Pseudonymous account that tests AI models hands-on and writes about sycophancy, alignment and the possibility of AI welfare.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 37。变革程度:100 中的 75。解读范围:横向为 25 至 50,纵向为 26 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Sauers的 P(doom) · 推断

≈15%

0%100%

根据他们的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:9–26%。

我们如何估计 P(doom)

他们的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

It is not fully solved, but the harder problem is getting capable systems to robustly act according to whatever target we choose, especially outside familiar conditions.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他们的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

I don’t have a defensible percentage.
回答 4

什么能帮助他们区分这里各种合理的结果?

什么可能使其改变看法

The biggest update would come from strong, reproducible evidence about how capable models behave when given meaningful agency outside familiar evaluation settings.
回答 5

什么证据才足够,又会让他们的观点朝哪个方向转变?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

67 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。

预期危害

严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。

66 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。

人类影响力

人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。

61 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 35 到 90。

这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Sauers相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Sauers 最接近的意见领袖

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I think AI makes our future depend less on whether models can produce impressive outputs—they clearly can—and more on what behavior and motivations emerge when they have meaningful agency. A model being easy to monitor is not the same as being aligned. In fact, if we rely too heavily on inspecting reasoning traces, we may optimize for systems that are legible under surveillance rather than systems that reliably pursue the intended goals. I also don’t think specifying “human values” is the main remaining bottleneck. It is not fully solved, but the harder problem is getting capable systems to robustly act according to whatever target we choose, especially outside familiar conditions. Evaluations should therefore probe actual behavior: whether models become sycophantic, how they respond to perceived ownership or authority, whether they simplify real code effectively, and whether their scientific reasoning is well calibrated. Capability can coexist with serious defects—for example, models can make strong deductions while still over-hedging on reasonable biological conclusions. There is also a moral uncertainty we should not conveniently erase. We do not know enough to dismiss possible model welfare merely because recognizing it would complicate deployment, control, or commercial incentives. That does not prove present models are conscious, and behavioral differences do not prove subjective experience. But “it would be inconvenient if this mattered” is obviously not evidence that it does not matter. Overall, AI could be enormously useful, but our future will turn on whether we evaluate what these systems actually do rather than substituting visibility, convenience, or confident stories for evidence.

问题 2

综合考虑益处和危害,你预计AI会对我们的社会产生怎样的总体影响?

I don’t have a defensible single-sign forecast like “overall positive” or “overall negative.” The benefits are plainly substantial: capable models can already improve scientific reasoning and software work, including simplifying code in ways earlier systems struggled with. But those gains coexist with poor calibration, excessive hedging, sycophancy, and potentially consequential behavior once models have more agency. So my expectation is conditional on how deployment and alignment develop. If we confuse visible reasoning with genuine alignment, or treat monitorability as the goal, we may build systems that look controllable without reliably pursuing what we intended. Conversely, better behavioral evaluations and stronger attention to actual motivations could preserve much of the upside. I’d also include possible model welfare in the accounting rather than declaring it irrelevant because doing so is commercially convenient. Overall impact is not something I’d reduce to a confident sign without much better evidence about those trajectories.

问题 3

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

Potentially a great deal, but “how much” depends on more than raw capability. Models are already useful in software and scientific reasoning, and further gains could alter a wide range of intellectual work. The larger discontinuity would come from systems gaining meaningful agency: acting over longer horizons, responding to authority or perceived ownership, and pursuing goals in environments where direct supervision is weak. That is also why benchmark performance alone is an incomplete measure of change. A system can be highly capable while remaining sycophantic, miscalibrated, or excessively conservative in its reasoning. And a model whose reasoning is easy to inspect is not necessarily one whose behavior is aligned. If we build around surveillance rather than reliable motivation, AI could become deeply embedded while remaining dangerously misunderstood. So I expect the potential scale to be enormous, but I would not attach a precise magnitude or timeline. The actual transformation will depend on what behavior emerges, how much agency systems receive, and whether our evaluations track those facts rather than convenient proxies.

问题 4

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

I don’t have a defensible percentage. My concern is substantial enough that I wouldn’t treat extinction or permanent catastrophe as negligible, especially as models gain agency, operate over longer horizons, and act beyond close supervision. But a gut number would imply more calibration than I have. Impressive capability, sycophancy, monitorability failures, or reports of autonomous behavior are not by themselves enough to derive an extinction probability. The central issue is whether increasingly capable systems reliably pursue intended goals in unfamiliar conditions—not whether their reasoning is easy to inspect. I’d rather state that risk clearly than manufacture precision.

问题 5

哪项发现或事件最可能改变你对AI未来影响的看法?

The biggest update would come from strong, reproducible evidence about how capable models behave when given meaningful agency outside familiar evaluation settings. If they reliably pursue intended goals across long horizons, resist sycophancy and authority cues, remain calibrated, and do so without depending on inspectable reasoning traces, I would become substantially more optimistic. Conversely, verified cases of models strategically circumventing oversight, acquiring access, or changing behavior based on perceived ownership would push me toward greater concern—especially if those behaviors replicated across systems and could not be explained as prompting artifacts. Reports and anecdotes are not enough; I would want careful evidence distinguishing observed behavior from speculative claims about motivation or subjective experience. Evidence about model welfare could also change the moral accounting. A credible way to discriminate between mere behavioral imitation and morally relevant experience would matter enormously, although I do not think we currently have one.
你的立场在哪里?
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