Adam Elmore

Adam Elmore

x.com/adamdotdev

Software developer and podcast co-host who finds AI agents powerful for routine coding but values hands-on programming and sustainable work habits.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 51。变革程度:100 中的 32。解读范围:横向为 46 至 75,纵向为 11 至 64。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Adam Elmore的 P(doom) · 推断

≈3%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:低于 10%。

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

If every change becomes a conversation with an agent, I can ship more while understanding less of the codebase.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

I’ve seen both striking successes and stubborn failure loops, so the practical question is whether better models produce durable leverage or just more plausible output moving faster.
回答 2

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

什么可能使其改变看法

The biggest shift would come from agents becoming reliably capable without requiring constant supervision—and doing so without hiding how the system works from the engineer.
回答 2

什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

65 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。

预期危害

预计会出现可控或局部的危害。

35 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 33。

人类影响力

根据你的回答得出的暂定估计;较宽的范围表示其他合理解读。

51 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 0 到 100。

AI使用规则

在事先落实保护措施或获得许可之前,限制所讨论的AI用途。

模拟位置:允许所讨论的AI用途,同时实施有针对性的问责与保护措施。

尽量减少对所讨论AI用途的限制。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Adam Elmore相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Adam Elmore 最接近的意见领袖

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I think AI will make a lot of knowledge work dramatically faster, especially programming. Models can already replace hours of mundane work, improve files, suggest changes, and let one engineer operate across more of a system. That is real leverage, not just hype. But I don’t think faster automatically means better. The tradeoff I keep running into is distance. If every change becomes a conversation with an agent, I can ship more while understanding less of the codebase. The work can shift from making things to feeding, reviewing, and redirecting agents—sometimes through failure loops that only look productive. That can erode both engineering judgment and the satisfaction of the craft. It can also encourage an unhealthy always-on rhythm, as though idle agents or sleep represent wasted capacity. So I expect a future with much cheaper plausible output, but not cheap quality. Choosing worthwhile goals, developing taste, checking the work, and caring enough to make something good still require effort. We’ll also need to treat agents as operational actors with meaningful access: credentials, tools, and autonomy create concrete risks. The future I want keeps humans in control and uses models to remove drudgery without removing our understanding of—or connection to—the work.

问题 2

哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?

The biggest shift would come from agents becoming reliably capable without requiring constant supervision—and doing so without hiding how the system works from the engineer. If I could delegate substantial changes, inspect clear reasoning and diffs, and consistently come away with more understanding rather than less, that would resolve much of my ambivalence. The opposite would also matter: repeated evidence that greater capability mainly creates more review burden, security exposure, compulsive agent-management, and codebases nobody really understands. I’ve seen both striking successes and stubborn failure loops, so the practical question is whether better models produce durable leverage or just more plausible output moving faster.

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

你的立场在哪里?
回答几个简单问题,探索你自己的AI世界观。
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