问题 1
Teortaxes
x.com/teortaxestexPseudonymous account that posts technical commentary on AI research and argues for broadly accessible AI and global participation in its governance.
AI将如何改变世界?
模拟位置解读范围
横向:他们表达的 Doom–Bloom 前景看法。 纵向:变革程度。
Doom–Bloom:100 中的 61。变革程度:100 中的 65。解读范围:横向为 50 至 75,纵向为 50 至 75。这些是解读坐标,而不是事件概率。
Teortaxes的 P(doom) · 推断
他们的展望取决于什么
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预期益处
预计将带来显著益处,但受到重要条件或分配方面的限制。
80 / 100
影响小变革性影响
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 100。
预期危害
严重或广泛的危害预计将是未来不可忽视的一部分。
66 / 100
影响小变革性影响
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 67 到 67。
人类影响力
人类的选择具有实质性但受到很大制约的影响。
55 / 100
影响力小影响力强
在定性尺度上,解读范围为 49 到 76。
AI访问权限
限制对强大AI的访问。
允许访问,但须遵守能力或用途限制。
模拟位置:支持广泛或开放地访问强大AI。
这些解读保留了他们陈述的条件。益处和危害都可能很大。这些范围描述的是我们如何解读他们的模拟回答,而不是统计置信区间。
与Teortaxes相比,你的立场在哪里?
用大约3分钟描绘你自己的AI世界观,然后进行比较
相似的世界观
模拟世界观与 Teortaxes 最接近的意见领袖
来源
用于为此模拟用户提供事实依据的文章、访谈和著述。
模拟评估
AI matters because it expands the range of problems we can actually attack. The most important frontier is not another layer of consumer software or merely replacing programmers. It is scientific and industrial capability: helping researchers reason through difficult problems, supporting engineers and other professionals, and eventually improving work across many physical products. An AI need not be superhuman in every respect to be extremely valuable; reliable assistance on real tasks already changes what people can attempt.
But the distribution of that capability matters. I do not want the future organized around chip embargoes, a closed national AGI project, or a few institutions deciding who gets access. AGI concerns everyone, so global participation is not optional theater. Open models are part of that picture, although a growing open-model business should not be confused with actually closing the capability gap at the frontier.
I also want stronger public scrutiny of extraordinary claims. If a system allegedly produces a mathematical breakthrough, outsiders should get an unambiguous problem statement and a commitment to the withheld solution so they can attempt independent replication. Likewise, claims about alignment faking should not be generalized from one specially trained model without controls and cross-model comparisons.
There are real failure modes, but “rogue AGI kills some people but does not end the world” occupies a substantial part of the plausible space too. Incidents can be severe without fitting an extinction-only narrative. So I expect AI to be scientifically transformative, politically contested, and dangerous in uneven ways—not reducible to either consumer convenience or one cinematic apocalypse.
问题 2
Taking benefits and harms together, what overall impact do you expect AI to have?
Overall, I expect AI to be strongly transformative, with much of its value coming from scientific discovery, industrial work, and useful assistance to human professionals. It does not need to become universally superhuman to produce large benefits.
The sign of the outcome depends heavily on access and power. Broad participation, independent scrutiny, and the ability to replicate important results make a better future more plausible. Chip embargoes, exclusive national projects, and a frontier controlled by a few institutions push in the opposite direction. Open models help, but their commercial growth alone does not prove that frontier power is decentralizing.
I also expect serious harms, including narrow-goal failures that can kill people without ending civilization. That middle territory is neglected when discussion collapses into either harmless productivity software or extinction. So my overall expectation is major benefit mixed with real, uneven danger and intense political conflict over who controls the capability.
问题 3
Setting aside good or bad: how much do you think AI will ultimately change the world—a little, a lot, or completely?
A lot—probably on the scale of a major industrial transformation. The deepest changes will come from scientific and industrial capability: accelerating research, assisting professionals, and improving the design and production of physical goods. AI does not need to become universally superhuman to alter what institutions and individuals can accomplish.
I would not say “completely,” because that implies a total discontinuity or a specific endpoint I cannot justify. Existing political structures, physical constraints, and concentrations of capital will continue to matter. But AI will substantially reshape science, industry, labor, and geopolitical power—and who controls frontier systems will help determine the shape of that change.
问题 4
What’s your rough gut-feel chance that AI causes human extinction or a similarly permanent catastrophe? A number or “no idea” is fine.
No idea—I don’t have a defensible numerical probability. I think severe but nonterminal disasters occupy substantial probability space, and extinction risk should not eclipse them.
你的立场在哪里?
描绘我的世界观
