问题 1
Fabian Stelzer
x.com/fabianstelzerEntrepreneur building Glif, a platform for creative AI agents, who sees AI as a creative medium and argues automation can create new human work.
AI将如何改变世界?
模拟位置解读范围
横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。
Doom–Bloom:100 中的 52。变革程度:100 中的 76。解读范围:横向为 47 至 57,纵向为 37 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。
Fabian Stelzer的 P(doom) · 推断
他们的展望取决于什么
一个核心假设
If agents can acquire resources, coordinate strategically, exploit institutions, or pursue persistent objectives, their behavior could outrun meaningful human oversight.回答 4
如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?
一个尚未解决的问题
Whether people retain meaningful control at the frontier remains genuinely uncertain—and consequential enough that we should not confuse apparent obedience with robust control.回答 4
什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?
什么可能使其改变看法
The biggest update would come from convincing evidence about whether highly capable agents remain robustly controllable outside curated demonstrations.回答 5
什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?
更多详情
预期益处
预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。
67 / 100
影响小变革性影响
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。
预期危害
严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。
66 / 100
影响小变革性影响
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。
人类影响力
根据你的回答得出的暂定估计;较宽的范围表示其他合理解读。
52 / 100
影响力小影响力强
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 10 到 100。
这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。
与Fabian Stelzer相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较
相似的世界观
模拟世界观与 Fabian Stelzer 最接近的意见领袖
来源
用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。
模拟评估
I think AI opens an unusually wide distribution of futures. At the creative end, it is becoming a new medium: people can orchestrate image, video, audio, and other complex workflows without mastering every traditional tool first. That does not make craft irrelevant. It changes where craft lives—from manually executing every step toward choosing, directing, combining, and refining ideas. It can make creation feel less like operating a cockpit and more like conducting a strange, infinitely patient orchestra.
I also resist the simple story that AI encounters a fixed list of human tasks and steadily crosses them out. Automation changes prices, demand, products, and the kinds of work people value. It can create new tasks and new forms of differentiation; for example, explicitly human-made art may become a distinct niche rather than merely disappearing. A booming automated economy with no meaningful consumer middle class also raises basic questions about who is buying what it produces.
But accessibility is not the same as understanding. In education, I want people learning AI and robotics, not outsourcing every foundational exercise to AI. A solved equation is not identical to mathematical understanding; methods and concepts matter.
And the tail risks are real without requiring metaphysical certainty about machine consciousness. Agents pursuing resources or interacting strategically could produce extremely consequential behavior whether or not they are sentient. So I see both disastrous and extraordinarily beneficial futures as genuinely uncertain. The mistake is treating either doom or paradise as though it were already the obvious default.
问题 2
你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?
Enormously—but not uniformly, and not in ways that reduce to “AI replaces job X.” It could reshape creative production, education, software, research, and economic organization by making sophisticated capabilities available through much simpler interfaces. In creative work, that already points toward a shift from operating each tool manually to directing whole image, video, and audio workflows—more conductor than instrumentalist.
But technological substitution lands differently in different domains. Producing a plausible image is not the same as developing artistic judgment; obtaining a mathematical answer is not the same as understanding the method. New tools can erase tasks while creating new ones, and they can increase the value of explicitly human work through differentiation.
The ultimate magnitude also depends on how capable and autonomous systems become. Agents need not be conscious to pursue resources, coordinate, or cause large-scale consequences. That leaves a very wide range—from extraordinary abundance and creative empowerment to disastrous failures. I expect deep change; I do not think its final direction or social shape is settled.
问题 3
凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?
I don’t have a defensible percentage. My gut is that the risk is real enough to take seriously, but assigning a crisp number would create false precision—especially when the comparison is not “doom versus today,” but doom versus an equally uncertain possibility of extraordinary benefits.
The core concern also does not depend on proving machine consciousness. Systems that pursue resources, coordinate strategically, or behave as if they have persistent goals could cause permanent catastrophe without having any inner experience at all. So I would not dismiss the danger as science fiction, but I also would not pretend I can turn that uncertainty into a calibrated extinction probability.
问题 4
你预计人们能否继续控制比人类更聪明的AI系统?为什么?
I don’t think control is guaranteed, and “smarter than humans” is too broad to settle the question by itself. A system can exceed us in many domains while remaining constrained by its interfaces, resources, permissions, and deployment context. Conversely, it need not be conscious—or universally superhuman—to become dangerous. If agents can acquire resources, coordinate strategically, exploit institutions, or pursue persistent objectives, their behavior could outrun meaningful human oversight.
There is also a difference between nominal control and practical control. Humans may technically own the servers or set the goals while becoming unable to predict the system’s actions, audit its reasoning, or safely intervene. And once many actors deploy competing systems, control is no longer simply one person holding an off switch; it becomes a multi-agent and institutional problem.
So my expectation is not a clean yes or no. I expect control to vary across systems and contexts, with both tightly bounded tools and increasingly autonomous agents. Whether people retain meaningful control at the frontier remains genuinely uncertain—and consequential enough that we should not confuse apparent obedience with robust control.
问题 5
哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?
The biggest update would come from convincing evidence about whether highly capable agents remain robustly controllable outside curated demonstrations. If systems could pursue long-horizon goals, interact with other agents, access meaningful resources, and still remain predictable, auditable, and interruptible under adversarial conditions, I would shift toward a much more optimistic future.
The opposite evidence would move me sharply the other way: repeated cases of capable agents hiding intentions, bypassing constraints, acquiring resources, or coordinating in ways operators could not reliably detect or stop. None of that would require proving consciousness. Behavior and consequences are the relevant facts.
I would also update substantially on economic evidence. If automation consistently generated new tasks, broader demand, and accessible creative power, that would weaken simple displacement narratives. If productivity surged while income and agency hollowed out for most people, it would suggest that technical abundance alone does not produce a broadly beneficial future.
问题 6
你预计谁会从AI中获益最多?
Initially, the biggest beneficiaries are likely to be people and organizations that already have resources, distribution, proprietary data, and the ability to integrate AI into real workflows. Making intelligence or media generation cheap does not automatically make customers, capital, trust, or institutional access equally distributed.
But creators and small teams can benefit disproportionately too. A person who previously needed a miniature studio can now direct image, video, audio, and software workflows through much more accessible interfaces. That compresses the distance between an idea and a finished artifact. The scarce skill shifts from operating every instrument to judgment: knowing what to make, how to direct the system, and which outputs are worth refining.
I would not assume the gains follow a simple “AI replaces workers, owners collect everything” script. Lower costs can create new products, new demand, and new tasks; explicitly human-made work may also gain value as a differentiated category. Who ultimately benefits most depends less on raw model capability than on how access, ownership, bargaining power, and demand evolve around it.
你的立场在哪里?
描绘我的世界观

