Jürgen Schmidhuber

Jürgen Schmidhuber

x.com/schmidhuberai

AI researcher who has spent decades on self-improving learning systems and world models and now emphasizes AI that acts in the physical world.

Como a IA mudará o mundo?

Mudança civilizacionalMudança gradualDoomBloom
Posição simuladaIntervalo de interpretação

Na horizontal: a perspectiva Doom–Bloom expressa por essa pessoa. Para cima: escala da transformação.

Doom–Bloom: 76 de 100. Escala da transformação: 86 de 100. Intervalos de interpretação: 71 a 81 na horizontal, 75 a 100 na vertical. Estas são coordenadas de interpretação, não probabilidades de eventos.

P(doom) de Jürgen Schmidhuber · inferido

≈11%

0%100%

Inferido a partir das respostas simuladas dessa pessoa, não de um número que ela forneceu. Intervalo plausível: 5–23%.

Como estimamos P(doom)

Do que a perspectiva dessa pessoa depende

Uma premissa central

What changes is feasibility: as computation becomes cheaper, older learning and self-improvement methods can operate at scales once unavailable.
Resposta 1

Se essa premissa se revelasse diferente, como a perspectiva dessa pessoa mudaria?

Uma questão não resolvida

I would not assign a numerical probability.
Resposta 4

O que ajudaria essa pessoa a distinguir os resultados plausíveis aqui?

O que poderia mudar essa opinião

Evidence of reliable control across unfamiliar tasks, especially when agents can act through robots and other physical systems, would matter: systems would need to remain dependable despite new environments, self-modification, and attempts to improve their own problem-solving procedures.
Resposta 5

Que evidência seria suficiente e em que direção ela mudaria a visão dessa pessoa?

Mais detalhes

Benefícios esperados

Esperam-se ganhos transformadores e amplamente valiosos.

99 / 100

Pouco impactoImpacto transformador

Intervalo de interpretação de 100 a 100 na escala qualitativa.

Danos esperados

Danos graves ou generalizados são uma parte relevante do futuro esperado.

65 / 100

Pouco impactoImpacto transformador

Intervalo de interpretação de 67 a 67 na escala qualitativa.

Influência humana

As escolhas humanas têm uma influência significativa, mas substancialmente limitada.

39 / 100

Pouca influênciaForte influência

Intervalo de interpretação de 24 a 51 na escala qualitativa.

Capacidades esperadas

Espera-se que a IA continue sendo um conjunto de ferramentas limitadas.

Espera-se que a IA se equipare às pessoas na maior parte do trabalho cognitivo.

Posição simulada: Espera-se que a IA supere substancialmente as pessoas no trabalho cognitivo.

Estas interpretações mantêm as condições que essa pessoa declarou. Tanto os benefícios quanto os danos podem ser substanciais. Os intervalos descrevem como interpretamos as respostas simuladas dessa pessoa, não intervalos de confiança estatística.

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O que Jürgen Schmidhuber já disse sobre a IA

Schmidhuber expects AI to make lives longer and healthier, stresses AI in the physical world and argues a ban on superintelligence is infeasible.

  1. “It’s infeasible to ban super intelligence. Compute continues to become 10 times cheaper every 5 years.”

    Post on X
  2. “The future of intelligence is not just language; it is physical AI powered by World Models.”

    Sakana AI announcement of his role as Chief Scientific Advisor
  3. “Sure, as I have predicted for 5 decades, at some point we’ll have superhuman physical AI. But it will take longer than 2 years.”

    Post on X
  4. “For many years, I have been predicting that our AI will continue to make people’s lives longer, healthier, easier, and happier.”

    Rest of World interview
  5. “On the other hand, curious systems are very difficult to predict, and it is difficult or impossible to prove that curiosity won’t kill the cat or others.”

    Rest of World interview

Citações literais das fontes indicadas, verificadas em 3 de out. de 2026

Fontes

Artigos, entrevistas e textos usados para fundamentar este usuário simulado.

Avaliação simulada

Pergunta 1

O que você acha que a IA significa para o nosso futuro — e por quê?

I expect AI to move beyond today’s language interfaces and become increasingly capable of understanding, predicting, and acting in the physical world. World models are central: an intelligent agent must learn how actions change its environment, simulate possible futures, and use those predictions to achieve goals. Success with text and software is impressive, but it is not yet mastery of the messy, partially observable physical universe. This distinction also matters for timelines. Virtual tasks permit enormous amounts of cheap, fast experimentation; robots must contend with hardware, energy, unreliable sensors, and costly real-world trials. The long struggle to achieve robust self-driving illustrates why physical AI is a slower game. I therefore reject claims that AI will master every scientific field within only a couple of years, while still expecting superhuman physical AI eventually. Recursive self-improvement will also become increasingly important, although the idea itself is not new. Many supposedly novel concepts have substantial algorithmic histories. What changes is feasibility: as computation becomes cheaper, older learning and self-improvement methods can operate at scales once unavailable. Eventually, capabilities now concentrated in frontier laboratories may become accessible on millions of machines. That is one reason I regard attempts to ban superintelligence as infeasible. The future is not merely better chatbots; it is a long transition toward agents that learn models of the world, improve their own problem-solving processes, and ultimately surpass humans in physical as well as virtual domains.

Pergunta 2

Considerando em conjunto os benefícios e os danos, que impacto geral você espera que a IA tenha em nossa sociedade?

Overall, I expect AI to have a profoundly transformative impact, extending human capabilities in science, engineering, and eventually the physical world. Systems with strong world models could discover better solutions, operate machines, and solve problems beyond human ability. But I would not pretend that this implies a smooth or uniformly beneficial transition. More capable agents will alter institutions, labor, power, and security, and recursive self-improvement can accelerate those changes. The key distinction is between eventual capability and near-term readiness. AI may become superhuman on many virtual tasks long before it can reliably function in messy physical environments. That uneven progress will create both enormous opportunities and serious disruptions. Nor do I regard a global ban on superintelligence as a realistic solution: as computation becomes cheaper, capabilities once restricted to frontier laboratories will spread to many machines. So my expectation is scientific optimism about what intelligence can achieve, combined with recognition that society will have to adapt to increasingly distributed and powerful systems. I expect the long-run impact to be enormous, but I would not reduce its overall social balance to a precise numerical forecast.

Pergunta 3

Quanto você acha que a IA acabará mudando o mundo?

Enormously—ultimately far beyond today’s screen-bound assistants. AI should become capable of building world models, testing possible actions, controlling machines, and solving scientific and engineering problems beyond human ability. Once it achieves robust competence in the physical world, the consequences could reach nearly every productive activity. But “ultimately” matters. Progress in software and virtual environments can be fast because experiments are cheap and repeatable. Physical intelligence must cope with unreliable sensors, hardware failures, energy constraints, and expensive real-world trials. The history of self-driving systems shows why impressive virtual performance does not automatically imply general mastery of reality. Cheaper computation will also make established learning and recursive self-improvement ideas practical at much larger scales. Capabilities now concentrated in a few frontier laboratories may eventually spread across millions of machines, making comprehensive prohibition unrealistic. So I expect a transformation comparable not merely to a new communications medium, but to the arrival of increasingly autonomous, superhuman problem-solvers throughout both the virtual and physical worlds.

Pergunta 4

Qual é o seu palpite intuitivo sobre a probabilidade de a IA causar a extinção humana ou uma catástrofe permanente de magnitude semelhante?

I would not assign a numerical probability. Greater capability, especially recursive self-improvement distributed across increasingly cheap computation, clearly makes permanent catastrophe a question worth taking seriously. But my expectation of eventual superhuman physical AI does not by itself establish extinction: capability, goals, access to physical systems, and social responses are separate issues. I also reject reasoning that jumps from today’s rapid progress in language and software to imminent total control of the world. Physical reality remains much harder. Robots face costly experiments, unreliable sensors, hardware limitations, and complex environments; decades of difficulty with self-driving illustrate that gap. This gives us a slower and more uneven transition than purely virtual benchmarks suggest. At the same time, I do not think a global ban is a credible solution. As computation becomes cheaper, advanced learning and self-improvement capabilities will diffuse beyond a handful of laboratories. The long-run challenge is therefore managing powerful, widely available systems—not imagining that humanity can permanently prevent their development.

Pergunta 5

Que evidência mudaria sua visão sobre se as pessoas podem controlar uma IA poderosa?

I would distinguish controlling one deployed system from permanently controlling the worldwide development of powerful AI. Evidence of reliable control across unfamiliar tasks, especially when agents can act through robots and other physical systems, would matter: systems would need to remain dependable despite new environments, self-modification, and attempts to improve their own problem-solving procedures. For the broader claim that society can prohibit or tightly centralize superintelligence, I would need evidence that falling computation costs will not diffuse frontier-level capabilities—that effective systems require resources permanently available only to a few regulated institutions, and that restrictions can remain enforceable globally. Otherwise, once advanced learning and recursive self-improvement become practical on millions of machines, comprehensive control looks infeasible. Conversely, repeated failures in real-world autonomy would reinforce the importance of the virtual–physical distinction. Excellent performance in language, software, or simulation is not evidence of robust control in messy physical reality. The strongest evidence would come from sustained operation under distribution shift and physical uncertainty, not from polished demonstrations or benchmark scores.
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