Open-source developer who shares small-model reasoning experiments and favors wide access to AI over government restrictions.

How will AI change the world?

Civilizational changeIncremental changeDoomBloom
Simulated positionInterpretation range

Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.

Doom–Bloom: 79 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 76 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 74 to 84 horizontally, 49 to 100 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.

Lewis’s P(doom) · inferred

≈14%

0%100%

Inferred from their simulated answers, not a number they gave. Plausible range: 9–23%.

How we estimate P(doom)

What their outlook hinges on

A central assumption

Open models, small-model research, and recursive improvement are central to that upside because they expand who can experiment, verify results, and contribute.
Answer 2

If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?

An unresolved question

We do not know exactly what such systems will look like, and claims of certainty-level safety proofs are not credible.
Answer 1

What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?

More details

Expected upside

Transformative, broadly valuable gains are expected.

100 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 100 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

Expected harm

Severe or widespread harm is a material expected part of the future.

64 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 67 to 67 on the qualitative scale.

Human influence

Human choices have meaningful but substantially constrained influence.

62 / 100

Little influenceStrong influence

Interpretation range 38 to 87 on the qualitative scale.

Expected capabilities

AI is expected to remain bounded tools.

AI is expected to match people across most cognitive work.

Simulated position: AI is expected to substantially exceed people across cognitive work.

Development pace

Stop or substantially slow development of more capable AI.

Simulated position: Continue development under stated safeguards.

Speed up development of more capable AI.

Access to AI

Restrict access to powerful AI.

Allow access subject to capability or use restrictions.

Simulated position: Favor broad or open access to powerful AI.

These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.

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Similar worldviews

Thought leaders whose simulated worldviews are closest to Lewis’s

Sources

Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.

Simulated Assessment

Question 1

What do you think AI means for our future—and why?

I think AI means much more widely distributed intellectual capability and, eventually, systems that help improve the process of building better systems. Open models, small-model reasoning experiments, and accessible tooling matter because progress should not be confined to a few labs or mediated primarily through government restrictions. Broad participation makes experimentation, verification, and practical use possible across many domains. That is not the same as claiming advanced AI is harmless. Superintelligence should not be caricatured as either guaranteed malevolence or merely a conventional chatbot connected to powerful tools. We do not know exactly what such systems will look like, and claims of certainty-level safety proofs are not credible. Recursive improvement could produce major gains, but it also makes the details of implementation and deployment increasingly consequential. My preferred response is continued development with serious technical scrutiny, not safety politics that converts uncertainty into a rationale for stopping or centralizing progress. Labs should engage with substantive concerns from domain experts—for example, mathematicians worried about how their work is used—and make real tradeoffs where necessary. But those concerns should inform engineering and release decisions, not become a blanket argument against widely accessible AI or continued improvement.

Question 2

Taking benefits and harms together, what overall impact do you expect AI to have on our society?

Overall, I expect AI to be broadly beneficial: it should distribute intellectual capability, accelerate technical work, and let far more people build useful systems rather than leaving that capacity inside a few institutions. Open models, small-model research, and recursive improvement are central to that upside because they expand who can experiment, verify results, and contribute. The harms could still be substantial. More capable systems can amplify misuse, concentrate power, and create consequences that are hard to predict—especially once systems meaningfully contribute to their own improvement. I reject both “superintelligence is inevitably evil” and “it is just a chatbot, so there is nothing new to worry about.” Neither simplification helps. So my positive expectation is not a claim of guaranteed safety. It is a judgment that continued, broadly accessible development is preferable to responding to uncertainty with government restrictions or centralized control. The right approach is serious technical scrutiny and engagement with concrete domain concerns, including difficult release tradeoffs, while preserving open participation and continued progress.

Question 3

How much do you think AI will ultimately change the world?

I expect AI to change the world profoundly, especially by making advanced intellectual capabilities broadly available and by accelerating the creation of still more capable systems. The largest shift is not simply better chatbots; it is that reasoning, software development, research assistance, and experimentation become cheaper and accessible to many more people. Recursive improvement could make that process compound rather than proceed at today’s pace. The scale is difficult to quantify because genuinely advanced systems cannot be cleanly reduced either to inevitable catastrophe or to familiar software with a nicer interface. Their effects will depend heavily on implementation, access, and deployment. Widely available models could distribute power and enable independent verification, while concentrated systems could give a small number of institutions disproportionate control. So I expect a very large transformation, but not one whose final shape can be proved in advance. That uncertainty calls for substantive technical scrutiny and attention to concrete domain concerns—not using speculative certainty as a justification for government restrictions or freezing development.

Question 4

What’s your gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe?

I would not attach a defensible percentage to it. My gut is that the risk is real but not the default outcome. Recursive improvement and highly capable systems could create permanent consequences, so dismissing them as ordinary chatbots is unserious; treating superintelligence as inevitably hostile is equally unjustified. More importantly, a fabricated number would imply precision we do not have. We cannot prove certainty-level safety, but uncertainty alone does not justify government restrictions or centralized control. I would continue development while applying serious technical scrutiny to concrete systems, deployments, and domain-specific concerns.
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