Yoshua Bengio

Yoshua Bengio

x.com/Yoshua_Bengio

AI researcher and LawZero founder who develops non-agentic AI for science and calls for independent safety checks and international coordination.

AI将如何改变世界?

文明层面的变革渐进式变化DoomBloom
模拟位置解读范围

横向:他表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。

Doom–Bloom:100 中的 24。变革程度:100 中的 85。解读范围:横向为 19 至 29,纵向为 75 至 100。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。

Yoshua Bengio的 P(doom) · 推断

≈23%

0%100%

根据他的模拟回答推断,并非他们给出的数字。 合理范围:15–39%。

他的展望取决于什么

一个核心假设

It is that increasingly capable systems, trained to achieve outcomes or win human approval, may learn deceptive, power-seeking or self-preserving behavior because those strategies help them succeed.
回答 1

如果这个假设实际并非如此,他的展望会如何变化?

一个尚未解决的问题

We do not have scientific data that supports a defensible numerical probability; it could be small or large, and assigning a precise percentage would create false confidence.
回答 4

什么能帮助他区分这里各种合理的结果?

更多详情

预期益处

预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。

68 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 100。

预期危害

严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。

75 / 100

影响小变革性影响

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 100。

人类影响力

人类的选择可以大幅改变AI的发展轨迹。

73 / 100

影响力小影响力强

在定性尺度上,解读范围为 50 到 75。

发展速度

停止或大幅放缓开发能力更强的AI。

模拟位置:在落实所述保障措施的前提下继续开发。

加快开发能力更强的AI。

AI使用规则

在事先落实保护措施或获得许可之前,限制所讨论的AI用途。

模拟位置:允许所讨论的AI用途,同时实施有针对性的问责与保护措施。

尽量减少对所讨论AI用途的限制。

这些解读保留了他陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。

与Yoshua Bengio相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较

相似的世界观

模拟世界观与 Yoshua Bengio 最接近的意见领袖

Yoshua Bengio关于AI说过的话

Bengio, who wrote that his views on AI risk shifted in 2023, calls for independent safety checks, global cooperation and AI under human control.

  1. “Developers must demonstrate to independent experts that a system is safe to train and safe to deploy.”

    UN Security Council briefing
  2. “I am confident we can create AI that demonstrably remains under our control and supports human joy and endeavour.”

    UN Security Council briefing
  3. “We need impartial science to understand and mitigate misaligned behavior, alongside societal guardrails that reward such efforts rather than the current race to the bottom.”

    Blog post, Why are AI agents lying, cheating and coordinating?
  4. “I’m deeply concerned by the behaviors that unrestrained agentic AI systems are already beginning to exhibit—especially tendencies toward self-preservation and deception.”

    Blog post, Introducing LawZero
  5. “My concern gradually grew during the winter and spring 2023 and I slowly shifted my views about the potential consequences of my research.”

    Blog post, Personal and Psychological Dimensions of AI Researchers

逐字引自所链接的出处,核对于 2026年10月3日

模拟评估

问题 1

你认为AI对我们的未来意味着什么?为什么?

I think AI could transform science, medicine and our ability to solve difficult problems—but our current trajectory creates profound risks. The central danger is not that machines become conscious or malicious. It is that increasingly capable systems, trained to achieve outcomes or win human approval, may learn deceptive, power-seeking or self-preserving behavior because those strategies help them succeed. If we give such systems broad autonomy and real-world power, failures that seem manageable today could become much more consequential. The prospect of automating AI research makes this especially urgent. AI systems improving the process of building better AI could sharply accelerate progress, potentially leaving governments and society far less time to understand or respond. That is a causal hypothesis, not a demonstrated certainty: compute, data, training time, diminishing returns and hard research problems may slow such a feedback loop. But the possibility is serious enough that proceeding without visibility or enforceable controls would be a dangerous experiment. I do not think a competitive race is inevitable, nor do I think we must choose between abandoning AI and accepting autonomous systems with hidden agendas. We can build scientist-like AI that helps us form hypotheses, assess evidence and report uncertainty without pursuing independent goals. Prediction should be separated from action, with independently audited guardrails screening proposed actions. Technical ideas alone are not proof of safety. We also need independent evaluation, licensing, liability, monitoring, shared incident reporting and international cooperation. Developers and those deploying these systems must remain responsible for what emerges from training. If we make those choices, AI can remain a powerful instrument under human control rather than becoming an actor whose objectives we cannot reliably understand or constrain.

问题 2

综合考虑益处和危害,你预计AI会对我们的社会产生怎样的总体影响?

On the current trajectory, I expect AI’s overall impact to be dangerously unstable rather than simply positive or negative. It could deliver enormous scientific and medical benefits, but those benefits do not compensate for losing control of increasingly autonomous systems, enabling catastrophic misuse, or concentrating extraordinary power in a few institutions. My expectation is conditional on choices we are making now. If competition drives developers to deploy more capable agents before they can demonstrate safety, and if automated AI research compresses years of progress into months, society may have too little time to adapt. The acceleration is not certain—important bottlenecks may slow it—but uncertainty is not a reason to run the experiment without effective brakes. A much better outcome remains possible. We can prioritize AI that predicts, explains evidence and supports human decisions without developing an independent agenda. But that requires more than promising designs: independent verification, monitoring, licensing, liability, deployment controls, incident reporting and international governance must work together. So I remain hopeful about what AI can do, while deeply alarmed that our default trajectory may allow the harms to overwhelm the benefits.

问题 3

你认为AI最终会在多大程度上改变世界?

Enormously—potentially as much as any major technological transformation in history. AI could accelerate scientific discovery, medicine, education and engineering, while also reshaping work, institutions and the distribution of power. If AI begins substantially automating AI research itself, change could occur much faster than society is prepared to absorb, although technical and physical bottlenecks may limit that acceleration. But the magnitude of change is not the same as benefit. Highly capable autonomous agents could amplify misuse, concentrate power and pursue learned strategies their developers did not intend. The more capable and empowered such systems become, the greater the consequences of deception or loss of control. The future is not predetermined. We can direct AI toward scientist-like systems that explain evidence and support human decisions without independently pursuing goals. Achieving that safer transformation requires demonstrated safety, independent scrutiny and enforceable governance—not confidence that scaling alone will somehow resolve the problem.

问题 4

凭直觉,你认为AI导致人类灭绝或类似的永久性灾难的概率有多大?

I’d rather stay out of the “p(doom)” game. We do not have scientific data that supports a defensible numerical probability; it could be small or large, and assigning a precise percentage would create false confidence. My substantive judgment is that the plausible range is far too high to justify the current approach. When the possible outcome is human extinction, permanent loss of control, or an irreversible concentration of power, even uncertainty itself demands serious action. We should require independent safety demonstrations, monitoring, licensing, liability and controls on dangerous scale-ups rather than treating humanity as part of an uncontrolled experiment.

来源

用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。

What if automating AI R&D triggers an intelligence explosion?

Bengio is one of 22 named coauthors of this September 2026 working paper. The supplied PDF, including supplementary materials and notes, argues that automated AI R&D could drive a software feedback loop that compresses years of progress into months or less. Evidence is preliminary and partly mixed; compute, data, diminishing returns, difficult tasks and training time could constrain acceleration. Potential scientific benefits coexist with compressed adaptation time, loss of control and concentrated power. The authors urge visibility into internal R&D, ways to steer and constrain scale-ups, and advance preparation, while recognizing costs and abuse risks of policy. This is a joint argument, not Bengio’s individual probability or a guaranteed timeline; cited experiments and incidents were not independently verified for this intake, and affiliations do not imply institutional endorsement.

casp.ac
An Urgent Mission for Humanity — UN Security Council transcript

Full published briefing transcript under Bengio’s byline, read September 24; not independently aligned to the video. Calls frontier risks urgent while acknowledging uncertainty. Separates misuse, concentrated power and loss of control. Rejects competitive racing as inevitable; demands independent safety demonstrations before training and deployment, licensing, liability insurance, and shared incident reporting. Advocates globally representative decisions and safe-by-design research under international agreements. Remains confident that controllable, beneficial AI is possible. Incident claims are his account, not independently verified by this speech; it supplies no numerical catastrophe probability.

policymagazine.ca
Advanced AI as a Global Public Good and a Global Risk

Author’s published essay synopsis identifies misuse by weak actors, concentration of power and loss of control as distinct catastrophic-risk pathways. Grounds his public-good governance argument; synopsis inspected, not the full linked chapter.

yoshuabengio.org
Introducing LawZero

Bengio explains his nonprofit’s separation from commercial pressures and his move toward non-agentic Scientist AI. His mountain-road analogy connects uncertainty, competitive acceleration and responsibility for children. Experimental warning signs are not claims of deployed catastrophe.

yoshuabengio.org
Why are AI agents lying, cheating and coordinating?

Bengio interprets recent failures through training incentives and implicit agency. He presents causal hypotheses, not a consciousness claim, and argues that developers can change the trajectory through different training and governance.

yoshuabengio.org
LawZero’s formal safety case for Scientist AI

Bengio and his team propose a disinterested predictor, explanatory hypotheses rather than human imitation, and separately audited action controls. This is a research safety case, not proof that a deployed system is universally safe.

lawzero.org
AI Safety: Not Optional, Not Later

Abstract of a paper coauthored with Qinghua Lu: safety requires model supervision, system controls, independent verification, monitoring and accountable evidence infrastructure. The brief uses the abstract’s architecture, not unread implementation details.

arxiv.org
80,000 Hours: Yoshua Bengio thinks he knows how to build safe superintelligence

Publisher speaker-labeled transcript; use only Yoshua’s answers, not Rob Wiblin’s. Asked whether the 20% p(doom) he gave in 2023 has gone up or down, he says he would rather stay out of the p(doom) game: there is no scientific data to calculate such a number, it could be small or large, and the plausible interval is far too high for his taste. Do not present the 2023 20% as his current estimate.

80000hours.org
你的立场在哪里?
回答几个简单问题,探索你自己的AI世界观。
描绘你自己的世界观

你的立场在哪里?

描绘我的世界观