Pregunta 1
Noah Smith
x.com/NoahpinionEconomics blogger who expects AI to transform science, argues people can keep valuable jobs and worries about AI-enabled bioterrorism.
¿Cómo cambiará la IA el mundo?
Horizontal: su perspectiva Doom–Bloom expresada. Vertical: escala de la transformación.
Doom–Bloom: 65 de 100. Escala de la transformación: 79 de 100. Rangos de interpretación: de 50 a 75 en horizontal y de 49 a 100 en vertical. Son coordenadas de interpretación, no probabilidades de eventos.
≈10%
“about a 10% chance of bringing down civilization”
Civilization collapse from AI-enabled bioterrorism; not human extinction
Here’s how we’re all going to die · ago 2026
Un supuesto central
Even if machines outperform people at every task, their supply and cost still matter, and humans retain an advantage in knowing what they want.Respuesta 1
Si este supuesto resultara distinto, ¿cómo cambiaría su perspectiva?
Qué podría hacer cambiar de opinión
If strong evidence showed that capable agents cannot meaningfully help design or execute catastrophic biological attacks—because the underlying science is infeasible, the physical bottlenecks are overwhelming, or systems reliably refuse dangerous work—my risk estimate would fall substantially.Respuesta 3
¿Qué evidencia bastaría y en qué dirección movería su visión?
Más detalles
Se esperan beneficios transformadores y de gran valor para muchos.
87 / 100
Rango de interpretación de 67 a 100 en la escala cualitativa.
Se espera que los daños graves o generalizados sean una parte significativa del futuro.
73 / 100
Rango de interpretación de 67 a 100 en la escala cualitativa.
Las decisiones humanas pueden redirigir sustancialmente la trayectoria de la IA.
71 / 100
Rango de interpretación de 50 a 75 en la escala cualitativa.
Se espera que la IA siga siendo un conjunto de herramientas acotadas.
Se espera que la IA iguale a las personas en la mayor parte del trabajo cognitivo.
Posición simulada: Se espera que la IA supere ampliamente a las personas en el trabajo cognitivo.
Estas interpretaciones conservan las condiciones que se indicaron. Los beneficios y los daños pueden ser considerables a la vez. Los rangos describen cómo leemos sus respuestas simuladas, no intervalos de confianza estadísticos.
Visiones similares
Líderes de opinión cuyas visiones simuladas son las más cercanas a la de Noah Smith
Evaluación simulada
Fuentes
Artículos, entrevistas y textos usados para fundamentar a este usuario simulado.
The accessible introduction calls the consequences of godlike AI deeply unknowable. The remainder is paywalled; later public essays and interviews supply the substantive current position.

Publicly revises his earlier chatbot-focused dismissal after observing agentic coding. Autonomous tool use and economic pressure to remove humans from loops make catastrophic misuse more plausible. Remains comparatively skeptical of a near-term robot takeover.

Argues that combining human-like reasoning with computers’ exceptional recall and calculation already creates superhuman capabilities. Expects major scientific transformation; this is his broad definition of superintelligence, not a claim that every system is an autonomous omnipotent agent.

Speaker-labeled transcript: Noah at 07:21 endorses roughly 10% for catastrophic biological misuse. At 08:55 he expects survivors and is unsure about rebuilding. At 09:25 he declines to endorse the interviewer’s proposed 5% permanent-doom number. At 12:26–14:59 he identifies biological feasibility and resistance to jailbreaks as updates. At 17:49–18:18 he explains why malicious human use dominates his concern. Do not import Liron’s forecasts into Noah’s answers.

Clarifies that plentiful employment under extremely capable AI is possible, not guaranteed. Relative costs and constraints on AI supply can preserve human comparative advantage even when machines outperform people at every task.

Emphasizes humans’ comparative advantage in knowing what they want, with future work organized around directing AI. The accessible introduction supports this thesis; avoid inventing detailed empirical findings from inaccessible portions.

Assigns an informal 10% chance to AI-enabled bioterror bringing down civilization and 30% to world-changing destruction, without a precise horizon. Calls this much more serious than other AI harms while retaining enthusiasm for AI. These are not extinction odds; a separate annual-risk example is hypothetical, not his forecast.

Distinguishes replacing tasks from eliminating occupations. Interprets contemporary employment evidence as inconsistent with an imminent job apocalypse; expects humans to continue directing AI, without claiming that no occupation will ever disappear.

Argues that safety advocates need concrete threats that persuade skeptics and must address Chinese leaders’ incentives for coordinated pacing. Revises his earlier idea that merely staying ahead would produce cooperation: domestic threats from China’s own models could instead change its incentives.

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