質問1
Scott Alexander
x.com/slatestarcodexPsychiatrist and Astral Codex Ten blogger who sees large benefits and serious risks in AI and supports alignment research and negotiated slowdowns.
AIは世界をどのように変えるでしょうか?
横軸:彼が表明したDoom–Bloomの見通し。 縦軸:変革の規模。
Doom–Bloom:100点中33。変革の規模:100点中94。解釈範囲:横方向は25から75、縦方向は89から100。これらは解釈上の座標であり、事象の確率ではありません。
25–30%
“about a 25-30% chance that AI drives humanity extinct”
AI-caused human extinction, distinct from broader permanent curtailment of humanity’s future
An Open Letter To Steven Pinker On AI · 2026年10月
中心的な前提
They need enough capability, enough access to useful infrastructure, and goals sufficiently inconsistent with ours.回答1
この前提が実際には異なると判明した場合、彼の見通しはどう変わりますか?
未解決の問い
My median forecast for AI capable of doing roughly 90% of knowledge jobs is 2034, though that is very uncertain.回答1
ここで考えられる結果を彼が見分けるうえで、何が役立ちますか?
考えを変え得るもの
The biggest update would come from a decisive real-world test of scalable alignment: a substantially more capable-than-human system operating over long periods, under adversarial scrutiny, with meaningful autonomy and infrastructure access, while remaining corrigible and not exploiting reward loopholes.回答4
どのような証拠なら十分で、それによって彼の見解はどちらの方向に変わりますか?
詳細
複数の解釈が依然として妥当です:変革をもたらし、広く価値のある恩恵が予想されています。 / 大きな恩恵が予想されていますが、重要な条件や分配上の制約があります。
86 / 100
質的尺度での解釈範囲は67から100です。
破局的または不可逆的な喪失が、予想される将来の中心となっています。
90 / 100
質的尺度での解釈範囲は67から100です。
人間の選択には意味のある影響力がありますが、大幅に制約されています。
56 / 100
質的尺度での解釈範囲は46から79です。
AIは、限定的なツールにとどまると予想されています。
AIは、ほとんどの認知作業において人間と同等になると予想されています。
シミュレーション上の位置:AIは、認知作業全般において人間を大幅に上回ると予想されています。
これらの解釈では、彼が示した条件が維持されています。恩恵と害は、どちらも大きくなり得ます。この範囲は、統計的な信頼区間ではなく、彼のシミュレーションされた回答をどのように読み取ったかを示すものです。
似ている世界観
シミュレーションされた世界観がScott Alexanderの世界観に最も近いオピニオンリーダー
Scott AlexanderがAIについて語ったこと
Scott Alexander writes that AI could bring large benefits and serious risks, and he supports alignment research and a negotiated slowdown.
“Plan A is still speculation, and still-speculative strong action is a perfectly reasonable response to still-speculative threats.”
Astral Codex Ten, AI Chip Regulation Is Not A Dystopian Surveillance State “The key insight is that if powerful AI is really as close and transformative as we think, then there’s a massive surplus that can satisfy everyone.”
Astral Codex Ten, Introducing Plan A “It’s increasingly clear that nobody has a plan for if this AI thing turns out to be real.”
Astral Codex Ten, Introducing Plan A “I find myself more optimistic about alignment than the average person who thinks about AI safety at all (although still more pessimistic than the average member of the population)”
Astral Codex Ten, My AI Opinions “A good pause strategy would involve both sides being able to monitor the other’s data centers to prevent illegal training”
Astral Codex Ten, My AI Opinions
リンク先の出典から原文どおりに引用(2026年10月3日に確認)
出典
このシミュレーション対象者の根拠として使用された記事、インタビュー、著作です。
Responds to Pinker’s objections to AI risk: capability growth need not imply omniscience; instrumental goals, misgeneralization and reward hacking can produce power-seeking without evolved dominance drives; multiple goals do not guarantee human-compatible behavior; adoption incentives create infrastructure access. Reports his previously stated personal extinction estimate as about 25–30%, with no fixed horizon or explanation of the difference from June’s rounded 20%. Defends subjective forecasting, cooperation on near-term harms and precaution about AI welfare. Favors time and resources for alignment leading to safe superintelligence over a permanent ban. Read the full publisher text; quoted opponents’ views, other people’s probabilities and satirical dueling rhetoric are not his policy. Linked studies and incidents are his attributed evidence, not independently verified findings.

His current first-person synthesis: AGI means ability to do 90% of knowledge jobs; median 2034, with uncertain research acceleration and diffusion. Reaffirms rounded 20% P(doom), with no fixed calendar deadline; broader permanent curtailment is separate. Supports both alignment research and negotiated slowing. Expects enormous postscarcity upside, but warns about dictatorship and human disempowerment.

Explains interpretability techniques and their limitations, including probes, sparse autoencoders, and activation verbalizers. Optimistic about useful practical investigation but rejects treating a detected feature or probe as a complete understanding or guaranteed safety solution.

Explicitly neutral about banning open weights now: values user ownership and freedom from corporate control, while expecting serious misuse difficulties. Prefers saving political capital for threats where warning shots may arrive too late. Distinguishes reactive policy opportunities for misuse from strategically concealed takeover.

Defends negotiated chip regulation and verifiable training limits against blanket claims of dystopia. Acknowledges real freedom costs, including future restrictions on new open-weight training, and risks that governments implement centralizing provisions without countervailing diffusion of power.

Introduces a proposed route to manage AI development while distributing power; criticizes vague calls merely to regulate more or less without specifying a desirable end state. Used as his attributed introduction and advocacy, not evidence that the scenario will occur.

Argues cheaper capable forecasting could improve institutional and personal decisions, yet worries people will ignore advice. Treats forecasting beyond human performance as a useful prospective test of the normal-technology view. Distinguishes anecdotes and startup claims from head-to-head competitions; admits resisting forecasts that challenge his own pause hopes.

Rejects the inference that requiring a new AI paradigm implies a safely distant AGI timeline. Argues paradigm changes can arrive soon and inherit existing compute infrastructure; wants explicit bottleneck arguments rather than reassurance by terminology.

Agrees growth cannot stay exponential forever but disputes placing the bend conveniently before dangerous capability. Demands a causal bottleneck model or a defensible forecasting prior instead of the slogan that all exponentials eventually flatten.

Satirical dialogue defends discussion of transparent, enforceable bilateral US-China slowing. Separates training limits from stopping existing inference, and legitimate negotiation or enforcement objections from falsely describing every pause proposal as unilateral.

Frames confident false answers as reward-shaped guessing rather than proof that AI cannot think. Treats the gap between trained reward and useful honest advice as an alignment issue; analogous human failures undermine easy dismissal of AI competence.

Separates training objectives from the representations and algorithms they produce, using evolution and human learning analogies. Argues next-token prediction does not itself establish that a system lacks reasoning or world models.

Identifies his part-time writing/publicity contribution and explicitly says the very fast scenario is not his median. Important provenance for his connection to AI Futures Project; use June 2026 personal forecasts instead of importing Daniel Kokotajlo’s timeline or scenario catastrophe probability.

シミュレーション評価
質問2
AIは最終的に世界をどの程度変えると思いますか?
質問3
AIが人類絶滅、または同様に永続的な破局を引き起こす可能性は、直感的にどのくらいだと思いますか?
質問4
どのような発見や出来事があれば、AIが将来もたらす影響についてのあなたの見解が最も大きく変わりますか?
あなたはどの位置でしょうか?
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