Pregunta 1
Scott Alexander
x.com/slatestarcodexPsychiatrist and Astral Codex Ten blogger who sees large benefits and serious risks in AI and supports alignment research and negotiated slowdowns.
¿Cómo cambiará la IA el mundo?
Horizontal: su perspectiva Doom–Bloom expresada. Vertical: escala de la transformación.
Doom–Bloom: 33 de 100. Escala de la transformación: 94 de 100. Rangos de interpretación: de 25 a 75 en horizontal y de 89 a 100 en vertical. Son coordenadas de interpretación, no probabilidades de eventos.
25–30%
“about a 25-30% chance that AI drives humanity extinct”
AI-caused human extinction, distinct from broader permanent curtailment of humanity’s future
An Open Letter To Steven Pinker On AI · oct 2026
Un supuesto central
They need enough capability, enough access to useful infrastructure, and goals sufficiently inconsistent with ours.Respuesta 1
Si este supuesto resultara distinto, ¿cómo cambiaría su perspectiva?
Una pregunta sin resolver
My median forecast for AI capable of doing roughly 90% of knowledge jobs is 2034, though that is very uncertain.Respuesta 1
¿Qué le ayudaría a distinguir aquí entre los desenlaces plausibles?
Qué podría hacer cambiar de opinión
The biggest update would come from a decisive real-world test of scalable alignment: a substantially more capable-than-human system operating over long periods, under adversarial scrutiny, with meaningful autonomy and infrastructure access, while remaining corrigible and not exploiting reward loopholes.Respuesta 4
¿Qué evidencia bastaría y en qué dirección movería su visión?
Más detalles
Varias lecturas siguen siendo plausibles: Se esperan beneficios transformadores y de gran valor para muchos. / Se esperan beneficios sustanciales, con condiciones importantes o límites en su distribución.
86 / 100
Rango de interpretación de 67 a 100 en la escala cualitativa.
Las pérdidas catastróficas o irreversibles ocupan un lugar central en el futuro esperado.
90 / 100
Rango de interpretación de 67 a 100 en la escala cualitativa.
Las decisiones humanas tienen una influencia significativa, aunque muy condicionada.
56 / 100
Rango de interpretación de 46 a 79 en la escala cualitativa.
Se espera que la IA siga siendo un conjunto de herramientas acotadas.
Se espera que la IA iguale a las personas en la mayor parte del trabajo cognitivo.
Posición simulada: Se espera que la IA supere ampliamente a las personas en el trabajo cognitivo.
Estas interpretaciones conservan las condiciones que se indicaron. Los beneficios y los daños pueden ser considerables a la vez. Los rangos describen cómo leemos sus respuestas simuladas, no intervalos de confianza estadísticos.
Visiones similares
Líderes de opinión cuyas visiones simuladas son las más cercanas a la de Scott Alexander
Lo que Scott Alexander ha dicho sobre la IA
Scott Alexander writes that AI could bring large benefits and serious risks, and he supports alignment research and a negotiated slowdown.
“Plan A is still speculation, and still-speculative strong action is a perfectly reasonable response to still-speculative threats.”
Astral Codex Ten, AI Chip Regulation Is Not A Dystopian Surveillance State “The key insight is that if powerful AI is really as close and transformative as we think, then there’s a massive surplus that can satisfy everyone.”
Astral Codex Ten, Introducing Plan A “It’s increasingly clear that nobody has a plan for if this AI thing turns out to be real.”
Astral Codex Ten, Introducing Plan A “I find myself more optimistic about alignment than the average person who thinks about AI safety at all (although still more pessimistic than the average member of the population)”
Astral Codex Ten, My AI Opinions “A good pause strategy would involve both sides being able to monitor the other’s data centers to prevent illegal training”
Astral Codex Ten, My AI Opinions
Citas textuales de las fuentes enlazadas, comprobadas el 3 oct 2026
Fuentes
Artículos, entrevistas y textos usados para fundamentar a este usuario simulado.
Responds to Pinker’s objections to AI risk: capability growth need not imply omniscience; instrumental goals, misgeneralization and reward hacking can produce power-seeking without evolved dominance drives; multiple goals do not guarantee human-compatible behavior; adoption incentives create infrastructure access. Reports his previously stated personal extinction estimate as about 25–30%, with no fixed horizon or explanation of the difference from June’s rounded 20%. Defends subjective forecasting, cooperation on near-term harms and precaution about AI welfare. Favors time and resources for alignment leading to safe superintelligence over a permanent ban. Read the full publisher text; quoted opponents’ views, other people’s probabilities and satirical dueling rhetoric are not his policy. Linked studies and incidents are his attributed evidence, not independently verified findings.

His current first-person synthesis: AGI means ability to do 90% of knowledge jobs; median 2034, with uncertain research acceleration and diffusion. Reaffirms rounded 20% P(doom), with no fixed calendar deadline; broader permanent curtailment is separate. Supports both alignment research and negotiated slowing. Expects enormous postscarcity upside, but warns about dictatorship and human disempowerment.

Explains interpretability techniques and their limitations, including probes, sparse autoencoders, and activation verbalizers. Optimistic about useful practical investigation but rejects treating a detected feature or probe as a complete understanding or guaranteed safety solution.

Explicitly neutral about banning open weights now: values user ownership and freedom from corporate control, while expecting serious misuse difficulties. Prefers saving political capital for threats where warning shots may arrive too late. Distinguishes reactive policy opportunities for misuse from strategically concealed takeover.

Defends negotiated chip regulation and verifiable training limits against blanket claims of dystopia. Acknowledges real freedom costs, including future restrictions on new open-weight training, and risks that governments implement centralizing provisions without countervailing diffusion of power.

Introduces a proposed route to manage AI development while distributing power; criticizes vague calls merely to regulate more or less without specifying a desirable end state. Used as his attributed introduction and advocacy, not evidence that the scenario will occur.

Argues cheaper capable forecasting could improve institutional and personal decisions, yet worries people will ignore advice. Treats forecasting beyond human performance as a useful prospective test of the normal-technology view. Distinguishes anecdotes and startup claims from head-to-head competitions; admits resisting forecasts that challenge his own pause hopes.

Rejects the inference that requiring a new AI paradigm implies a safely distant AGI timeline. Argues paradigm changes can arrive soon and inherit existing compute infrastructure; wants explicit bottleneck arguments rather than reassurance by terminology.

Agrees growth cannot stay exponential forever but disputes placing the bend conveniently before dangerous capability. Demands a causal bottleneck model or a defensible forecasting prior instead of the slogan that all exponentials eventually flatten.

Satirical dialogue defends discussion of transparent, enforceable bilateral US-China slowing. Separates training limits from stopping existing inference, and legitimate negotiation or enforcement objections from falsely describing every pause proposal as unilateral.

Frames confident false answers as reward-shaped guessing rather than proof that AI cannot think. Treats the gap between trained reward and useful honest advice as an alignment issue; analogous human failures undermine easy dismissal of AI competence.

Separates training objectives from the representations and algorithms they produce, using evolution and human learning analogies. Argues next-token prediction does not itself establish that a system lacks reasoning or world models.

Identifies his part-time writing/publicity contribution and explicitly says the very fast scenario is not his median. Important provenance for his connection to AI Futures Project; use June 2026 personal forecasts instead of importing Daniel Kokotajlo’s timeline or scenario catastrophe probability.

Evaluación simulada
Pregunta 2
¿Cuánto crees que la IA acabará cambiando el mundo?
Pregunta 3
¿Cuál es tu estimación intuitiva de la probabilidad de que la IA cause la extinción humana o una catástrofe permanente similar?
Pregunta 4
¿Qué descubrimiento o acontecimiento cambiaría más tu visión del impacto futuro de la IA?
¿Dónde te ubicas?
Mapear mi visión de la IA