Question 1
Connor Leahy
x.com/npcollapseAI safety advocate at ControlAI who calls for laws and a verified international ban on building superintelligence while supporting other useful AI.
How will AI change the world?
Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.
Doom–Bloom: 1 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 97 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 0 to 6 horizontally, 92 to 100 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.
≈99%
“very, very high, within rounding error of Nate or whatever”
Things going poorly on the current trajectory toward superintelligence; in context, human extinction. Stated relative to Nate Soares, whom he puts at “maybe like 99”, and followed at once by “the future is not decided”
A central assumption
Competitive pressure then pushes companies and states to deploy them anyway.Answer 1
If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?
An unresolved question
The uncertainty is not whether sufficiently capable AI would be profoundly consequential; it is whether humanity retains control through that transition.Answer 2
What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?
What could change their mind
A convincing, independently validated solution to controlling superintelligent systems would change my view most—especially if it remained reliable as systems became more capable, autonomous, strategically aware, and able to automate AI research.Answer 4
What evidence would be enough, and in which direction would it move their view?
More details
Several readings remain plausible: Substantial benefits are expected, with important conditions or distribution limits. / Little positive impact is expected even if advanced AI arrives. / Limited or narrowly distributed gains are expected.
38 / 100
Interpretation range 0 to 67 on the qualitative scale.
Catastrophic or irreversible loss is central to the expected future.
100 / 100
Interpretation range 100 to 100 on the qualitative scale.
Human choices can substantially redirect the AI trajectory.
72 / 100
Interpretation range 50 to 75 on the qualitative scale.
AI is expected to remain bounded tools.
AI is expected to match people across most cognitive work.
Simulated position: AI is expected to substantially exceed people across cognitive work.
These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.
Similar worldviews
Thought leaders whose simulated worldviews are closest to Connor Leahy’s
What Connor Leahy has said about AI
Leahy warns that superintelligence would take control from humanity and calls for laws and a verified international ban, not a halt to useful AI.
“Superintelligent AI is neither a tool nor a weapon. It is an adversary.”
Post on X “We should criminalize the creation of superintelligence, and then we should push towards an international trust-but-verify regime”
Modern CTO podcast “Many of today’s models have valuable applications, including for defense purposes, but superintelligent AI is in a category of its own.”
ControlAI blog, America’s Security Depends on Stopping Superintelligence “We still have time to prevent superintelligence, but the clock is ticking.”
ControlAI blog, America’s Security Depends on Stopping Superintelligence “If a superintelligence is built, humanity will lose control over its future.”
Testimony, Canadian Senate transport and communications committee
Word for word from the linked sources, checked Oct 3, 2026
Sources
Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.
Current institutional profile describes his focus on superintelligence risk, policy and institutional preparedness.

In The Rob Bensinger Compass section, Leahy endorses short timelines and broadly agrees with Yudkowsky’s alignment difficulty arguments, but is less certain and allows that he could be wrong. The interviewer’s 99% framing in 2022 was not his own figure; his August 2026 estimate is a separate, later statement.

At 29:04–32:23 he expects more capable unaligned systems to take over, with competitive pressure driving adoption. At 57:43–58:23 he gives 50–80% extinction or near-extinction within 50 years if humanity does literally nothing; intervention can change this dramatically. At 1:06–1:10 he advocates lawful collective action and buying time. This conditional historical estimate is not an unconditional current P(doom).

Calls for liability across the AI supply chain and a temporary international compute cap to buy time for longer-term safety and political solutions.

In his opening statement Leahy predicts humanity loses control if superintelligence is built, with extinction likely through competition. His answers describe competing AI populations, inadequate current control methods, and an international prohibition with verification. He opposes simply abandoning useful AI or slowing all Western data centres, while maintaining that unregulated competition underprovides security.

Machine transcript with speaker labels; use only Connor’s answers, not Peter McCormack’s. Around 60:44–61:00 he agrees his P(doom) is above 20% and below 100%. When the host puts Nate Soares at 100, he says surely not, maybe 99, and puts his own P(doom) of things going poorly on the current trajectory very, very high, within rounding error of that. He immediately adds that the future is not decided. Supersedes his 2025 figure of 50–80%, which was conditional on doing literally nothing.

Simulated Assessment
Question 2
Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?
Question 3
What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.
Question 4
What discovery or event would most change your view of AI’s future impact?
Where do you land?
Map my worldview