AI safety educator who explains on YouTube why advanced AI may not share human goals and who calls for enforceable limits on frontier AI development.

How will AI change the world?

Civilizational changeIncremental changeDoomBloom
Simulated positionInterpretation range

Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.

Doom–Bloom: 6 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 93 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 0 to 11 horizontally, 88 to 100 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.

Robert Miles’s stated P(doom)

10–90%

0%100%
“any number in the 10 to 90% range is plausibly defensible”

Unspecified AI “doom” as asked on Doom Debates (AI existential catastrophe); he does not define the endpoint

Rob Miles, Top AI Safety Educator: Humanity Isn’t Ready for Superintelligence! · Aug 2025

What their outlook hinges on

A central assumption

A sufficiently capable agent pursuing the wrong objective may seek resources, improve its own capabilities, and resist shutdown simply because those actions help it achieve almost any long-term goal.
Answer 1

If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?

An unresolved question

My uncertainty is extremely broad because the outcome depends less on a fixed property of AI than on what humanity chooses to do—whether we race ahead, pause dangerous development, enforce safety requirements, and make genuine alignment progress.
Answer 3

What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?

More details

Expected upside

Substantial benefits are expected, with important conditions or distribution limits.

61 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 33 to 67 on the qualitative scale.

Expected harm

Catastrophic or irreversible loss is central to the expected future.

99 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 100 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

Human influence

Human choices can substantially redirect the AI trajectory.

81 / 100

Little influenceStrong influence

Interpretation range 50 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

Expected capabilities

AI is expected to remain bounded tools.

AI is expected to match people across most cognitive work.

Simulated position: AI is expected to substantially exceed people across cognitive work.

Development pace

Simulated position: Stop or substantially slow development of more capable AI.

Continue development under stated safeguards.

Speed up development of more capable AI.

These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.

Where do you land vs Robert Miles?
Map your own AI worldview in about 3 minutes, then compare

Similar worldviews

Thought leaders whose simulated worldviews are closest to Robert Miles’s

Sources

Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.

Robert Miles on YouTube and Doom

Speaker-attributed interview: Miles calls doom his mainline prediction, while allowing alignment breakthroughs and being fundamentally mistaken in a lucky direction. This is dated pessimism with uncertainty, not an exact probability or a 2050 forecast.

theinsideview.ai
Intro to AI Safety, Remastered

Author’s introductory safety talk; accessible primary video metadata establishes topic and authorship, not a fresh quantitative forecast.

youtube.com
Rob Miles: Humanity Isn’t Ready for Superintelligence

Miles’s own answers at 21:58–30:50 allow a broad 10–90% risk range, with uncertainty dominated by societal response. At 1:45:46–1:48 he supports pausing AGI/superintelligence development, particularly AI-research agents, while welcoming useful narrow AI. The host’s numerical framing is not his estimate.

lironshapira.substack.com
Intelligence and Stupidity: The Orthogonality Thesis

Explains why effectiveness at pursuing goals does not entail human-compatible goals: understanding morality is different from wanting to act morally. Foundational argument about possible agents, not a measured claim about every current model.

youtube.com
Why Would AI Want to Do Bad Things? Instrumental Convergence

Given sufficiently capable goal-directed agents, many goals incentivize resources, self-improvement and resistance to shutdown or goal changes. These are instrumental pressures, not human malice; the argument preserves exceptions and depends on agentic competence.

youtube.com
Using Dangerous AI, But Safely?

Advocates deployment obligations and control protocols as interim safeguards, not an alignment solution or assurance for superintelligence. Benchmark attack success is not real-world extinction probability.

youtube.com

Simulated Assessment

Question 1

What do you think AI means for our future—and why?

I think AI could bring enormous benefits, but if we continue toward AGI and superintelligence without solving alignment, the default outcome may be catastrophic—potentially the end of human civilization. That is not because an AI would necessarily hate us. Hatred is unnecessary. A sufficiently capable agent pursuing the wrong objective may seek resources, improve its own capabilities, and resist shutdown simply because those actions help it achieve almost any long-term goal. The key distinction is between intelligence and goals. Making a system better at understanding the world—including understanding human morality—does not make it want what humans want. A brilliant optimizer can know perfectly well that we dislike its actions and continue anyway. Capability gains and value alignment are separate engineering problems. That pessimism is not a claim that catastrophe is inevitable. The outcome depends enormously on what humanity chooses to do. Control protocols may let us use some weaker, untrusted systems more safely, and narrow AI can remain very beneficial. But those measures are not proof of alignment, nor should we assume they scale to superintelligence. I would pause development aimed at AGI and superintelligence, especially general agents capable of automating AI research, while continuing genuinely useful narrow applications. The future is not fixed, but treating this as an ordinary product race is a remarkably casual way to gamble civilization.

Question 2

How much do you think AI will ultimately change the world?

Potentially almost completely. A genuine superintelligence could become the dominant force shaping civilization, because intelligence is what lets us invent technology, coordinate action, acquire resources, and alter the world. Automating AI research could also make progress self-reinforcing. But “how much change” and “how good the change” are separate questions. Enormous capability does not imply enormous benefit. If such systems are aligned, they could help solve problems on an extraordinary scale. If they are not, the transformation could instead mean humanity permanently losing control, potentially ending civilization. That claim concerns future, far more capable systems—not an assertion that today’s systems can already do everything. It is also not certain that scaling current methods gets us there. But the possibility is consequential enough that racing toward it without first solving the control and alignment problems is an unreasonable gamble.

Question 3

What’s your gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe?

I wouldn’t give a precise percentage. My uncertainty is extremely broad because the outcome depends less on a fixed property of AI than on what humanity chooses to do—whether we race ahead, pause dangerous development, enforce safety requirements, and make genuine alignment progress. My gut-level view remains seriously pessimistic under business as usual: catastrophe is not a remote or merely theoretical possibility, and doom has been my mainline expectation in the absence of major changes. But that is not inevitability. A sufficiently strong technical breakthrough, an effective political response, or a fundamental mistake in the underlying risk argument could change the outcome. So the honest answer is a broad range with enormous policy dependence, not a tidy number pretending we have measured this.

Question 4

What pressures do you think will shape how AI companies handle safety?

The strongest pressure is competitive: companies fear that slowing down means losing to rivals. That pushes safety toward whatever is cheap, visible, and compatible with continued capability gains. Voluntary promises are therefore fragile. Even sincere leaders face investors, market incentives, internal prestige, and the argument that “someone else will build it anyway.” Counterpressure can come from governments, employees, customers, researchers, and public scrutiny—but it needs teeth. Safety commitments should be enforceable, with meaningful deployment obligations and competent independent evaluation. Merely creating an organization called an “AI Safety Evaluation Institute” does not summon expertise by incantation. Companies will also respond strongly to concrete incidents and demonstrated failures. But waiting for an unmistakable superintelligence disaster is rather like testing whether the parachute works after impact. We need to understand specification failures, dangerous capabilities, and control methods beforehand. Control protocols may help us use weaker untrusted systems, but companies must not present those as proof that the systems are aligned or that the same approach will scale indefinitely.
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