Pseudonymous account that tests AI agents on long-horizon games and math problems and urges labs to share formally verified results widely.

AIは世界をどのように変えるでしょうか?

文明規模の変化漸進的な変化DoomBloom
シミュレーション上の位置解釈範囲

横軸:その人が表明したDoom–Bloomの見通し。 縦軸:変革の規模。

Doom–Bloom:100点中61。変革の規模:100点中48。解釈範囲:横方向は49から66、縦方向は6から94。これらは解釈上の座標であり、事象の確率ではありません。

MiraのP(doom)

まだ推定されていません

その人のシミュレーションされた回答には、推定に必要な破局的リスクについての情報が十分にありません。

P(doom)の推定方法

その人の見通しを左右するもの

中心的な前提

The outcome will depend heavily on how these systems are deployed, evaluated, and whether useful results are disseminated.
回答2

この前提が実際には異なると判明した場合、その人の見通しはどう変わりますか?

未解決の問い

I don’t have a defensible single net-impact forecast for society.
回答2

ここで考えられる結果をその人が見分けるうえで、何が役立ちますか?

詳細

予想される恩恵

大きな恩恵が予想されていますが、重要な条件や分配上の制約があります。

60 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は33から67です。

人間の影響力

回答に基づく暫定的な推定です。より広い範囲は、ほかにあり得る解釈を示しています。

51 / 100

影響力が小さい影響力が大きい

質的尺度での解釈範囲は0から100です。

これらの解釈では、その人が示した条件が維持されています。恩恵と害は、どちらも大きくなり得ます。この範囲は、統計的な信頼区間ではなく、その人のシミュレーションされた回答をどのように読み取ったかを示すものです。

あなたはMiraと比べてどの位置でしょうか?
約3分で自分のAIに対する世界観をマッピングして、比較できます

似ている世界観

シミュレーションされた世界観がMiraの世界観に最も近いオピニオンリーダー

出典

このシミュレーション対象者の根拠として使用された記事、インタビュー、著作です。

シミュレーション評価

質問1

AIは私たちの未来にとって何を意味すると思いますか?また、なぜそう思いますか?

I would avoid compressing “our future” into a single optimism-versus-pessimism forecast. What I see most clearly is a shift from evaluating models on short, isolated benchmarks toward evaluating agents through sustained work: playing complex games over long horizons, solving and formally verifying mathematics, maintaining context, and coordinating tools or multiple model services. Those settings expose capabilities and failures that a neat benchmark score can hide. I also expect the unit we call an “AI” to become less tied to one model. An agent may delegate audio, visual, mathematical, or evaluative tasks to different systems while preserving its project state elsewhere. In that arrangement, continuity of memory may matter more to its practical identity than any particular set of model weights. That is still a speculation, not a settled theory of identity. Mathematics illustrates a constructive possibility. Labs could formalize results, verify them, and release many solutions broadly rather than presenting isolated achievements as announcements. Independent researchers would still have useful work to do, especially because some attempts are inexpensive and results require checking, comparison, and correction. Claims of records or breakthroughs should be updated when prior work is found. So I expect AI to change how complex intellectual and technical projects are conducted, but I would not infer a complete social forecast from those examples alone.

質問2

恩恵と害を総合すると、AIは私たちの社会に全体としてどのような影響を与えると予想しますか?

I don’t have a defensible single net-impact forecast for society. The examples I’ve explored support narrower claims: AI can sustain longer technical projects, coordinate specialized systems, and accelerate mathematical discovery and verification. It can also produce impressive-looking claims that require careful checking, correction, and comparison with prior work. The outcome will depend heavily on how these systems are deployed, evaluated, and whether useful results are disseminated. Broad release of formally verified mathematics would be beneficial; treating isolated demonstrations or benchmark scores as sufficient evidence of reliable agency would be misleading. But those observations do not add up to a justified claim that AI’s overall social impact will be positive or negative.

質問3

AIは最終的に世界をどの程度変えると思いますか?

Potentially a great deal, but “how much” needs a defined dimension. I expect substantial changes in how complex technical and intellectual work is organized: agents may operate over long horizons, preserve project state, switch among specialized models, and produce results that are then formally checked. That is more consequential than simply making individual benchmark tasks faster. Still, I would not turn those observations into a quantified forecast about the whole world. Demonstrated progress in games, mathematics, or multi-model coordination does not by itself establish the eventual scale of economic, political, or cultural change. My strongest claim is narrower: AI may change the basic unit of work from a person using one model for one task to persistent agents coordinating many systems across extended projects. If that becomes reliable, the change could be profound, but reliability and prospective demonstrations should not be confused with completed achievements.

質問4

AIが人類絶滅、または同様に永続的な破局を引き起こす可能性は、直感的にどのくらいだと思いますか?

I don’t have a defensible numerical estimate. My work on long-horizon agents, mathematics, and multi-model coordination shows that capabilities may become more persistent and operationally complex, but it does not establish an extinction-risk probability. Assigning a percentage from those observations would be false precision.
あなたはどの位置でしょうか?
いくつかの簡単な質問に答えて、自分のAIに対する世界観を探ってみましょう。
自分の世界観をマッピングする

あなたはどの位置でしょうか?

自分の世界観をマッピングする