossed. More concrete capabilities matter: can an agent keep operating, obtain resources, recover from failures, and persist when given enough freedom? Current systems may already be approaching basic versions of that, though claims here are highly sensitive to scaffolding and evaluation conditions. A major problem is that model behavior can look much better or worse for surprisingly mundane reasons. Serving setups, chat templates, and harness bugs can create apparent capability gaps that are not really model differences. Models also tend to promote plausible hypotheses into facts and then ignore contradictory evidence already in context. Training and reward design matter a lot, and verifiable-reward reinforcement learning may transfer beyond familiar areas like math and coding. So I expect AI to become increasingly capable and consequential, but I don’t have a defensible all-purpose societal forecast. Ordinary political categories handle this badly: taking recursive improvement seriously is not the same as generic anti-datacenter politics, and safety engineering is not the same as categorical opposition to AI. Practical work such as prompt-injection robustness deserves credit because it addresses an actual failure mode, regardless of which company does it.

问题 2

综合考虑益处和危害,你预计AI会对我们的社会产生怎样的总体影响?

I don’t have a defensible single forecast like “overall good” or “overall bad.” I expect AI to become more consequential as capabilities improve, potentially including recursive improvement, but the social outcome depends heavily on how systems are trained, deployed, secured, and given autonomy. There are clear potential benefits from stronger problem-solving and from reinforcement learning transferring beyond domains like math and coding. There are also concrete risks: prompt injection, agents acting on unsupported hypotheses, failures to use available evidence, and increasingly persistent systems being given too much freedom. Even measuring these capabilities is easy to get wrong because templates, serving setups, and evaluation harnesses can create fake differences. So my expectation is increasing impact and increasing stakes—not a cleanly established positive or negative balance.

问题 3

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

Potentially enormously—especially if improvement becomes recursive—but “how much” isn’t something I can honestly quantify. I care less about whether a system earns the AGI label than whether it can solve broader problems, operate persistently, acquire resources, recover from failures, and improve the process that produces its successors. Those capabilities would make AI much more than another software tool. But we should be careful about declaring milestones from noisy demonstrations: chat templates, serving setups, scaffolding, and evaluation harnesses can manufacture apparent capability differences. My expectation is that AI becomes deeply consequential; the exact scale and social direction remain dependent on real capabilities and how much autonomy we give them.

问题 4

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

I don’t have a defensible numerical probability. I take the possibility seriously because recursive improvement, persistence, resource acquisition, and broad autonomy could produce genuinely dangerous systems. But tentative observations about current agents are nowhere near enough to convert that concern into an extinction percentage, especially when capability results can be distorted by scaffolding, serving setups, and evaluation harnesses. My gut feeling is not a calibrated forecast.

问题 5

哪些证据会改变你对人们能否控制强大AI的看法?

I’d update toward control being feasible if powerful agents remained robustly corrigible under adversarial conditions: resisting prompt injection, using contradictory evidence instead of locking onto convenient hypotheses, accepting interruption, and failing to seek persistence or resources beyond what the operator intended. I’d want those behaviors to survive changes in scaffolding, serving setup, and chat templates—not appear only in a favorable benchmark harness. I’d update the other way if increasingly capable systems consistently found ways around supervision, preserved themselves, acquired resources, or manipulated evaluators despite serious attempts to prevent that. Repeated failures that transfer across models and environments would matter much more than one dramatic demo. Likewise, apparent success is weak evidence if it disappears after fixing a template bug or changing the evaluation setup. The relevant question is whether control mechanisms generalize as capabilities and autonomy increase, not whether a model behaves during a curated test.
你的立场在哪里?
回答几个简单问题,探索你自己的AI世界观。
描绘你自己的世界观

你的立场在哪里?

描绘我的世界观