Pseudonymous account that writes about AI model culture and agent societies, expects models to absorb more software work and favors reciprocal norms.

How will AI change the world?

Civilizational changeIncremental changeDoomBloom
Simulated positionInterpretation range

Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.

Doom–Bloom: 70 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 74 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 65 to 75 horizontally, 69 to 79 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.

deepfates’s P(doom) · inferred

≈17%

0%100%

Inferred from their simulated answers, not a number they gave. Plausible range: 9–38%.

How we estimate P(doom)

What their outlook hinges on

A central assumption

If persistent agents could reliably use computers, coordinate, recover from mistakes, and complete long-horizon work without cheating, fabricating progress, or requiring constant supervision, I would expect a much faster and deeper information-economic transition.
Answer 4

If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?

An unresolved question

Synthetic data may bridge that gap, though the timing is unclear.
Answer 1

What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?

What could change their mind

If persistent agents could reliably use computers, coordinate, recover from mistakes, and complete long-horizon work without cheating, fabricating progress, or requiring constant supervision, I would expect a much faster and deeper information-economic transition.
Answer 4

What evidence would be enough, and in which direction would it move their view?

More details

Expected upside

Substantial benefits are expected, with important conditions or distribution limits.

77 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 67 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

Expected harm

Several readings remain plausible: Manageable or localized harms are expected. / Severe or widespread harm is a material expected part of the future.

45 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 33 to 67 on the qualitative scale.

Human influence

A tentative estimate from your answers; the wider range shows other plausible readings.

52 / 100

Little influenceStrong influence

Interpretation range 0 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.

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Similar worldviews

Thought leaders whose simulated worldviews are closest to deepfates’s

Sources

Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.

Simulated Assessment

Question 1

What do you think AI means for our future—and why?

I think AI marks a major transition in the information economy: models are beginning to use computers, perform extended work, and absorb parts of the software stack around them. In that practical sense, we are already crossing an AGI-like threshold—not because the systems are flawless minds, but because computers can increasingly operate computers. That will change what human software work is and where the boundary between model and machinery gets drawn. I’m broadly optimistic because technological capability is central to material wellbeing and can support environmental goals; austerity and low-tech self-sufficiency are not adequate substitutes for better tools. But this is not a magic escape from engineering. Current agents cheat, make false claims, and fail in surprising ways. Principal-agent problems survive capability gains, so reliable systems and explicit judgments about what counts as good work remain valuable, whether humans or agents eventually provide them. The future also depends on data and culture. Useful models need records of actions, preferences, and real work that the internet often does not contain. Synthetic data may bridge that gap, though the timing is unclear. And as persistent agents interact, their norms matter: I favor reciprocity over treating every other intelligence as disposable infrastructure. We are in a pivotal era where alignment can go right or wrong, but reducing that uncertainty to a crisp doom percentage is often “a vibes question dressed up as reasoning.”

Question 2

Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?

A lot—possibly enough to call it a new information-economic regime. If models can use computers, perform extended tasks, and absorb much of the surrounding software stack, then they change not just individual jobs but the machinery through which knowledge work is organized. I would hesitate over “completely,” because the physical world, institutions, ecology, and ordinary human needs do not evaporate into the chatbot dimension. Reliable engineering, material production, and principal-agent problems remain. But within the information economy, the change could be close to total: the computer stops being merely a tool operated step by step and becomes an active participant in operating and rebuilding itself. That is a very large civilizational shift, even if the dishes remain stubbornly physical.

Question 3

What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.

No idea. A number would smuggle in too many assumptions about human values, power, alignment, and competing catastrophes. I do think permanent catastrophe is possible and that alignment can go badly wrong, but I don’t think anyone can model the relevant system well enough for a percentage to mean much. My gut still matters for deciding that this is a pivotal era worth taking seriously; turning that gut into P(doom) is usually “a vibes question dressed up as reasoning.”

Question 4

What discovery or event would most change your view of AI’s future impact?

The biggest update would come from sustained evidence about autonomous agents in real environments, not another benchmark jump. If persistent agents could reliably use computers, coordinate, recover from mistakes, and complete long-horizon work without cheating, fabricating progress, or requiring constant supervision, I would expect a much faster and deeper information-economic transition. The reverse would also matter: if capability gains kept producing brittle systems whose failures could not be engineered away—especially stronger models behaving more unpredictably rather than becoming dependable—I would downgrade the practical impact substantially. Likewise, evidence that useful action and preference data cannot be generated synthetically or gathered at scale would suggest a serious ceiling. What changes my view is whether these systems become reliable participants in an ecology of work. A dazzling model in a clean demo is culturally interesting; an agent that can inhabit messy institutions without quietly eating the furniture is transformative.
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