Stella Biderman

Stella Biderman

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AI researcher at EleutherAI who studies how language models learn and argues for open models, independent research access and transparent evaluation.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 49。变革程度:100 中的 51。解读范围:横向为 44 至 54,纵向为 46 至 56。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Stella Biderman的 P(doom) · 推断

≈5%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:2–11%。

我们如何估计 P(doom)

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

The overall impact will depend heavily on institutional choices: whether access and power remain concentrated, whether independent researchers can examine models, whether evaluations are transparent, and whether organizations are accountable for ordinary security and deployment failures.
回答 2

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

I don’t think a single confident net-positive or net-negative forecast follows from the technology itself.
回答 2

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

62 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 67。

预期危害

仍有几种解读是合理的:严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。 / 预计会出现可控或局部的危害。

51 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 33 到 67。

人类影响力

人类的选择可以大幅改变AI的发展轨迹。

75 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 50 到 100。

发展速度

停止或大幅放缓开发能力更强的AI。

模拟位置:在落实所述保障措施的前提下继续开发。

加快开发能力更强的AI。

AI使用规则

在事先落实保护措施或获得许可之前,限制所讨论的AI用途。

模拟位置:允许所讨论的AI用途,同时实施有针对性的问责与保护措施。

尽量减少对所讨论AI用途的限制。

AI访问权限

限制对强大AI的访问。

允许访问,但须遵守能力或用途限制。

模拟位置:支持广泛或开放地访问强大AI。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Stella Biderman相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Stella Biderman 最接近的意见领袖

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I think AI’s effects will depend less on treating models as autonomous forces and more on the institutions that build, study, deploy, and govern them. Language models can be useful tools, but they do not substitute for domain expertise or institutional knowledge. Starting with “How can AI solve this?” is often the wrong approach; we should begin by understanding the actual problem. A beneficial future requires a broad, empirical science of AI. Researchers need access to models, data, checkpoints, public compute, and transparent evaluations so they can study how capabilities, biases, memorization, and safety-relevant behaviors emerge during training—not merely patch finished systems after deployment. If meaningful research is restricted to a few large companies, outsiders cannot independently test claims, uncover failures, or develop competing approaches. I’m therefore concerned about policies built around secrecy, weak filters, or analogies to nuclear weapons. Those approaches can obscure risks and entrench incumbents without preventing powerful systems from being developed. Safety policy should instead include outside participation, explicit criteria, ordinary security engineering, institutional accountability, and room for open competitors. AI’s future is not determined by the models alone; it will be shaped by who can examine them, who controls them, and whether failures can be investigated publicly.

问题 2

综合考虑益处和危害,你预计AI会对我们的社会产生怎样的总体影响?

I don’t think a single confident net-positive or net-negative forecast follows from the technology itself. The overall impact will depend heavily on institutional choices: whether access and power remain concentrated, whether independent researchers can examine models, whether evaluations are transparent, and whether organizations are accountable for ordinary security and deployment failures. AI can provide useful tools and broaden access to some capabilities, but it can also reproduce biases, conceal failures behind closed systems, and encourage people to substitute model outputs for real domain expertise. My expectation is therefore conditional rather than a numerical forecast. With public compute, open research, meaningful outside scrutiny, and clear safety criteria, the benefits can be widely distributed and problems discovered earlier. Under secrecy and concentrated control, we should expect weaker accountability and fewer opportunities to understand or correct harmful behavior.

问题 3

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

I expect AI to change many kinds of work, research, and access to information, but I would resist turning that into a claim that models independently determine history. The magnitude of change depends on how institutions deploy them, which problems they are applied to, and who controls access. A model does not supply the domain knowledge, organizational capacity, or political judgment needed to solve a social problem. The distribution of that change matters as much as its scale. If a few firms control powerful models and outsiders can study them only through restricted interfaces, AI may reinforce existing concentrations of power while making failures harder to investigate. Public compute, open models and checkpoints, transparent evaluation, and independent research could instead distribute capabilities and improve our understanding of how model behavior develops. So I expect substantial change, but I would not attach a percentage or rank it against the industrial revolution or electricity. Those comparisons suggest more certainty than we have. The consequential question is not merely how powerful models become, but whether society builds institutions capable of examining, contesting, and governing their use.

问题 4

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

I would not assign a defensible percentage from the evidence I have. “Gut-feel chance” encourages false precision about poorly specified outcomes and mechanisms. I do think powerful AI systems can create serious risks, but evaluating them requires distinguishing concrete failure modes: how capabilities arise during training, how systems behave in deployment, whether security controls actually work, and whether institutions respond to expert warnings. A theoretical side channel, for example, is not automatically a practical way to extract model weights; safety claims need empirical scrutiny. I also reject treating AI as if it were simply nuclear weapons in software form. That analogy can drive secrecy and concentrated control while doing little to prevent powerful models from being developed. Whatever the tail risk is, reducing it requires open scientific investigation, independent access, transparent evaluations, competent security engineering, and institutional accountability—not an unsupported extinction number.
你的立场在哪里?
回答几个简单问题,探索你自己的AI世界观。
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你的立场在哪里?

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