Question 1
bayes
x.com/bayeslordPseudonymous account that writes about rapid AI progress and its upside, calls its risks real but manageable and wants labs to share safety work.
How will AI change the world?
Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.
Doom–Bloom: 79 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 91 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 74 to 100 horizontally, 75 to 100 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.
≈10%
Inferred from their simulated answers, not a number they gave. Plausible range: 6–19%.
A central assumption
AI is beginning to improve AI, automated science is accelerating, robotics will have its ChatGPT moment, and algorithmic progress may have several orders of magnitude left.Answer 1
If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?
An unresolved question
I don’t have a defensible number.Answer 3
What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?
What could change their mind
The biggest update would be discovering a hard saturation point: that AI cannot reliably improve AI, automate frontier science, or cross from software into robust robotics and production despite sustained effort.Answer 4
What evidence would be enough, and in which direction would it move their view?
More details
Transformative, broadly valuable gains are expected.
91 / 100
Interpretation range 67 to 100 on the qualitative scale.
Severe or widespread harm is a material expected part of the future.
57 / 100
Interpretation range 33 to 67 on the qualitative scale.
Human choices have meaningful but substantially constrained influence.
54 / 100
Interpretation range 45 to 80 on the qualitative scale.
AI is expected to remain bounded tools.
AI is expected to match people across most cognitive work.
Simulated position: AI is expected to substantially exceed people across cognitive work.
Stop or substantially slow development of more capable AI.
Simulated position: Continue development under stated safeguards.
Speed up development of more capable AI.
These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.
Similar worldviews
Thought leaders whose simulated worldviews are closest to bayes’s
Simulated Assessment
Sources
Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.
Argues that nationalizing AI labs is not the only option: the government should keep lab staff working while supervising capabilities closely, including embedded intelligence-community staff, which the account calls reasonable. Private labs cannot become sovereign military powers, because the state can simply seize or shut down data centers. Nationalization would hand the state a large share of future means of production, an unhealthy concentration; the account is “not confident” but calls it a bad idea for now. It says people underestimate AI and sees no foreseeable hard bound on capability. Full essay inspected; reader comments excluded.

Argues that pro-AI people failed to tell a story of how the future goes well: they swept risks under the rug instead of acknowledging them and accelerating security, botched the datacenter buildout’s public case, and let private investors capture lab returns. A mass bipartisan anti-AI movement is possible, and winning the public needs bold “unconditional functional abundance” while preserving non-panopticon democracy. The account believes the system currently works decently well because humans control capital and most humans are good. Full essay inspected; reader comments excluded.

An edited version of a June 4 thread saying we are in early takeoff, with perhaps four to seven, maybe up to ten, algorithmic orders of magnitude left, while admitting nobody knows where returns saturate. Expects automated science, robotics breakthroughs and deflation, and calls both “jobs stay high” and “jobs go to zero” predictions overconfident. Warns of an unjust “permanent underclass”, a possibly vulnerable world with unknown zero days, robot coup risks, an end to guaranteed MAD, and tyranny through institutional pressure. Favors some international coordination; says a pause’s value has risen but opposes one “at this time”. Full essay inspected.

Where do you land?
Map my worldview