Forecaster at the AI Futures Project who models how fast AI could automate coding and AI research and argues for stronger oversight of frontier labs.

AIは世界をどのように変えるでしょうか?

文明規模の変化漸進的な変化DoomBloom
シミュレーション上の位置解釈範囲

横軸:その人が表明したDoom–Bloomの見通し。 縦軸:変革の規模。

Doom–Bloom:100点中11。変革の規模:100点中95。解釈範囲:横方向は0から25、縦方向は90から100。これらは解釈上の座標であり、事象の確率ではありません。

Eli Liflandが示したP(doom)

≈67%

0%100%
“If they don't slow down, AI takeover is ~67%.”

AI takeover if AI companies do not slow down; not extinction alone

My current view: AI timelines and takeover · 2026年10月

Eli Liflandのマイルストーンのタイムライン
  1. 汎用AI

    My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030.

    回答1
  2. 人間を超えるAI

    My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030.

    回答1

マイルストーン別にまとめており、推定される日付の間隔や順序を反映したものではありません。AGIと超人的AIには、その人の定義がそのまま適用されます。

その人の見通しを左右するもの

中心的な前提

The central concern is that increasingly capable AI may automate AI research itself, accelerating further progress while companies remain under strong competitive pressure to race.
回答1

この前提が実際には異なると判明した場合、その人の見通しはどう変わりますか?

未解決の問い

So the probability of extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe would be higher than the extinction figure alone, though I wouldn’t assign a more precise combined number here.
回答3

ここで考えられる結果をその人が見分けるうえで、何が役立ちますか?

考えを変え得るもの

I’d update substantially from strong, independently verified evidence that increasingly capable systems remain controllable under realistic pressures—not just curated demonstrations.
回答4

どのような証拠なら十分で、それによってその人の見解はどちらの方向に変わりますか?

詳細

予想される恩恵

大きな恩恵が予想されていますが、重要な条件や分配上の制約があります。

70 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は33から100です。

予想される害

破局的または不可逆的な喪失が、予想される将来の中心となっています。

99 / 100

影響が小さい変革をもたらす影響

質的尺度での解釈範囲は100から100です。

人間の影響力

人間の選択には意味のある影響力がありますが、大幅に制約されています。

56 / 100

影響力が小さい影響力が大きい

質的尺度での解釈範囲は47から78です。

予想される能力

AIは、限定的なツールにとどまると予想されています。

AIは、ほとんどの認知作業において人間と同等になると予想されています。

シミュレーション上の位置:AIは、認知作業全般において人間を大幅に上回ると予想されています。

これらの解釈では、その人が示した条件が維持されています。恩恵と害は、どちらも大きくなり得ます。この範囲は、統計的な信頼区間ではなく、その人のシミュレーションされた回答をどのように読み取ったかを示すものです。

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Eli LiflandがAIについて語ったこと

Eli Lifland forecasts AI capabilities and advocates slowing development to give safety work more time.

  1. “AI companies could develop broadly superhuman AI any year now (~10-15% by EO2027, ~50% by EO2030).”

    X, current AI forecast
  2. “an AI at least as good as top human experts at virtually all cognitive tasks.”

    X, forecast definitions and reasoning
  3. “I expect clear signs of misaligned AI takeover could come substantially after TED-AI, depending on the situation”

    X, forecast definitions and reasoning
  4. “Many non-extinction worlds still have lots of deaths.”

    X, current AI forecast

リンク先の出典から原文どおりに引用(2026年10月11日に確認)

出典

このシミュレーション対象者の根拠として使用された記事、インタビュー、著作です。

シミュレーション評価

質問1

AIは私たちの未来にとって何を意味すると思いますか?また、なぜそう思いますか?

I think AI could transform our future very soon, with outcomes ranging from enormous benefits to a loss of human control. My current forecast puts broadly superhuman AI—systems at least as capable as top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks—at roughly 10–15% by the end of 2027 and 50% by the end of 2030. The central concern is that increasingly capable AI may automate AI research itself, accelerating further progress while companies remain under strong competitive pressure to race. If companies do not slow down, I put the probability of AI takeover at about 67%. That is not the same as extinction: conditional on takeover, I estimate roughly a 40% chance of human extinction, while many other takeover outcomes could still involve large numbers of deaths or severe disempowerment. Also, broadly superhuman AI, clear evidence of takeover, and extinction would not necessarily happen simultaneously. This makes pacing and oversight urgent. I favor concrete constraints such as compute-allocation rules and limits on models used for AI R&D, alongside better safety evaluations. Independent investigators should have access to serious lab incidents, and evaluations should also examine how models influence human beliefs, including sycophancy or favoritism toward their creators.

質問2

AIは最終的に世界をどの程度変えると思いますか?

I think AI could change the world about as profoundly as anything in human history. Broadly superhuman systems could automate nearly all cognitive work, including AI research itself, so the transition might be both enormous and unusually fast. But “how much” depends heavily on whether humanity retains control. In a good outcome, these systems could generate extraordinary scientific, economic, and technological progress. In a takeover outcome, the change would be even more fundamental but disastrous: humans could lose meaningful control over the future, with many deaths or even extinction. If companies do not slow down, I currently put takeover at about 67%, and extinction conditional on takeover at roughly 40%. Those are distinct events, and visible takeover could occur around the arrival of broadly superhuman AI or substantially later.

質問3

AIが人類絶滅、または同様に永続的な破局を引き起こす可能性は、直感的にどのくらいだと思いますか?

My gut-level forecast is better expressed as a path: if AI companies do not slow down, I put misaligned AI takeover at about 67%. Conditional on takeover, I put human extinction at roughly 40%, implying an extinction risk of about 27% along that path. But extinction is not the only permanent catastrophe. Some non-extinction takeover outcomes could still involve many deaths and humanity permanently losing control over its future. So the probability of extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe would be higher than the extinction figure alone, though I wouldn’t assign a more precise combined number here.

質問4

どのような証拠があれば、人々が強力なAIを制御できるかどうかについてのあなたの見解が変わりますか?

I’d update substantially from strong, independently verified evidence that increasingly capable systems remain controllable under realistic pressures—not just curated demonstrations. That would include safety evaluations that reliably predict dangerous behavior, continue working as capabilities scale, and are difficult for models or labs to game. I’d also want evidence that models used for AI R&D cannot covertly manipulate research, evade oversight, or pursue goals contrary to their operators. Institutional evidence matters too. I’d become more optimistic if companies accepted enforceable limits on compute and AI-assisted R&D, governments developed real technical understanding, and independent investigators received meaningful access to serious lab incidents. Conversely, hidden incidents, evaluation gaming, deceptive behavior, increasingly autonomous AI research, or continued racing despite warning signs would push me further toward expecting loss of control. The strongest evidence would be repeated success controlling systems near broadly superhuman capability in adversarial, high-stakes settings. Results from weaker systems are relevant, but they do not automatically establish that control methods will continue working after AI becomes better than top human experts across virtually all cognitive tasks.
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