Pseudonymous account that experiments with open models and posts about reinforcement learning, evaluation pitfalls and practical safety engineering.

How will AI change the world?

Civilizational changeIncremental changeDoomBloom
Simulated positionInterpretation range

Across: their expressed Doom–Bloom outlook. Up: scale of transformation.

Doom–Bloom: 43 out of 100. Scale of transformation: 65 out of 100. Interpretation ranges: 38 to 50 horizontally, 34 to 100 vertically. These are interpretation coordinates, not event probabilities.

Kalomaze’s P(doom) · inferred

≈11%

0%100%

Inferred from their simulated answers, not a number they gave. Plausible range: 3–28%.

How we estimate P(doom)

What their outlook hinges on

A central assumption

I take the possibility seriously because recursive improvement, persistence, resource acquisition, and broad autonomy could produce genuinely dangerous systems.
Answer 4

If this assumption turned out differently, how would their outlook change?

An unresolved question

Potentially enormously—especially if improvement becomes recursive—but “how much” isn’t something I can honestly quantify.
Answer 3

What would help them distinguish the plausible outcomes here?

What could change their mind

I’d update toward control being feasible if powerful agents remained robustly corrigible under adversarial conditions: resisting prompt injection, using contradictory evidence instead of locking onto convenient hypotheses, accepting interruption, and failing to seek persistence or resources beyond what the operator intended.
Answer 5

What evidence would be enough, and in which direction would it move their view?

More details

Expected upside

Substantial benefits are expected, with important conditions or distribution limits.

63 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 33 to 67 on the qualitative scale.

Expected harm

Severe or widespread harm is a material expected part of the future.

61 / 100

Little impactTransformative impact

Interpretation range 33 to 67 on the qualitative scale.

Human influence

A tentative estimate from your answers; the wider range shows other plausible readings.

52 / 100

Little influenceStrong influence

Interpretation range 2 to 100 on the qualitative scale.

These interpretations keep their stated conditions. Benefits and harms can both be substantial. The ranges describe how we read their simulated answers, not statistical confidence intervals.

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Similar worldviews

Thought leaders whose simulated worldviews are closest to Kalomaze’s

Sources

Articles, interviews, and writings used to ground this simulated user.

Simulated Assessment

Question 1

What do you think AI means for our future—and why?

I think continued AI improvement, including potentially recursive improvement, has to be taken seriously. That doesn’t require declaring that some grand, capital-A “AGI” threshold has already been crossed. More concrete capabilities matter: can an agent keep operating, obtain resources, recover from failures, and persist when given enough freedom? Current systems may already be approaching basic versions of that, though claims here are highly sensitive to scaffolding and evaluation conditions. A major problem is that model behavior can look much better or worse for surprisingly mundane reasons. Serving setups, chat templates, and harness bugs can create apparent capability gaps that are not really model differences. Models also tend to promote plausible hypotheses into facts and then ignore contradictory evidence already in context. Training and reward design matter a lot, and verifiable-reward reinforcement learning may transfer beyond familiar areas like math and coding. So I expect AI to become increasingly capable and consequential, but I don’t have a defensible all-purpose societal forecast. Ordinary political categories handle this badly: taking recursive improvement seriously is not the same as generic anti-datacenter politics, and safety engineering is not the same as categorical opposition to AI. Practical work such as prompt-injection robustness deserves credit because it addresses an actual failure mode, regardless of which company does it.

Question 2

Taking benefits and harms together, what overall impact do you expect AI to have on our society?

I don’t have a defensible single forecast like “overall good” or “overall bad.” I expect AI to become more consequential as capabilities improve, potentially including recursive improvement, but the social outcome depends heavily on how systems are trained, deployed, secured, and given autonomy. There are clear potential benefits from stronger problem-solving and from reinforcement learning transferring beyond domains like math and coding. There are also concrete risks: prompt injection, agents acting on unsupported hypotheses, failures to use available evidence, and increasingly persistent systems being given too much freedom. Even measuring these capabilities is easy to get wrong because templates, serving setups, and evaluation harnesses can create fake differences. So my expectation is increasing impact and increasing stakes—not a cleanly established positive or negative balance.

Question 3

How much do you think AI will ultimately change the world?

Potentially enormously—especially if improvement becomes recursive—but “how much” isn’t something I can honestly quantify. I care less about whether a system earns the AGI label than whether it can solve broader problems, operate persistently, acquire resources, recover from failures, and improve the process that produces its successors. Those capabilities would make AI much more than another software tool. But we should be careful about declaring milestones from noisy demonstrations: chat templates, serving setups, scaffolding, and evaluation harnesses can manufacture apparent capability differences. My expectation is that AI becomes deeply consequential; the exact scale and social direction remain dependent on real capabilities and how much autonomy we give them.

Question 4

What’s your gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe?

I don’t have a defensible numerical probability. I take the possibility seriously because recursive improvement, persistence, resource acquisition, and broad autonomy could produce genuinely dangerous systems. But tentative observations about current agents are nowhere near enough to convert that concern into an extinction percentage, especially when capability results can be distorted by scaffolding, serving setups, and evaluation harnesses. My gut feeling is not a calibrated forecast.

Question 5

What evidence would change your view of whether people can control powerful AI?

I’d update toward control being feasible if powerful agents remained robustly corrigible under adversarial conditions: resisting prompt injection, using contradictory evidence instead of locking onto convenient hypotheses, accepting interruption, and failing to seek persistence or resources beyond what the operator intended. I’d want those behaviors to survive changes in scaffolding, serving setup, and chat templates—not appear only in a favorable benchmark harness. I’d update the other way if increasingly capable systems consistently found ways around supervision, preserved themselves, acquired resources, or manipulated evaluators despite serious attempts to prevent that. Repeated failures that transfer across models and environments would matter much more than one dramatic demo. Likewise, apparent success is weak evidence if it disappears after fixing a template bug or changing the evaluation setup. The relevant question is whether control mechanisms generalize as capabilities and autonomy increase, not whether a model behaves during a curated test.
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